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ABSTRACT 
We are all familiar with the overwhelming number of usernames and passwords 
needed in our daily life in the networked world. Services need to identify their end 
users and keep record on them. Traditionally, this has been done by providing the 
end user with an extra username and password for each new service. Managing all 
these isolated user identities is painful for the end user and work-intensive for the 
service owner. Having out-of-date user accounts and privileges is also a security 
threat for an organisation. 
Identity management refers to the process of representing and recognising entities 
as digital identities in computer networks. In an organisation, an end user’s identity 
has a lifecycle. An identity is created when the user enters the organisation; for ex-
ample, a new employee is hired, a student is admitted in a school or a company 
gets a new customer. Changes in the end user’s affiliation to the organisation are 
reflected to his identity, and when the end user departs, his identity needs to be re-
voked. Organisational identity management develops and maintains an architecture 
that supports maintenance of user identities during their life cycle. In cross-
organisational identity management, these identities are used also when accessing 
services that are outside the organisation.  
This thesis studies identity management in organisational and cross-organisational 
services. An organisation’s motivations for improving identity management are 
presented. Attention is paid to how the person registries in an organisation should 
be interconnected to introduce an aggregated view on an end user’s identity. Con-
nection between identity management and introduction of more reliable authentica-
tion methods is shown. The author suggests what needs to be taken into account in 
a usable deployment of single sign-on and PKI for authentication. 
Federated identity management is a new way to implement end user identity man-
agement in services that cross organisational boundaries. This thesis studies how to 
establish a federation, an association of organisations that wants to exchange in-
formation about their users and services to enable cross-organisational collabora-
tions and transactions. The author presents guidelines for organising a federation 
and preserving an end user’s privacy in it. Finally, common use scenarios for fed-
erated identity management are presented. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This section first provides a short description of identity management and its posi-
tion and motivation in an organisation. Background, motivation, goals and research 
methods of this thesis are introduced next. Finally, an overview of the subsequent 
sections is presented. 
1.1. Positioning Identity Management 
When a new person needs to be represented in an information system, a new iden-
tity is created for him. This may require adding a new record to a user database, is-
suing him a username and a password for authentication and granting him access 
to resources he needs to use. Identity management and related concepts of identity, 
authentication, authorisation and auditing are going to be introduced in detail in 
Section 2. 
Identity management is not a new subject of interest. Since the early years of in-
formation technology, computers have stored and processed person records.  User 
accounts have been used for separating end users’ processes and files already years 
before networks and the Internet. When a user has needed to access his user ac-
counts, he has proved the ownership of the account by typing in a password. 
The proliferation of the Internet, especially the World Wide Web, has lead to a 
situation where each end user has a multitude of user accounts in systems managed 
by different organisations and placed around the Internet. It has been relatively 
easy for the system owners to set up a new isolated user database for each service. 
However, for common end users, the number of separate usernames and passwords 
has become unmanageable.  
To manage the increasing complexity, there have been attempts to detach the iden-
tity management from services and establish a separate middleware layer between 
the network and the services to take care of tasks related to end users’ identities 
and authentication (Figure 1). The middleware layer can span one organisation (or-
ganisational identity management, c.f. local area network, LAN) or several organi-
sations (cross-organisational identity management, c.f. wide area network, WAN). 
However, so far, the attempts to establish a single Internet-wide identity manage-
ment system (such as a global X.500 directory [ITUT05] or Microsoft Passport 
[MICR04, OPPL04]) have not succeeded.  
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Figure 1. Identity management as a middleware layer between the network 
and services 
During recent years, identity management has grown into an area of interest of its 
own, with its roots in other topics, such as computer security. Identity management 
is also motivated by efficiency and the potential new business opportunities it may 
provide. Table 1 depicts organisations’ motivations for identity management; i.e. 
what kind of results an organisation is expecting from an investment in identity 
management. 
Table 1. Motivations for an organisation to invest in identity management 
Motivation Focus 
Information security Adequate protection with minimal costs. Balancing costs 
and risks 
Efficiency Investing in identity management to get cost reductions 
by increased efficiency 
New business oppor-
tunities 
Investing in identity management to get new revenue or 
to enable new ways of operation that have not been pos-
sible otherwise 
An obvious motivation for identity management is information security. Their 
close relationship is apparent in the definition of computer security as the preven-
tion and detection of unauthorised actions by users of a computer system 
[GOLL99:9]. From an information security perspective, identity management is a 
necessity for an organisation’s business. It does not bring competitive advantage 
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regarding competitors, but its poor implementation may risk the organisation and 
its reputation. Identity management is considered mostly an expense that risk man-
agement tries to balance with the potential loss of realised risks. The goal is to im-
plement adequate protection with minimal costs. 
Maintaining an individual’s identities in several isolated systems causes inefficien-
cies for the organisation and for the end user who needs to remember multiple 
usernames and passwords. The second motivation for identity management in an 
organisation is efficiency. Investments in identity management are expected to lead 
to reduced costs by eliminating overlapping work. In addition, the quality of in-
formation increases as the amount of overlapping (and, sooner or later, conflicting) 
information is reduced. 
The third and maybe the most challenging motivation is the potential for busi-
nesses that would not have been otherwise possible or would have been too cum-
bersome for end users. This covers both potential new revenues for companies and 
new, more flexible ways to organise the internal services of an organisation. Poten-
tial for new businesses is especially in cross-organisational (a.k.a. federated) iden-
tity management, which is still a new and evolving area with undiscovered busi-
ness opportunities. 
It is worth noticing, that the three motivations presented above are not conflicting 
with each other. Instead, they can be considered as alternative perspectives of the 
same issue, each of them emphasising different objectives. If planned well, actions 
taken to improve an organisation’s identity management are able to gain results 
that serve all the three dimensions. For instance, reducing the number of independ-
ent usernames and passwords increases efficiency (the users need not remember 
and IT support needs not maintain so many of them) and information security (if 
there are fewer passwords the users are able to remember them and do not need to 
write them down). 
The three motivations also demonstrate the interdisciplinary nature of identity 
management and this thesis. Besides information security, identity management 
can be studied also in a larger context of computer science and engineering (for in-
stance, communications, software and systems engineering) or information sys-
tems science (which introduces the management and financial perspectives to the 
topic). Nevertheless, it can be argued that information security provides a good 
starting point for a study on identity management, because even a highly efficient 
and advanced identity management architecture is useless if it is insecure. 
The focus of this thesis is identity management from the point of view of an or-
ganisation which provides end users with services, and, thus, needs to take care of 
identity management in those services. An end user is a person having a relation-
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ship to the organisation, such as being an employee, a student or a customer. The 
relationship also characterises the life cycle of the identity, including its creation, 
maintenance and removal. 
It can be questioned how restrictive this limitation of focus actually is. A funda-
mental characteristic of organisational identity management is that the organisation 
has an interest to ensure the quality of the end users’ identities, and this holds true 
for most scenarios including those of an employee, a student and a customer 
above. Services where the end users represent themselves, not an organisation such 
as their employer, are maybe the opposite scenario. User-centric identity manage-
ment technologies [BHAR06] (such as OpenID [RECO06, RECO06b]) try to cover 
this scenario. 
1.2. Background and Motivation  
In Finland, there are 20 universities and 29 polytechnics with 41 200 employees, 
307 300 degree students and 174 200 other students in the Ministry of Education 
sector [MINE06, MINE06b]. Having more than half a million potential end users 
with considerable turnover, identity management is a notable challenge for Finnish 
higher education. Students and employees are skilled Internet users and in the in-
stitutions they have a modern IT environment in place. This makes higher educa-
tion institutions a prominent laboratory for identity management related research 
and engineering. 
Since 2000, I have been working in identity management related activities in Fin-
nish higher education. My first assignment was the FEIDHE project, a common 
project for the IT service units in Finnish universities and polytechnics, which 
looked for ways to make use of PKI and smart cards for authentication of univer-
sity staff and students. The project was concluded in 2002 and I and my colleagues 
published the results (Publication 2) in the annual conference of EUNIS, the asso-
ciation of European universities’ IT service units. 
After the authentication-focused FEIDHE project, improving organisational iden-
tity management in general was considered important. In other words, whereas the 
FEIDHE project aimed at replacing the password with a smart-card-based authen-
tication, the follow-up activities focused to end users having just one username in 
their organisation. Current and best practices of the institutes were collected and 
disseminated in a series of workshops called School in User Administration, 
which, over a three year period, covered the staff responsible for identity manage-
ment in 69 percent of the institutions. The School in User Administration is de-
scribed in Publication 1. 
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During the projects, cross-organisational (a.k.a. federated) use of resources was 
identified as an item of interest. Universities and polytechnics co-operated by shar-
ing IT services, and cross-organisational identity management was expected to 
ease their use. Federated identity management had also become a subject of re-
search [e.g. BUEL03, SHIM05].  
The Haka project, another project initiated by the IT service units in Finnish uni-
versities and polytechnics, studied federated identity, based on open source imple-
mentations developed by the US universities.  In February 2004, the project was 
concluded and the results proposed the establishment of the Haka federation, the 
identity federation of Finnish higher education, which was launched in May 2005. 
I have been strongly involved in the development, coordination and operation of 
the federation. Publication 3, Publication 4, Publication 5 and Publication 6 have 
been made in connection with this work. 
1.3. Research Goals  
Research in IT must address the design tasks faced by practitioners [MARC95]. 
The goal of this thesis is to build and validate models and a methodology for or-
ganisational and cross-organisational identity management. As a part of the thesis, 
instantiations of organisational and cross-organisational identity management are 
built, evaluated and theorised. 
A lot of enabling technology is already available for organisational [PERK07] and 
cross-organisational [RAGO06, LIBE07] identity management, but there are not so 
many research results on how to organise the use of this technology in a way that 
also takes into account issues like privacy laws and usability. This thesis is mostly 
focused on cross-organisational identity management, but because the cross-
organisational dimension builds on organisational identity management, they are 
both covered in this thesis. 
1.4. Research Methods 
The taxonomy of research methods by Järvinen [JÄRV01] is presented in Figure 2. 
On the top level, research approaches are divided into the approaches studying re-
ality and the approaches studying mathematics, i.e. symbolic systems such as for-
mal languages and algebraic units. Approaches studying reality are split into the 
approaches stressing utility of innovations and the approaches stressing what real-
ity is. Approaches for innovation (a.k.a. constructivism) are further divided to 
building and evaluating innovations. Research stressing what reality is is divided 
into conceptual-analytical approaches and empirical studies, which is further split 
to theory-testing approaches and theory-creating approaches. 
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Figure 2. Taxonomy of research methods [JÄRV01] 
Physics is considered a prototype of empirical approaches testing theory. The goal 
is to model reality to an extent that makes it predictable. Sciences like sociology 
and psychology are empirical sciences that try to understand the world and create 
theories explaining it. Design sciences are considered research stressing utility of 
innovations. Whereas natural sciences try to understand reality, design science at-
tempts to build technical, organisational and other innovations that serve human 
purpose. Its products are assessed against criteria of value or utility – does it work? 
[JÄRV01, MARC95] 
The main research method of this thesis is constructivism. However, Publication 3 
on usability is based on empirical approach. For Publication 3 we used focus group 
discussions and quantitative test sessions to create and test a theory on “what the 
world is”, in this case, how do users expect an easy-to-use system to work. The re-
search outputs of the publications are further elaborated in Section 8. 
1.5. Structure of the Thesis and the Author’s Contribution 
Section 2 introduces basic concepts for this thesis, including identity, authentica-
tion, authorisation and auditing. Section 3 places the concepts in the context of an 
organisation, making end users employees of an employer, students of a school, 
customers of a company and so on, depending on the context. The section and re-
lated publications contain the author’s findings in organisational identity manage-
ment, including typical shortcomings. Based on a significant practical experiment, 
recommendations and guidelines for deployment of a PKI based authentication 
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system are presented. Additionally, the first empirical study available in the litera-
ture regarding usability of logout in a single-sign on system is presented, supple-
mented by guidelines for designers of future systems. 
The rest of the thesis is devoted to cross-organisational a.k.a. federated identity 
management, where end users use services provided by other organisations than 
their home organisation. Section 4 introduces the concept of federated identity 
management. The author has presented its requirements and one of the first inter-
pretations of what implications the EU privacy laws impose on a compliant de-
ployment. Section 5 presents organisational aspects of federated identity manage-
ment, including the concept of a federation. The author has presented an analysis 
on the possible alternative ways to organise a federation and the reasoning why 
one of the alternatives was selected for deployment in Finnish higher education. 
Some other examples of existing federations are also presented.  
Finally, Section 6 suggests ways to make use of federated identity, and presents 
some application areas for it. As an example application of federated identity, the 
author has presented one of the first adoptions of federated identity for authorisa-
tion of network access. Section 7 concludes the thesis. Additionally, Section 8 pre-
sents research outputs and activities and the author’s contribution in the publica-
tions. 
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2. CONCEPTS OF IDENTITY MANAGEMENT 
In this section, the basic concepts of identity management are introduced. The per-
spective of identity management in an organisation is emphasised. The section is 
concluded as an analysis of the concepts in a timeline.  
2.1. Identity and Identifiers 
A digital identity is an abstraction of an individual1 in information systems. In 
computer sciences, it is important to distinguish the concept of digital identity from 
the concept of identity in the psychological and sociological sciences. In psychol-
ogy, identity means the distinguishing character or personality of an individual 
[MERR07]. In order to determine their identity, people try to discover who they 
are, what their strengths are and what kinds of roles they are best suited to play in 
their life [FELD99:446]. However, in computer sciences, the digital identity is not 
anything more than bits and bytes. From this on, for brevity, we call digital identity 
just an identity. 
An identity consists of attributes, which are any kind of characteristics associated 
to the individual [CAMP04]. Some attributes describe the demographic properties 
(such as age and sex) or preferences (such as preferred language) of the individual. 
Some attributes (such as a customer number or employee’s job title) describe his 
relationship to a particular organisation. Liu et al [LIU04] call these attributes the 
organisational (or position) identity, as opposite to the personal (or agent) identity. 
Attributes that uniquely identify the individual within a context of a specific name-
space are particularly interesting; they are called identifiers [CAMP04]. Each 
namespace has an authority that controls the namespace and is responsible for 
maintaining the uniqueness of the identifiers. For instance, IT services unit of 
Tampere University of Technology (TUT) ensures that the email address mi-
kael.linden belongs at most to one individual at a time2. However, in a namespace 
other than TUT, the identifier mikael.linden may be assigned to another person.  
Identifiers, such as email addresses, usernames and employee numbers, have or-
ganisation-oriented namespaces. Typically, it is necessary for an organisation to 
                                                
1 Other principals, such as legal persons and computers, also have digital identities with attributes 
such as street addresses, domain names, IP addresses etc. However, in this thesis, only human 
users are considered.  
2 Actually, it may be desirable to preserve some uniqueness over time, as well. When a user de-
parts TUT reserves his email address for two years before it can be reassigned to another person 
[TUT07]. This is considered as an adequate protection to prevent the emails of the new and previ-
ous email address owner from being mixed. Other identifiers, such as social security numbers, are 
never expected to be reassigned. 
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assign several identifiers to an individual. Information systems need to uniquely 
identify all user accounts, and if an existing identifier cannot cover the user base of 
the system, a new locally administered identifier needs to be introduced. External 
identifiers, such as the national identification numbers that governments assign to 
citizens, cause difficulties for the same reason; a foreign user does not have one, 
not necessarily even in his home country, because some countries do not use them 
[OTJA06]. In Europe, the national identification numbers are also considered sen-
sitive [OTJA06]. 
Hierarchies can be used for making the local identifiers globally unique. Parts of a 
hierarchical namespace can be delegated to subordinate naming authorities. For in-
stance, the Domain Name System (DNS) [RFC1035] of the Internet ensures that 
the identifier mikael.linden@tut.fi is globally unique in the SMTP based Internet 
email system. Respectively, the X.500 directory specification [ITUT05] uses coun-
try codes [ISO 3166] for constructing the globally unique identifier (called the Dis-
tinguished Name) of an object. 
Use of global naming schemes has also faced criticism. Initiatives such as SPKI 
[RFC2693] and SDSI [RIVE96] have proposed to abandon the strivings for a 
global hierarchy and make use of local identifiers, instead. A local name is mean-
ingful only for the one that assigns the name (for instance, “next door’s Bob”), and 
the local names can be chained to make them reach more people (“Alice is a friend 
of next door’s Bob”). If necessary, the public key of an object can be used as its 
globally unique identifier.  
The identity of an individual is often considered the universal set of his attributes 
spread over a large number of information systems. In rare circumstances, one in-
formation system holds all the attributes of one individual – from the privacy per-
spective such an information system would present a huge privacy risk. Instead, 
the attributes are stored in several information systems; each set of attributes con-
stituting a partial identity of the same individual.  
The concept of partial identity is depicted in Figure 3, which presents an identity, 
consisting of four partial identities; one in a telecom company, one in an airline, 
one in a car rental company and one in the employer of the individual. Attributes 
like name and address are present and required for each of the four partial identi-
ties. To differentiate the individual from the others, the maintainers of the partial 
identities have assigned identifiers to the individual (such as, the employee number 
by the employer, the frequent flyer number by the airline, the customer number by 
the car rental company and the phone number by the telecom company). The credit 
card number is known only to the airline and the car rental company, which use it 
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for crediting their services. Attributes like birthday and birthplace are not known to 
any of the four parties. 
 
Figure 3. Partial identities of an individual [DAMI03]. 
None of the four parties possesses all the attributes of the individual. This is a de-
sirable property from the privacy perspective, which is defined as the right of indi-
viduals to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information 
about them is communicated to others [WEST67]. Surveys show that people are 
concerned about their privacy [e.g. IBM99] and how and in which conditions their 
personal data is collected for profiling [CULN99].  
According to Section 10 of the constitution of Finland, everyone's private life is 
guaranteed [CONS99]. Personal data act [PF99], implementing the European Un-
ion’s data protection directive [EP95], provides more detailed provisions on the 
protection of personal data. The objectives of the act are to implement, in the proc-
essing of personal data, the protection of private life and the other basic rights 
which safeguard the right to privacy, as well as to promote the development of and 
compliance with good processing practice. 
It is often not even possible to make a connection between the partial identities of 
an individual. For example, in Internet chatrooms, people use pseudonyms3 to hide 
their identity, i.e. to complicate linking their partial identity in the chatroom to 
their other partial identities. However, there are also situations where linking the 
                                                
3 Greek: pseudo-onum (false name) means a name other than the real name. 
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partial identities is desirable for an organisation or for the individual, which is an 
essential theme in this thesis. Some of the reasons are as follows.  
User convenience. People may consider their convenience more important than 
keeping their partial identities apart. This happens, for example, in a single sign-on 
scenario. 
Organisation’s business goals. An organisation’s business goals make it neces-
sary to be able to link a person’s partial identities. For example, to avoid the abuse 
of social subsidies, it may be necessary for public bodies to get an aggregated view 
on all the subsidies and incomes an individual has. 
Efficiency. In an organisation, maintaining several overlapping partial identities 
for an individual is inefficient, and lowers the quality of data. It is often more effi-
cient to construct and maintain an aggregated view on the identity of an individual. 
Information security. In order to protect information systems and, more widely 
speaking, the society where people live, it is often necessary to be able to trace 
people’s transactions. Since this is also conflicting with the individuals’ privacy, 
drawing the line between the individual’s privacy and the society’s rights to in-
fringe it is a continuous discussion. 
Mueller [MUEL04] points out that the interests of an individual and an organisa-
tion are often in conflict which each other. For an end user, issues like convenience 
of use, ability to have multiple identities (for instance, to separate work emails 
from private ones) and switching costs (cf. portability of telephone numbers in 
telecommunication services) are considered important. For the organisation main-
taining the identities, issues like economics of scale, value of the data obtained (for 
example, regarding a user’s behaviour as a consumer) and value of the resources 
protected (for example, company secrets) are of importance. Both of these interests 
need to be taken into account. 
2.2. Authentication 
As mentioned above, an identity is an abstraction of an individual in an informa-
tion system. Authentication of identity, in turn, is making a binding between the 
partial identity and the corresponding individual in real life. By some means, the 
authenticator wanting to make the binding is assured that the individual in flesh-
and-blood is the same person that has the partial identity in the information system. 
During authentication, some cryptographic material, such as a session key, is typi-
cally generated to secure the communication, and the binding exists as long as the 
cryptographic keys do. 
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Authentication always makes a connection between two events in time. It answers 
a question such as; is this person the same person who received his username and 
password two months ago in the helpdesk of the organisation? Is this person the 
same one who opened his bank account and deposited 1000 euros two years ago? 
Is this person the same individual who was issued a passport 8 years ago, when he 
was a kid of 10 years, accompanied with his parents? We often end up with a chain 
of authentications; the passport is used for opening the bank account and user ac-
count, and when a person wants to renew his passport, he again needs to present 
his previous passport or other proof of identity.  
In the face-to-face world, the authentication can be done, for example, by means of 
a passport or other photo ID document issued by a party trusted by the authentica-
tor, or the authenticator may recognise the face of the person being authenticated. 
In the on-line world, there are several means available with varying reliability. Lit-
erature often uses the following categories for authentication of people 
[RENA05:104] 
• Something people know (such as PIN codes and passwords) or are able to 
recognise (such as faces or photos they have seen before) 
• Something people hold (such as keys, smart cards or devices generating 
one-time passwords) 
• biometrics, i.e. something people are (such as fingerprint or iris pattern) or 
how they behave (such as voice recognition or typing patterns).  
All these authentication mechanisms have their well-known pros and cons. For in-
stance, passwords and PINs are cheap and easy to deploy and nearly everyone is 
familiar with them, but people use them carelessly and they can be eavesdropped 
and replayed easily. Keys and cards need additional hardware, and biometrics is 
still considered a new and evolving technology. As analysis of different authenti-
cation mechanisms and their reliability is not in the core of this thesis, they are not 
further elaborated here. A framework for assessing the reliability of authentication 
is provided, for instance, in [BURR06]. 
It is important to distinguish between authenticating the identity of a person and a 
machine. The three categories above are available for weak authentication, when a 
machine needs to authenticate a human user. In a machine-to-machine authentica-
tion, there is an additional method called strong authentication, which utilises 
means provided by the cryptographic sciences. As humans cannot make the neces-
sary cryptographic calculations manually, strong authentication cannot be used to 
authenticate a human user. However, strong authentication may play a role also in 
authenticating human users. For example, the user may hold a smart card with an 
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on-board cryptographic processor, which uses a PIN code or fingerprint to authen-
ticate the user. A server in the network, in turn, uses strong authentication to au-
thenticate the smart card. As a result, the overall reliability of authentication in-
creases. This setup (Figure 4) is typical in smart-card-based PKI and was the theme 
of Publication 2. 
 
Figure 4. Weak and strong authentication in a chain 
As will be seen, in the landscape of identity management, authentication is mostly 
a technical thing and there are a plenitude of technical ways and products to handle 
it. On the other hand, for common people familiar with a computer prompting for 
username and password, authentication is the thing that makes identity manage-
ment concrete. Thus, in the media, it is a common misconception to think identity 
management is all about authentication. 
As mentioned above, authentication makes a binding between an individual in-
real-life and his partial identity. As a final remark, it should be pointed out that of-
ten it is not necessary for a service to know the identity of the end user. Anonymity 
is defined as the state of being not identifiable within a set of all the possible sub-
jects [PFIT05]. Following the Personal data act, the Finnish Government Informa-
tion Security Management Board VAHTI has adopted the view that, by default, an 
individual should be served anonymously. An individual needs to reveal his iden-
tity only if identifying the customer is necessary for the service [VAHT06b]. This 
principle can be applied to private services, as well. 
2.3. Authorisation and Access Control 
Authorisation is a decision to allow a particular action based on an identifier or at-
tribute [CAMP04]. Introduced for the first time in the 1960s [LAMP69], an access 
control matrix has been the traditional way to express authorisation. In an access 
control matrix, each subject (end user) is represented by a row and each object (re-
source) by a column. A subject’s authorisations to the objects are presented in the 
cells, using actions that are relevant in the context of the system. Each column of 
the matrix is called an access control list of the object, and each row the capabili-
ties of the subject. [ANDE01:53] 
Smart 
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Table 2 presents an access control matrix of a file system, using actions read (R) 
and write (W). Alternatively, in an access control matrix of an application for man-
aging travel expense reports, the objects would be the travel expense reports and 
the actions, for instance, create a new report, approve a report and initiate payment. 
Table 2. Access control matrix  
Subject \ Object /users/bob/ /tmp/foo /etc/passwd 
Alice - WR - 
Bob RW R - 
In a complex system with a multitude of subjects and objects, the access control 
matrix becomes very large and difficult to manage. End users leaving the organisa-
tion or changing their position make maintaining the access control matrix even 
more challenging. This has lead to the introduction of roles as a level of abstraction 
between subjects and the actions they are able to carry out for objects. In the 
1990s, role-based access control (RBAC) has become a subject of research [e.g. 
FERR92, FERR95, SAND96, BARK97, FERR00]. For an organisation that ex-
periences a large turnover of personnel, a role-based security policy is the only 
logical choice [FERR92]. 
In RBAC, each user is assigned one or more roles, and each role is assigned one or 
more privileges to carry out operations. Roles may have hierarchies and the separa-
tion of duties can be done using constraints. Since this thesis focuses on identity 
management in organisations, RBAC is an attractive tool for authorisation in sub-
sequent sections. 
 
Figure 5. An example of role-based access control implementation in man-
agement of travel expense reports 
Figure 5 illustrates an example of a travel expense report management system. In 
the organisation, all the employees have the role “worker” and the superiors have 
an additional role “superior”. The role-based access control policy of the travel ex-
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Worker 
Superior
Create/ 
update report 
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pense report management system is that all the workers are allowed to make busi-
ness trips (and claim travel expenses) and the superiors approve their workers’ 
travel expenses. Now, an end user makes use of his role as a worker, when he signs 
in to the system, to use his create/update privileges. For approving the travel ex-
penses, the superior signs in using his role, to use his privilege of approve report. 
Role hierarchies can be introduced to allow superiors to create/update their own 
travel reports, through the process of privilege inheritance.  
RBAC has also limitations. Suppose that a service is permitted for any adult resi-
dent of Tampere, and each end user has two attributes; the place of domicile and 
the date of birth. For RBAC, a new role “an adult resident of Tampere” should be 
maintained for every end user (in practice, by deriving if from the two attributes). 
An end user may be permitted to use several different services whose access con-
trol may be based on distinct roles. As a result, potentially a large number of roles 
need to be maintained for each end user. 
Attribute-based access control (ABAC) extends RBAC to make it more flexible. 
According to ABAC, permissions can depend on any attribute of the user, service 
or the environment [YUAN05]. The fundamentals of ABAC are presented in the 
access control framework by ISO/ITU-T [ISO96, ITUT95]. The framework bases 
an access control decision on any relevant information on the initiator and the tar-
get of the request, on the request itself and on its context. 
If roles are considered to be attributes of the end user, ABAC is able to cover all 
the RBAC use scenarios. The access control can also be based on an attribute of 
the resource (for instance, the owner of the file) and on the environment (for in-
stance, the date and the strength of user authentication). Using ABAC, access to an 
adult resident of Tampere could be grant, if the following equation is true: 
(CurrentDate-DateOfBirth)≥18 years AND PlaceOfDomicile=”Tampere” 
Whether it is implemented using access control matrix, RBAC or ABAC, an essen-
tial principle in authorisation is the principle of least privilege. End users should 
not be given more privileges to resources than they need to accomplish necessary 
tasks. Separation of duties, a concept known in financial administration for centu-
ries [ANDE01:187], augments the principle of least privilege by presuming that at 
least two persons are needed to carry out the most sensitive tasks. For instance, 
considering the example in Figure 5, it is necessary to introduce a constraint that 
prevents a supervisor from approving his own travel expenses. 
Windley recognises the principle of least privilege as a good guideline, but in prac-
tice often difficult to implement to a full extent, because it implies very fine-
grained modelling of permissions in the system. Essentially, every action that 
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might ever be taken by any user on any resources needs a permission defined. Any 
change in the system or the way it is used affects the permissions in the system, 
which makes maintenance too cumbersome. Windley proposes that instead of im-
plementing highly fine-grained permissions based on least privilege, a more 
coarse-grained model for permissions is enough if supplemented by accountability-
based access control, which is going to be introduced in Section 2.4. [WIND05:65] 
The ability to delegate is a fundamental issue in authorisation. Delegation means a 
subjects ability to transfer his privileges to another subject. This is a typical situa-
tion in an organisation, where many kinds of things contend for people’s time. For 
example, a company policy may set the circumstances where heads of the units 
may delegate their privileges to approve travel expenses. 
Access control relates closely to authorisation. Whereas authorisation is a rather 
abstract concept, covering an organisation’s policies, practices and decision-
making, access control is the concrete function in an information system that an-
swers yes or no to the question “is this subject authorised to perform this action to 
the object”. Access control is often divided into two functions; Policy Decision 
Point (PDP) which uses the available information on authorisations to produce the 
“yes or no answer”, and Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) which enforces the deci-
sion made by the PDP. Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) 
[MOSE05] defines a standard for expressing authorisation requests and responses 
and access control policies in XML format. 
This section introduced authorisation as a process that follows authentication of the 
end user’s identity. As a final remark, it is now pointed out that, for authorisation, 
it is not always necessary to uniquely identify an individual. Merely, it may be 
enough to ascertain a certain attribute of the individual. For example, a policeman 
asking for a driving license of a driver is usually interested in the person’s permis-
sion to drive the vehicle, not in his name or other attributes. The same applies in 
the electronic world, and there have been proposals like SDSI [RIVE96] and SPKI 
[RFC2693] which make use of authorisation certificates without revealing the end 
user’s identity to the service. Federated identity management opens new possibili-
ties to provide authorisation without identification. They will be covered in Section 
6.1.3. 
2.4. Auditing 
As different information systems have become more integral and important to 
businesses, risks of failures in peoples access rights and the way people use them 
have grown. Complementing authorisation and access control, the importance of 
having proper mechanisms for auditing and accountability has grown, partly as a 
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consequence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 [USAC02] in the United States. 
Providing reporting tools for audit purposes has become an ordinary feature of 
available commercial products. 
According to the Government Information Security Management Board VAHTI 
[VAHT06], reporting tools should provide reports on 
- what roles are given to a user 
- what privileges are assigned to a role 
- what privileges are assigned to a user (combination of the two above) 
- which users have a given role 
- which users have a given privilege  
Using the tools, identity management audits should be conducted in a regular basis 
to find out 
- if there are end users who are no more employed by the organisation 
- if there are roles which are no more in use 
- if there are objects or privileges which are no more in use 
- if there are orphaned authorisations (i.e., to an object that does not exist 
any more) 
- that separation of duties is implemented properly and the end user’s 
privileges do not cause dangerous combinations 
- that roles, objects and processes have owners with well-defined respon-
sibilities 
- that identity management processes are defined and followed 
As mentioned in the Section 2.3, Windley points out that the permission-based ac-
cess control model is difficult and expensive, if applied to the full extent. Windley 
proposes that it is more practical to augment the permission-based model with 
what he calls accountability-based access control; user actions are logged, and 
when the logs show an unauthorised access by a user, appropriate action is taken 
afterwards. According to Windley, accountability-based access control scales bet-
ter than permission-based access control, because it is a log processing problem 
that can be done offline by a separate system. In a real-world scenario, organisa-
tions should consider what is the risk they can tolerate, and balance the use of 
permission-based and accountability-based access control. Accountability-based 
systems are considerably cheaper to implement and operate. [WIND05:66] 
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Windley does not make it explicit, how the logs should be processed to disclose 
unauthorised use. If there was a fully automatic system that reads log files and 
flags unauthorised access, why not to use it as a Policy Decision Point that gener-
ates a negative response to an unauthorised access request on-the-fly, not after-
wards? Apparently, Windley means that there is some human intervention in-
volved; log files are examined when there are doubts that unauthorised access has 
taken place. For instance, in Finland, every now and then it turns out that individ-
ual civil servants have misused the population registry to query personal data on 
public figures for curiosity. The government states that, besides educating civil 
servants, there are afterwards controls in place to detect improper use of the popu-
lation data [WIDE03]. While this can work as a deterrent for misuse, it can hardly 
discover all the misuse that happens.  
Regarding accountability-based access control, it should be noticed that processing 
log files identifying an individual is processing personal data. In Finland, the Per-
sonal Data Act [PF99] and the Act on the Protection of Privacy in Working Life 
[PF04] set limitations on how log files may be processed. As an example, Windley 
proposes audits of the email server logs to ensure that the company secrets are not 
sent to the competitors by email [WIND05:66]. However, for an employer, this is 
currently forbidden in the Finnish law [PF04]. 
A properly implemented inerasable audit trail should take into consideration the 
fact that end users’ identities and authorisations change over time. It is possible, 
that the user had the authorisation when carrying out the action but has later de-
parted or changed his position. At the time when the audit records are examined, 
he would not have the authorisation. Whether permission-based or accountability-
based access control is used, the audit trail should be able to answer, why an end 
user was permitted to do the action at the time when it was carried out. 
2.5. Putting the Concepts in a Timeline 
To conclude the introduction of identity management concepts, the concepts are 
now placed on a timeline in order to find out in which order the concepts typically 
take place in an organisation. In real life, the order of some of the events may vary, 
but certain common characteristics can be identified. 
Depending on the history of the organisation and its information systems, role-
based authorisation is a prime candidate for the first thing to happen. For example, 
in a well-established organisation, the company policy for approving travel ex-
penses has probably been done years ago, for example, by the board of directors 
(noted as the man with the tall hat in Figure 6). The policy can be, for example, 
that “the heads of the units are permitted to approve travel expenses”. Hence, the 
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authorisation is done, effectively, when this policy has been agreed on, and every-
thing that follows (for example, assigning privileges to the heads of the units) is 
just implementing the policy. 
 
Figure 6. Example of identity (a), authentication (b), authorisation (c) and 
auditing (d) in a travel expense management system 
A candidate for the second concept to be addressed is identity. To be more spe-
cific, this covers creating a partial identity for an end user (Bob Smith in the fig-
ure) and assigning one or more identifiers (bsmith in the figure) to him to ensure 
his unique identification. The partial identity is supplemented with appropriate at-
tributes, such as the role and privilege attributes for the travel expense manage-
ment process. Once created, the partial identity has to be maintained as well, as the 
user’s attributes and roles change during his job career. From the information secu-
rity point of view, the most important change takes place when a user finally 
leaves the organisation; related changes to his identity and attributes need to be 
made in order to stop him from using the organisation’s information systems that 
he is no more authorised to use. 
Considering the timeline, authentication and access control are the two things that 
take place when a resource is being used. During authentication, the information 
system ensures that the end user, located somewhere in the Internet, is the person 
who has a partial identity in the user database of the information system. In Figure 
7, Bob presents his identifier (bsmith) as a claim of his partial identity, and the 
claim is verified with a password.  
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Once the identity has been verified, the subsequent access control procedure makes 
the decision whether the end user is permitted to access the resource or not. In the 
figure, role-based access control is implemented; Bob Smith has a role “head of the 
unit”, and the company policy is “heads of the units are permitted to approve travel 
expenses”, thus, Bob is permitted to approve travel expenses. Once Bob completes 
his task, he closes his session, and the authentication and access cease. 
Audits can be done before or after the end user uses the information system. If 
done beforehand, the question is often “which users are authorised to use this sys-
tem in this role” or “what actions is this user authorised to carry out”. If auditing is 
done afterwards, the question is “which users have used this system during a cer-
tain period of time” or “what tasks has this user carried out in the system during 
certain periods of time”. 
This concludes the introduction of the four concepts of identity management. From 
a technical perspective, the goal of identity management is to ensure that the end 
user is able to make only the actions he is authorised to do. From a juridical per-
spective, identity management ensures that an authenticated person can be kept ac-
countable for the actions made using that identity. Together with the identity man-
agement practices and the audit trail, those actions can be traced back to a person 
in-real-life. This shows how these four concepts are intertwined and cannot be con-
sidered separately from each other. 
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3. IDENTITY MANAGEMENT IN AN ORGANISATION 
Organisations, whether they are private companies or public bodies, store identity 
information of people affiliated to the organisation, such as employees, customers, 
patients and students. In an organisation, identities have lifecycles. When a new 
person (say, employee) enters the organisation, his identity is created to related in-
formation systems (provisioning). When attributes of the identity are changed (e.g. 
employee changes his position), the changes need to be reflected to the information 
systems, and, finally, when the person’s affiliation to the organisation ceases, his 
authorisations in the information systems needs to be revoked (de-provisioning).  
Traditionally, identity management in an organisation has meant integrating infor-
mation systems for user provisioning, password management and access control 
[DJOR05]. For this thesis, the definition of identity management has been adopted 
as the process of representing and recognising entities as digital identities in com-
puter networks [JØSA05].  
Usually, identity management also covers authentication, authorisation and audit-
ing.4 On the other hand, in identity management, there are also scenarios in which 
an identified user does not actually “log in”. For example, tax authorities gather 
data from an individual, his banks and his employer, and identity management (in 
practice, the national identification number) ensures that incomes and taxes are 
registered for the correct taxpayer. However, currently in Finland, electronic tax 
declaration is not in use and the taxpayer (the identified user) cannot actually log 
in (although tax inspectors do log in). In that sense, identity management is a wider 
concept than user administration, which is considered to mean keeping track of the 
information system users and their privileges. 
Managing identities in an organisation’s information systems has been a familiar 
topic for practitioners for years. However, as noted by Fuchs and Pernul 
[FUCH07], it has not gained significant attention in the research community. There 
are some case studies available [e.g., BLEZ02, ANCH03, LARS05, RIEG07]. 
Many practical issues are covered in Phil Windley’s book Digital Identity 
[WIND05]. 
3.1. Benefits of Centralised Identity Management  
In isolated identity management, each information system manages its own iden-
tity data independently. In centralised identity management, the organisation has 
                                                
4 Sometimes, the concept of Identity and Access Management (IAM) is used instead to underline 
authentication, authorisation and auditing as part of identity management. 
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built interconnections between the identity data in its information systems. Instead 
of having partial identities in each of the organisation’s information systems, indi-
viduals have one unified partial identity that covers all (or, in practice, most of) the 
information systems. An end user has a unique identifier which identifies him in 
the information systems, or there is at least5 a mechanism (such as a directory) 
which is able to map the identifiers a person has. 
For the owner of an information system, centralised identity management often re-
duces routine work related to identity management. The system owner does not 
have to care about creating identities to new persons and making sure they are up-
to-date and deactivated appropriately, when the person departs. Furthermore, if the 
end user has a password for logging in, credentials provided by the centralised 
identity management can be utilised, and the system owner does not have to care 
about, e.g., resetting forgotten passwords. In short, the system owner can concen-
trate on doing his business and leave administrational routines, like identity man-
agement, to the organisational unit responsible for them, such as to the IT service 
unit. 
For an end user, centralised identity management enables the principle of one login 
credential; for example, a single username and password. Because a user has to 
remember only one frequently used password, it is easier to learn and remember, 
and there is less need to write passwords down on a piece of paper.  Furthermore, it 
is realistic to put more requirements for the single password, regarding its quality 
and renewal times. As a result, security of password-based authentication is en-
hanced.  
From the information security perspective, centralised identity management also 
makes it easier to ascertain that end users’ accounts and permissions to use infor-
mation systems expire as they depart from the organisation. Forgetting to close 
people’s accounts when they leave is considered a major security risk for an or-
ganisation. Furthermore, new and more reliable authentication mechanisms can be 
introduced to several information systems at once, because the new authentication 
credential can be coupled with the end user’s identity in one centralised place. Fi-
nally, having an aggregated view on a person’s identity makes it easier to imple-
ment tools for auditing purposes. 
All in all, centralised identity management increases an organisation’s efficiency 
by reducing the overlapping work in identity management. End users are happier 
                                                
5 For instance, in the HR system, the identifier is typically the employee number and in Unix, it is 
the uid of the user. However, it may be impossible to use the employee number as the unique 
identifier in other systems, because users other than employees do not necessarily have them. 
The HR system, on the other hand, may be a legacy system not supporting the use of external 
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with fewer passwords to remember, and information security is increased. Fur-
thermore, introducing new information systems becomes easier as there is an iden-
tity management infrastructure in place, on which the new systems can rely. 
To conclude the chapter of the benefits, it is worth noticing that despite its bene-
fits, the applicability of centralised identity management has also limitations. If not 
designed for compatibility, software products may not necessarily have interfaces 
that could be used for integration to the organisation’s centralised identity man-
agement, or the integration cost of the product (especially, if the number of users is 
small) could just be too big. Traditionally, software products used to be monolithic 
systems with no modular interfaces for external authentication and access control. 
Instead, authentication and access control was coded directly to the programme 
code. Furthermore, depending on the policy of the organisation, the most sensitive 
systems may not want to rely on an identity management external to the system, ei-
ther.   
3.2. Identity Flows in an Organisation 
Software vendors have recognised that real organisations do not have coherent in-
formation system environments acquired from a single vendor. Instead, organisa-
tions do and will have several systems carrying identity records of the same indi-
viduals. For example, the human resources (HR) system carries the personal details 
of employees and their employment, telephone exchange their phone numbers, 
Windows Active Directory their user accounts in the Microsoft environment and 
so on. The way forward is to interconnect these information systems so that iden-
tity changes in one system are reflected to other systems in a predefined way. 
In order to rationalise identity management in an organisation, some person regis-
tries are elevated to base registries, which are the registries where new identities 
enter the organisation. Once a new identity has been created in a base registry, it is 
available to other connected registries as well. New persons cannot be entered to 
connected registries without entering them to a base registry. On the other hand, if 
an identity is removed from a base registry, it is de-provisioned or deactivated in 
the connected registries as well. One can say that a base registry owns an identity 
object in the identity management system of the organisation. 
Authoritative sources complete the picture; they are person registries which own 
a certain attribute of an identity object. Changes to the attribute are propagated 
from authoritative sources to other connected systems. Prominent authoritative 
sources are, for example, email server for email address, telephone exchange for 
                                                                                                                                                
identifiers, such as uids. It is sufficient that the centralised identity management is able to map the 
two identifiers.  
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phone number and for employee number the employee registry, which can also be 
a base registry for an entire identity object.  
Agreeing on the authoritative source for each attribute in the organisation aims at 
removing overlapping maintenance of the same piece of information. If there are 
two organisational units maintaining independent instances of the same informa-
tion (for example, in a university, both the student administration and the library 
maintains students’ home addresses in their systems), it is likely that changes to 
the information are not done consistently, causing loss of integrity of the data.  
Agreement on  authoritative sources can be compared to a normalised database, a 
concept that database designers are familiar with. Both of them increase the quality 
of data by removing potentially conflicting instances of the same data. Actually, 
one could see organisational identity management as one big logical database with 
update rights granted to different parts of the organisation.  
An enterprise directory is a core middleware architecture that may provide com-
mon authentication, authorisation and attribute services to electronic services of-
fered by an institution [BELL02]. The processes used for feeding the enterprise di-
rectory with data from the base registries and other authoritative registries are 
called a metadirectory [BELL02]. A metadirectory can be implemented as a 
home-grown set of scripting, database views etc. However, during recent years, 
several commercial metadirectory products have entered the market [PERK07]. 
An alternative way to implement an enterprise directory is a virtual directory, 
which, unlike a metadirectory, does not make copies of identity data from authori-
tative sources to an enterprise directory. Instead, a virtual directory provides a 
view of a single directory, but when a connected system makes use of the direc-
tory, personal data is actually fetched from base registries and authoritative sources 
on-the-fly. [WIND05:87] 
 
Figure 7. Identity flows in a university 
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Figure 7 illustrates an example of a university. The two main groups of people af-
filiated to a university are students and employees. The student registry stores data 
on the students’ target degrees, enrolments and credit units, and is by nature the 
place where the students’ role information is most up-to-date in a university. In the 
same way, the Human Resources (HR) registry is the registry used for paying sala-
ries to employees, and the data can be expected to be of high quality. These two 
registries are most likely base registries in a university. Depending on the institu-
tion, there may be additional base registries for the alumni, library patrons etc. It is 
worth noticing that the same individual may exist in several base registries at the 
same time and the identity flow has to take that into account. 
In the figure, the metadirectory connects the registries. When a new identity is en-
tered to a base registry, the metadirectory uses predefined rules to provision the 
identity to the other registries. Consequently, the email server may take the respon-
sibility of creating the user’s email address, which then flows back to other regis-
tries, possibly including the base registry. Thus, the email server is the authorita-
tive source for the user’s email address. 
The end user himself can also be the authoritative source for some attributes. The 
password is a typical example; when the password needs to be changed, the end 
user types in the new password, which is then propagated to the registry/registries 
making use of it. Depending on the organisation, office room number or office 
hours of a professor are other potential attributes for self-administration. However, 
an attribute used for authorisation should typically not be administered by the user 
himself.  
Publication 1 describes a study on the present identity management systems in Fin-
nish universities. The study was conducted as part of a several-year project to im-
prove identity management in Finnish universities and polytechnics. In the project, 
staff of the institutions’ IT service units were interviewed to investigate current 
identity management practices. The study, which covered 61 percent of the higher 
education institutions in Finland, showed that most of the institutions make use of 
the student registry as the base registry for students’ identities. However, for em-
ployees’ identities the use of the HR registry is considerably lower. In connected 
systems, email servers, operating system accounts and intranet accounts make use 
of the enterprise directory, mostly because they are all maintained by the informa-
tion management unit. Other organisational units, such as the library and the learn-
ing technology centre, do not make use of the enterprise directory. Instead, they 
provide end users with an extra username and password and maintain the identities 
separately.  
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The study showed that Finnish higher education institutions have a lot of potential 
in making their identity management more efficient. In the project, an attempt was 
made to disseminate best practices from the forerunners to the other institutions. 
Details on the dissemination activities are presented in the publication. 
3.3. Object model for Identity Management in an Organisation 
Based on the introduction of the concepts in Section 2 and the identity flows intro-
duced in Section 3.2, this section presents an object model for identity manage-
ment in an organisation. The model is visualised in Figure 8 using a class diagram 
of UML [OMG07], which is the most important and widely used specification lan-
guage for object modelling in the software industry [HAIK04:117]. The attributes 
and methods of the classes are context-specific and omitted from the figure. 
 
Figure 8. A UML class diagram of identity in an organisation 
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remains after the person dies or (in the context of organisational identity manage-
ment) departs, implying that the identity can be associated to zero or one living 
Person Identity 
Partial identity 
Attribute Service 
0..1 1 
1 
1..* 
1..* 
0..* 
Directory 1 0..* 
Identifier Role 
0..* 0..* 0..* 0..* 
Authentication 
credential 
0..*
0..*
0..1 
0..* 
relates hie-
rarchically 
to 
0..* 
0..* 
relates to  
Permission 
Group 
 29 
 
person. On the other hand, in this model, each partial identity belongs to exactly 
one identity. Otherwise, the identity would represent not a single person but a 
group of persons. 
In the context of organisational identity management, a partial identity is stored in 
a directory. If all the information systems in the organisation were connected to 
the centralised identity management, an end user would have just one partial iden-
tity, which is stored in the enterprise directory (see Section 3.2) of the organisa-
tion6. However, if the organisation has information systems which do not make use 
of the centralised identity management, identities in those are considered as sepa-
rate partial identities and stored in other directories (e.g. in a local user database of 
the system). For instance, if the organisation has centralised identity management 
with an exception of three information systems having an isolated identity man-
agement, an end user may have four partial identity instances in the organisation, 
one in the enterprise directory and three in the local directories. 
As mentioned in Section 2.1, a partial identity consists of attributes describing the 
individual. Identifiers are attributes which deserve special attention; they identify 
uniquely a partial identity (and, hence, a person) in their context. For usernames, 
the context is, typically, an information system or the organisation as a whole. E-
mail addresses are globally unique, whereas national identification numbers have 
one country as their scope. One partial identity may have one or several identifiers 
associated to it, some of them (such as an employee number or a username) as-
signed locally by the organisation and some (such as a national identification num-
ber) by an external organisation. To ensure unique identification in all circum-
stances, at least one locally assigned identifier is necessary. Otherwise, the 
organisation faces problems with end users who do not have external identifiers 
(such as a national identification number) or whose external identifier is not known 
to the organisation. 
Introduced in Section 2.3, roles are attributes describing the user’s relationship to 
the organisation in order to facilitate access control. Some roles describe the per-
son’s relationship to a group. The person may, for instance, be a member or a 
chairman of a group, or the group may be the project team of a project manager. 
Groups may have hierarchies as well, that is, they may have subgroups. Any num-
ber of individuals may be related to (e.g. be a member of) a group. On the other 
hand, in this model, a role (e.g. a membership) can be related at most to one group. 
If a person is a member in two groups (for instance, a group and one of its sub-
groups), he has two separate role attributes. 
                                                
6 In practice, the metadirectory synchronises local identity copies in the connected systems as pro-
posed in Figure 7. In the UML diagram, the directory represents the identities in the connected 
systems, as well. 
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Authentication credentials are attributes which assist in making the binding be-
tween an end user and his partial identity. By possessing an authentication creden-
tial, an end user proves that he is the person the partial identity represents. An au-
thentication credential is personal i.e. belongs to one or zero persons (zero, if the 
person has died or permanently lost the authentication credential).  
In this model, only individuals can be authenticated. A group cannot be authenti-
cated per se, because, as mentioned in Section 2.5, the audit trail must ensure that 
the actions taken in an information system can be traced back to a person in-real-
life. If groups were authenticated principals, it would not be possible to trace an 
action back to the individual. Instead, in this model, an individual needs to be au-
thenticated first and then his role attribute examined to find out his group member-
ship.   
An authentication credential can be, as mentioned in Section 2.2, e.g. a password, 
an asymmetric key pair or some biometric data. Some authentication credentials, 
such as asymmetric key pairs, are also unique identifiers, because nobody should 
possess the same asymmetric key pair (if it were not, then the key generation proc-
ess would be seriously flawed and the public key system implementation should be 
abandoned [RFC2693]). Some credentials need not to be unique; for instance, two 
different persons may accidentally use the same password. Usually, an end user en-
ters his password together with his unique identifier (e.g. a username).  
Attributes, or some of them, may be arranged in a hierarchy, which is defined as a 
graded or ranked series of values [MERR08]. For numeric attributes, such as the 
date of birth, weight or seniority, the hierarchy is obvious. Job titles, military ranks 
and security clearances can be hierarchical, as well. Also roles may have hierar-
chies and having a higher role in the hierarchy implies the lower role [FERR00]. 
For instance, if a project manager is defined to be higher in the hierarchy than an 
employee, a project manager has automatically the role employee, as well. Fur-
thermore, a hierarchy may apply to authentication credentials. A framework (such 
as, NIST SP 800-63 [BURR06]) may be in place for assessing the strength of au-
thentication mechanisms and deducing that some authentication credential may 
provide stronger authentication than the other. 
On the right side, services are the information systems that the end user is using. 
An end user may have a permission to make operations (such as, read or write a 
file or approve a travel expense report) in the service. Each permission may allow 
the end user to do various actions in the service (for instance, the end user may 
both create and update a travel expense report) and, on the other hand, several dif-
ferent permissions can be defined for a service (a worker can create a travel ex-
pense report and his supervisor approve it). How the permission depends on the 
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service is context-specific and not answered by the object model. In an implemen-
tation, a permission may, for instance, depend on the ownership of a file. During 
log-in, other conditions (such as the date and the strength of authentication7) may 
also affect the decision to grant or deny access. 
The object model makes use of the attribute-based access control model (ABAC) 
that was presented in Section 2.3. In ABAC, a permission is based on any security 
relevant attribute of an end user (such as, the name, age, organisational unit, home 
postal code or a role). Alternatively, a permission may be given to a group and the 
users belonging to the group may use the permission.. If the permission is based on 
a hierarchical attribute, superior attributes inherit the permissions of the lower at-
tributes in the hierarchy [FERR00]. For example, if a student of a course is permit-
ted to access a learning management system, and a teacher is superior to a student, 
then the teacher is permitted to access it as well. If teachers are not actually permit-
ted to access the learning management system then they should not be made supe-
rior to students in the role hierarchy 
Groups, people and attributes have some similar properties, but they also have dif-
ferences. The differences between a group, a person and an attribute are as follows: 
- groups are entities in their own right and may have attributes that de-
scribe them such as address, term, officers, etc. Attributes do not have 
similar properties 
- people are members of groups and this is signalled by the person having 
a group membership attribute. Groups may also signal this by having a 
membership attribute that list the people who are its members. 
- people are entities with authentication credentials but groups are enti-
ties that do not have authentication credentials 
As mentioned in Section 2.3, an access control matrix and role-based access con-
trol are special cases of ABAC. If the attribute to which the permission is assigned 
is an identifier of a partial identity, the traditional access control matrix is used. If 
the permission is assigned to a role, role-based access control in use. According to 
the UML diagram, a permission could be assigned to an authentication credential, 
as well. This is useful if the authentication credential is a certificate, but assigning 
permissions directly to passwords may not be reasonable.  
                                                
7 Several authentication assurance frameworks, such as NIST SP 800-63 [BURR06] and EC 
IDABC Interoperability [IDAB07], pay attention not only to the authentication mechanism used in 
the beginning of the session, but also on the assurance of who possesses the authentication cre-
dential (including, e.g. the initial proofing of identity and the delivery of the credential to the end 
user). In this object model, the static aspect can be expressed as an attribute of the authentication 
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A class diagram for user identities is probably part of the design documentation in 
many software projects in the industry. In the literature, there is some previous 
work available, as well. Emig et al [EMIG07] have presented an access control 
model for web service-oriented architecture (WSOA). The model aims at support-
ing a problem typical for web services; has a permission been granted for an au-
thenticated subject to invoke a WSOA service.  
Focused on WSOA, Emig et al model the service-related side of the object model 
more carefully, including the web service operations and their parameters. Still 
their model has a lot in common with the object model presented in Figure 8. The 
most notable difference is that Emig et al have an indirection between roles and 
permissions that they admit is not consistent with RBAC; roles are not attributes of 
an identity, but a user’s attributes can be derived from her roles and permissions 
can then be associated to the attributes. Furthermore, Emig et al do not introduce 
partial identities in their model because they consider them irrelevant for their 
WSOA focused model. However, they are relevant for this thesis with a focus on 
identity management in an organisation. 
There are also object models focusing on smaller parts of the model presented in 
this thesis. Shin et al [SHIN00] have presented an object model on role-based ac-
cess control. The model is more specific and covers also role constraints and ses-
sions. Basin et al [BASI06] have supplemented RBAC with a hierarchy of actions 
as an additional layer of abstraction between permissions and services. Further-
more, Basin et al assign roles to the subject class, and users and groups are sub-
classes of the subject class. In other words, according to Basin et al, the authenti-
cated principals can be either groups or individual users. In this thesis, the subjects 
are always individual users, because Section 2.5 has emphasised the ability to trace 
the transactions back to the individual for accountability purposes. If the authenti-
cated subjects were groups, the identity of the individual group member could not 
be revealed. 
This section introduced an object model for identity management in the context of 
an organisation. In Section 4, the thesis is extended to cover identity management 
in contexts which consist of several organisations. We will see that in federated 
identity management the partial identity of an end user needs not to be managed by 
the same organisation that manages the service. Later, in Section 6.1.3, it will be 
also discussed which of the parties will manage the roles and permissions of the 
end users.  
                                                                                                                                                
credential object class. It is a responsibility of the authentication service to make sure that the ac-
tual perceived strength of authentication in the beginning of a session does not exceed it. 
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3.4. PKI in Authentication 
Whereas identity flows and authorisation often happen in the back-end systems, 
authentication and access control (“the machine prompting a username and pass-
word”) is where identity management becomes visible to an end user. This tends to 
emphasise the importance of authentication as part of identity management in an 
organisation. People not familiar with the big picture of identity management try to 
find ways to enhance identity management by enhancing authentication, which are 
two separate, although interconnected, issues. 
In a public key infrastructure (PKI), an attribute of an end user’s identity is his 
public key. The private key corresponding to the public key should be in the sole 
control of the end user, for example, in a smart card in the end user’s pocket. In or-
der to authenticate in an information system, an end user uses his private key to re-
spond to a cryptographic challenge presented by the authenticator. A more com-
plete description of PKI, smart cards and their utilisation in an organisation can be 
found in the author’s licentiate thesis [LIND02]. 
PKI, as defined in the X.509 standard [ITUT00], is the infrastructure able to sup-
port the management of public keys able to support authentication, encryption, in-
tegrity or non-repudiation services. According to PKIX (the Internet Engineering 
Task Force working group for X.509 based PKI), it is a set of hardware, software, 
people, policies, and procedures needed to create, manage, store, distribute, and 
revoke digital certificates based on asymmetric cryptography [RFC4949]. PKI is 
another method of managing end users’ identities. A public key certificate, signed 
by a trusted certificate authority, and a signed message from the keyholder can be 
used for authenticating the keyholder, and other unique identifiers, attributes or 
even permissions of the end user can be extracted from his certificate.  
PKIs and directories are complementary ways to implement identity management 
in an organisation. In a directory based implementation, the relying party (e.g. the 
service the end user is using) needs an on-line access to the directory for authenti-
cation and retrieval of attributes. In a PKI based implementation the attributes are 
available in the certificate(s) signed by one or more certificate authorities. Using 
the public key in the certificate, the end user can be authenticated in a distributed 
manner and the certificate authority’s signature guarantees the integrity of the data 
in the certificate. It is also possible to deploy a conversion for certificate and direc-
tory based identity management. For instance, certificates can be issued on-the-fly 
based on the attributes provided by the directory.  
Several studies have shown that PKI is too difficult for common end users to un-
derstand [WHIT99, BALF05, WIND05:56]. Users do not have intuitive under-
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standing of public key cryptography and how PKI is used to achieve a goal, for ex-
ample, to send an encrypted message. Requesting and using a certificate may be 
easier, when a user has a concrete medium – a smart card – to be inserted for au-
thentication, but the drawback is the need for additional hardware and software 
(smart card reader with related drivers). 8 
Publication 2 presented results of a project that looked for ways to introduce PKI 
relying on smart cards in Finnish higher education. The two-year FEIDHE project, 
featured by eight pilots, took place in 2000-2002 and was a common project for all 
the Finnish universities and polytechnics. The publication presents seven conclu-
sions regarding security, interoperability and branding of a PKI smart card and to 
whom and how the smart cards should be introduced.   
An essential finding in the publication was that whereas certificate-based authenti-
cation increases the reliability of authentication, the first step is to introduce a cen-
tralised identity management in the organisation. In centralised identity manage-
ment, an end user has one identity in the organisation, and the public key can be 
introduced as an attribute for that identity. As a result of the publication, focus in 
identity management in Finnish higher education was moved from PKI-based au-
thentication to organisational identity management. 
A usability study [TAUC02] made as part of the project showed that if a PKI with 
smart cards is introduced as an authentication mechanism for end users, they ex-
pect that all or at least a majority of services are available with the smart card au-
thentication. The end users become frustrated in a mixed world, where some of the 
services are available with smart card authentication and some with traditional 
passwords. So, from the usability perspective, PKI and smart-card-based authenti-
cation make sense only, if they can be introduced to a large number of services si-
multaneously. The only reasonable way is to first introduce the centralised identity 
management, and then introduce the public key as one attribute of an end user in 
the centralised identity management. Finally, the PKI-based authentication can be 
introduced to services, provided that applications and end user devices support it 
and that support and helpdesk have been organised for end users.  
Studies have also concluded that equipping an end user with the necessary hard-
ware and software and organising training and support makes PKI/smart card de-
ployment expensive [DAMI03, WIND05:56]. Fulfilling the end users’ expecta-
tions of a smart card-based authentication to all the services may turn out to be too 
costly. Publication 2 suggests that PKI-based authentication is introduced based on 
the need; first, to the most sensitive applications and to end users, such as adminis-
                                                
8 It is still to be seen if integrated architectures, such as a private key placed in the SIM card of a 
mobile phone, manage to alleviate the problem. 
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trators, whose reliable authentication is important. Windley shares this view 
[WIND05:57]. 
3.5. Single Sign-on and Logout 
Information security and usability9 (”the ease of use”) are often considered as com-
peting design goals. Concepts like single sign-on (SSO) can alleviate the confron-
tation by making security systems more usable. Nevertheless, security designers 
too often neglect the whole issue, resulting in introduction of systems with usabil-
ity flaws. Users are known to be the weakest links for security and a security sys-
tem with a usability flaw is a trap that is set for an unsuspecting end user. In 
Publication 3, one trap was located in the logout functionality of common single 
sign-on systems. 
Single sign-on is one step beyond authentication; it means that an end user only 
has to authenticate once and, then, all the services permitted to him are available 
without further authentications. The authentication mechanism can be anything, 
nowadays often username and password. 
Pashadilis et al [PASH03] and De Clercq [CLER02] have presented architectures 
and systems for single sign-on not only in the web but in information systems in 
general. In his taxonomy, Pashadilis presents four categories for single sign-on 
systems. These categories are summarised in Table 3. The closest corresponding 
categories by De Clercq are presented in parentheses.  
Table 3. The four categories for single sign-on (SSO) systems by Pashadilis 
et al [PASH03]. De Clercq’s corresponding categories are in parentheses 
[CLER02].  
 Local SSO systems Proxy-based SSO systems 
Pseudo-SSO sys-
tems 
Local pseudo-SSO systems 
(secure client-side creden-
tial caching) 
Proxy-based pseudo-SSO 
systems (secure server-side 
credential caching) 
True SSO systems Local true SSO systems 
(public key infrastructure -
based SSO systems) 
Proxy-based true SSO sys-
tems (token-based SSO sys-
tems) 
In pseudo-SSO systems, no modifications are necessary for the actual service. In-
stead, there is an intermediate pseudo-SSO component between the user and the 
                                                
9 ISO 9241-11 standard defines usability as the extent to which a product can be used by specified 
users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified con-
text of use. [ISO98] 
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service. The component authenticates the user and provides his cached credentials 
to the service. In a true SSO system, there is no cache for user credentials. Instead, 
the services are modified to trust assertions made by a specific Authentication Ser-
vice Provider that takes care of the actual authentication of the user. 
In a local SSO system, single sign-on is implemented by a component installed in 
the user's workstation or other client device, whereas in the proxy-based mode, 
there is a separate server dedicated for authentication between the user and the ser-
vice.  
A usable implementation of single sign-on has its challenges. Logout in a single 
sign-on setup is often a neglected functionality. For Publication 3, the authors car-
ried out an empirical study on end users’ expectations of logout in a web single-
sign on system. The study focused mostly on the intranet of an organisation and  
was the first that drew attention to this often-neglected side effect of single sign-
on. The results have implications on how usable services should be implemented in 
a single sign-on environment. 
The following scenario clarifies the logout problem in a single sign-on environ-
ment.  
1. An end user signs in to service A with his web browser and is prompted to 
enter his username and password.  
2. Having used service A, the end user follows a link to service B. Because of 
the single sign-on, he is able to start using the service without further au-
thentication.   
3. Finally, the end user presses a logout button in service B.  
4. If the end user now browses back to service A, does he expect he has to en-
ter his username and password again? 
The study showed that when single sign-on is in place, end users also expect single 
logout. It means that when an end user clicks logout in one of the applications he is 
logged in to, he expects that he will be logged out of all of the applications in the 
single sign-on environment. This is doable in a pseudo single sign-on system (see 
Table 3), where all the traffic goes through the proxy; the session between the end 
user and the pseudo-SSO component is simply torn down, and the end user cannot 
use any of the services any more. The functionality could be implemented also in a 
local pseudo-SSO system. However, common web browsers, for instance, do not 
usually provide logout functionality for session making use of the HTTP Basic Au-
thentication, and the only way to logout is to close the browser. 
 37 
 
However, in true single sign-on systems, logout is cumbersome. Somehow, the 
protocol used for single sign-on should implement a transaction that tears down the 
existing sessions with all the applications the single sign-on covers. In the context 
of web applications, this typically includes removing a cookie from the cookie 
store of the end user’s browser. This covers also any federated services that will be 
introduced in Sections 4 and 6.2.  
Furthermore, the study also concluded that the users should be fully aware whether 
they are unauthenticated or authenticated end users in the service. This can be ac-
complished, for example, by showing the name of the authenticated user in the 
user interface.   
3.6. Identity Management Architecture 
Section 3.2 presented a conceptual infrastructure for identity management. How-
ever, a lot of managerial work has to be carried out before an organisation is in a 
position where it is able to set up an enterprise directory, connect it to existing reg-
istries and let the users enjoy the single sign-on experience. Identities are closely 
coupled to the organisation’s business, and introducing an enterprise directory 
means unifying the organisation’s policies and procedures.  
Windley defines identity management architecture as a coherent set of standards, 
policies, certifications and management activities which are aimed at providing a 
context for implementing a digital identity infrastructure that meets the current 
goals and objectives of the business, and is capable of evolving to meet the future 
goals and objectives [WIND05:134]. According to Fuchs and Pernul, identity man-
agement is based on three pillars; technologies, processes and policies [FUCH07]. 
Identity management architecture is a result of an actively managed evolutionary 
process, also covering issues which have little to do with the actual identity man-
agement at the first sight. 
For example, suppose that the HR registry is elevated as a base registry as pro-
posed in Section 3.2. Entering a new person to the HR registry triggers provision-
ing his identity to the other connected registries and removing it when the contract 
ends. Earlier, the HR department has considered that their primary task is that 
monthly salaries are paid in time, and the clerks in the department have phased 
their work to serve that goal. As a result, the practice may be that the clerks gather 
new contracts of employment and enter them to the HR registry once a month, and 
it turns out that the only day the HR registry is up to date is the day the salaries are 
paid. However, if the HR registry is used for provisioning and de-provisioning em-
ployees’ identities, the registry should be updated on a daily basis. As Mueller 
[MUEL04] points out, use of the HR department as the entry point for user data 
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may cause unanticipated problems, because HR people are not focused on how 
other departments use the data.  
As another example, during projects in the Finnish universities, the author has of-
ten faced a practice that employees have several periodical contracts of employ-
ment in a sequence. When a new period starts, there may be a gap of a few days or 
weeks before the busy head of the institute is at the office for signing the new con-
tract. Meanwhile, the employee contacts the IT service desk and asks some grace 
period for his user accounts to be able to continue his work. However, this is cur-
ing the consequence, not the cause of the problem. Missing contracts of employ-
ment10 may cause also other problems, for instance, with insurances and, after all, 
it is modest that the employee is able to be confident that he is really employed and 
will be paid salary. Instead of designing and maintaining processes for the prob-
lems caused by delayed renewals of contracts, the organisation should pay atten-
tion to the efficiency of the process for hiring and renewing the contracts of em-
ployment. Timely renewal of contracts is desirable both for the employee and the 
employer. 
Centralised identity management means processes and data flows across organisa-
tional units. One of the practical challenges of identity management architecture is 
unifying syntax and semantics of the data flows. What are the codes and vocabu-
laries used in different organisational units? What do they mean and how are they 
used? Codes and vocabularies cover, for instance, structure of the organisation, 
project codes and job titles, different types of user identities etc. Unifying attribute 
syntaxes and semantics is a requirement, if attributes are used for authorisation. 
Role- or attributes-based authorisation does not make sense, if the parties do not 
have a common view on what a particular value means. 
For instance, university libraries intend to license scientific journals to their stu-
dents, faculty and supporting staff, irrespective of where they are located, and to 
their other regular and registered users on-site [LIGU07]. Earlier, the access con-
trol of electronic journals was based on the campus IP address space and there was 
no technical means to make a fine-grained enforcement. Anyone using a machine 
on campus was able to access the material. There was no need for distinguishing 
between degree students, open university students and further education students, 
or researchers that were actually employed by the university (i.e., had a contract of 
employment) and researchers working on a grant. Nowadays, identity management 
systems make this distinction possible, bringing libraries to face a new question; 
how do they define a student and a faculty member? 
                                                
10 The law recognises also an oral contract of employment, but in the Finnish public sector, includ-
ing higher education institutions, all the decisions should have written form, including decision to 
employ someone. 
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A fundamental requirement for centralised identity management is that organisa-
tional units are not reluctant to co-operate with each other. As shown by a study in 
the UK universities, there may be a significant amount of mistrust between the or-
ganisation’s IT service unit and other organisational units on the same hierarchical 
level. A reason for that is lack of communication, understanding and coordination 
within the administration and between the functions of the institutions. According 
to the study, many departments considered the services provided by the IT service 
unit inadequate and developed their own IT services and IT support staff. Central-
ised identity management means centralised control of data and it is hard to 
achieve in an organisation with lack of trust and confidence. [ALLE02] 
3.7. A Method for Improving Organisational Identity Management 
Previous sections have presented issues that should be taken into account when de-
signing organisation’s identity management. To conclude this section, a method to 
improve organisational identity management architecture is presented. The method 
consists of six steps. 
Step 1. Identify the owner of identity management infrastructure 
At first, ownership for the identity management related issues in the organisation 
needs to be decided. Usually, the owner is located in the senior management of the 
organisation’s IT services unit. The owner needs to have a broad perspective of the 
business of the organisation, which makes it easier to focus the refinements on the 
issues that are most essential for the success of the organisation. The owner has 
also potential to become the project’s key proponent in the organisation. In project 
management literature [SCHW07:75], this role is often known as the champion of 
the project. 
Step 2. Get top management support 
Identity management related projects have influence and need commitment and re-
sources in several parts of the organisation. In order to drive changes affecting sev-
eral organisational units, the commitment of the top management is a success fac-
tor of the project.  This is a well-known advice both in project management 
literature [SCHW07:58] and in business process re-engineering literature 
[VOND96:151]. 
Top management support is needed, because identity management projects cause 
not only technical changes, but also the changes in the processes in the organisa-
tion. Otherwise, the ideas would be rejected by the middle management. As de-
scribed in Section 3.6, organisational units do not necessarily see how their proc-
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esses relate to the identity management architecture of the organisation, and tend to 
optimise the processes to reflect their own needs. 
Step 3. Analysis phase 
The analysis phase reflects the three motivations of identity management presented 
in Table 1 (page 2). The risk analysis examines the probability and severity of re-
alisation of risks related to identity management. What are the assets that require 
most protection? Are there risks related to unauthorised access, reliability of au-
thentication or inerasability and non-repudiation of the audit trail? How to balance 
the risks and the costs of protection? 
Analysis of the potential to improve efficiency focuses on reducing costs. Is there 
potential to cut overlapping maintenance of identity information in the organisa-
tion? Could improved authentication and single sign-on reduce the time people 
spend on logging in to information systems? Could role-based authorisation poli-
cies or a general-purpose workflow engine for applying and granting permissions 
ease management and auditability of authorisation?  
Analysis of potential for new businesses or new ways to organise internal informa-
tion management tries to identify ways how improved identity management could 
enable issues that have not been possible or have been too difficult earlier. For in-
stance, standard interfaces could ease outsourcing of information systems. New in-
formation systems which make use of the rich set of attributes available for end us-
ers could be introduced. 
Step 4. Requirements specification phase 
Based on the three dimensions of the analysis phase, requirements for the organisa-
tional identity management architecture are specified. Are there external regula-
tions that the organisation needs to comply with? What are the needs for identity 
flows in the organisation? How soon should an end user’s account be closed when 
he departs? What kind of attributes does the organisation want to utilise in its iden-
tity management and which of them have potential in authorisation? What are the 
needs for authentication; who needs to be authenticated strongly and where? What 
are the requirements for audit trail? 
Step 5. Design phase 
In the design phase, the identity management architecture fulfilling the require-
ments is designed. Owners for different pieces of identity information are agreed 
on; for instance, the HR unit becomes the owner of employees’ names and em-
ployee numbers and IT services unit owns their email addresses. Once the owners 
of attributes are known, they are able to decide the authoritative sources for the at-
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tributes; for example, the authoritative source for employees’ name and employee 
number might be the HR registry. The owners of the attributes become also re-
sponsible for defining the attribute semantics, including vocabularies, if any.  
Having agreed on authoritative sources, some of them are elevated to base regis-
tries, which are the places where new identities enter the organisation. A map of 
the organisation’s IT systems can now be drawn, where some systems are base reg-
isters for identities, some are authoritative sources for attributes and the rest of the 
systems rely on the identity data provided to them. This results in a design of iden-
tity flows in the organisation. 
Because the identity management architecture is strongly coupled with the proc-
esses in the organisation, necessary changes to the processes need to be identified 
and designed. For instance, if HR registry is used as the base registry for em-
ployee’s identities, process changes may be needed to ensure that the data in HR 
registry is always up-to-date. If identity data is designed to flow from HR registry 
to the building access system, the management process of the building access sys-
tem need to be changed so that the porters will not any more enter employees’ 
identity data to the system when providing them with access cards. If permissions 
to use information systems have been based on circulating signed paper forms, re-
placing them by a workflow engine causes process changes. Designing the process 
changes requires considerable amount of understanding of the organisation’s func-
tions. 
Step 6. Incremental implementation phase 
In the implementation phase, the design is put into practice. The organisation ac-
quires necessary products, such as a metadirectory, and integrates them to the base 
registries, authoritative sources and other connected systems. Necessary changes to 
the organisation’s identity data semantics and vocabularies are implemented and 
new processes introduced. Necessary changes to the processes of the organisation 
are implemented.  
The first five steps followed the well-known waterfall model for systems develop-
ment lifecycle. For the implementation phase, an incremental model is proposed, 
consisting of a series of partial products (increments) throughout the project time-
scale [GRAH92]. New systems and features are delivered gradually, trying to 
minimise the disturbance it causes to the daily life of the organisation.  Early re-
sults of the project can be shown, inspiring further development of the identity 
management architecture. Benefits of the identity management architecture can be 
first introduced where the analysis has shown biggest benefits, whereas the less 
important features can be delivered later. 
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This section presented a method to improve the implementation of organisational 
identity management architecture. However, improving identity management is a 
continuous process. Changes in the organisation’s business, new needs and the 
new possibilities provided by technology lead to changed requirements and the re-
design of the identity management architecture. Some of them may be influenced 
by federated identity management, which is going to be introduced next.  
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4. FEDERATED IDENTITY MANAGEMENT 
So far, this thesis has discussed identity management in the context of one organi-
sation. However, the Internet is an inherently cross-organisational construct and all 
the more (typically, web-based) services provided by different organisations ex-
pect users to log in. Of course, each organisation can set up an identity manage-
ment infrastructure of their own, as presented in the Section 3. However, during 
the last years, cross-organisational (a.k.a. federated) identity management has be-
come a subject of research. Well-known standards have also emerged, and soft-
ware vendors have introduced compliant products, paving the street for use in pro-
duction environments. 
In cross-organisational identity management, organisations establish loose partner-
ships to share the identity data of their end users. Federating end users’ identities 
has become the best-established concept for this, the term expressing that people’s 
partial identities in several organisations and their services are coupled together. 
The main motivation of federated identity management is to enhance user conven-
ience and privacy as well as to decentralise user management tasks through the 
federation of identities among business partners [SHIN04]. This section studies the 
concept of federated identity management in more detail.  
Traditionally, authentication and authorisation of end users have been closely cou-
pled to the application itself. From the software engineering perspective, the prin-
cipal idea behind federated identity management is to make use of Web service 
technology to separate authentication and authorisation mechanisms from the ap-
plications themselves [GAED05]. 
4.1. A Model for Federated Identity 
Publication 4 used a model presented by early Shibboleth documents [ERDO02] 
for federated identity management. A similar model has become predominant 
among standardisation bodies and software vendors. The Liberty Alliance’s terms 
Identity Provider (IdP) and Service Provider (SP) have superseded the terms Ori-
gin and Target site. The model is depicted in Figure 9. Depending on the context, 
the term Identity and Service Provider may refer either to a server running related 
service or to the organisation responsible for the service. 
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Figure 9. A model for federated identity management 
An Identity Provider is the party responsible for issuing and maintaining an end 
user’s identity, including related attributes and authentication credentials. The ac-
tual set of attributes depends on the context. In public sector services, attributes 
like National Identification Number11 or being guardian of an underage child are 
important, in commercial service attributes like credit card number, and in univer-
sities the ones describing the end user’s relationship to the university, such as be-
ing a degree student, professor, lecturer of a particular course etc. The model does 
not stop Service Providers from keeping attributes of their own, and several Ser-
vice Providers probably want to maintain user preferences and other attributes re-
lated to customising their service for the particular end user. 
The Identity Provider is also the party responsible for the authentication of the end 
user. There may be several authentication methods available, and depending on the 
service and the user’s role and permission in the service, a Service Provider may 
expect some degree of reliability of the authentication carried out by the Identity 
Provider. The Identity and Service Provider need to have common standards for 
expressing the reliability of authentication. For instance, the US National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST) has presented a four-level categorisation for 
assurance of authentication, covering both identity proofing of new end users and 
the authentication mechanisms used when an end user signs on to a service 
[BURR06]. The European Commission has suggested a similar model for govern-
ment services in EU [IDAB07]. 
Based on the attributes (and a sufficiently high authentication level), the Service 
Provider may decide what kind of service to provide to the end user.  The attributes 
                                                
11 According to a study by Otjacques et al [OTJA06], all the EU countries, except Germany and 
Hungary, have or are planning to have at least national identification numbers. Some countries 
also have sector-specific identification numbers. 
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provided by an Identity Provider help the Service Provider in this decision. They 
also provide means for role-based access control, giving the end user permission to 
certain functionalities based on his role as expressed by the Identity Provider. If 
more fine-grained access control mechanisms are needed the Service Provider may 
be coupled to an authorisation infrastructure, such as PERMIS [CHAD06, XU05]. 
A user’s right to opt-in for attribute release will be covered in Section 4.3.4. 
The unique identifier of an end user is a particularly interesting detail, not in the 
least from the privacy and anonymity perspective. A Service Providers’ ability to 
track12 an end user’s behaviour and aggregate his personal data depends strongly 
on it. Pfitzmann et al [PFIT05] define five kinds of pseudonyms, which are listed 
below in the order of increasing strength of anonymity. 
- Person pseudonyms (such as a national identification number and a 
phone number) are regarded as a representation of the holder’s civil 
identity and are not designed to preserve his anonymity. 
- Role pseudonyms (such as a customer pseudonym or an Internet ac-
count; attributes like eduPersonPrincipalName [INTE06]), which are 
limited to specific roles. Roles may be assigned by the end user himself 
or by an organisation, such as a company or an employer. 
- Relationship pseudonyms (for example, eduPersonTargetedID 
[INTE06]). A different pseudonym is used for each communication 
partner. The Identity Provider uses the same pseudonym every time a 
given end user accesses a given Service Provider, but for different Ser-
vice Providers the end user has a different pseudonym. This pseudonym 
corresponds to the persistent identifier of SAML [RAGO06]. 
- Role-relationship pseudonyms. For each role and for each communica-
tion partner a different role-relationship pseudonym is used. 
- Transaction pseudonym. For each transaction, a transaction pseudonym 
non-linkable to any other pseudonym is used. This corresponds to the 
transient identifiers of SAML [RAGO06] and to the concept of a handle 
in early Shibboleth documentation [ERDO02]. Transient identifiers are 
used only during one session. A given end user has a different pseudo-
nym every time he enters the same Service Provider. This is the sce-
nario with the strongest anonymity, where there is actually no unique 
identifier for an end user at all. The Identity Provider merely releases a 
set of attributes to the Service Provider, and if the attributes do not 
                                                
12 As noticed by Pfitzmann, an Identity Provider may have an extensive log of services the user 
has been using, which may become another privacy threat [PFIT03b]. Bhargav-Spantzel et al rec-
ognises this as a disadvantage of a relationship-focused system such as SAML [BHAR06]. 
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uniquely identify the individual, the Service Provider has little means to 
deduce, who the user is.  
In addition to Identity and Service Providers, there can be a third kind of party, 
called an Attribute Provider. An Attribute Provider has no means to authenticate an 
end user, but is authoritative to some attribute of him. An attribute provider can be, 
for example, in conjunction with an Identity Provider; the Identity Provider au-
thenticates an end user and is responsible for a basic set of his attributes, and the 
Attribute Provider provides additional attributes on him. 
Others have also proposed models for federated identity management. Djordjevic’s 
model [DJOR05] identifies more primitive functionalities than the author’s model, 
such as secure token service (STS) for issuing and validating assertions carrying 
attributes and Policy Decision Point (PDP) for making access control decisions, 
and analyses their roles in existing federated identity architectures. Gaedge et al 
[GAED05] have also considered single sign-on and self-service identity manage-
ment interface as part of their federated identity model. In the author’s work, these 
issues are covered by organisational identity management. 
4.2. Requirements for Federated Identity 
The model of federated identity in the previous section provided basic roles for the 
parties involved. This section introduces a set of issues that the Identity and Ser-
vice Providers need to agree on. The community that decides on the issues is called 
an identity federation, which will be introduced in Section 5.  
This section is based on Publication 5. These requirements were used and found 
beneficial by the author in the early years of federated identity, when few people 
were familiar with the concept. In the requirements, the familiar technical and non-
technical pieces (protocol, schema, PKI and trust) are used to construct the larger 
picture of federated identity, making the concept easier to understand and adopt. 
Finally, the requirements are compared to those presented by others. 
4.2.1. Federating Protocol 
Holzmann defines a protocol as a set of rules that govern the interaction of concur-
rent processes in distributed systems [HOLZ91].  In federated identity, the federat-
ing protocol provides the basic means for the Identity and Service Provider to ex-
change identity related messages with each other. Over the years, several protocols 
have been proposed, such as the proprietary .NET Passport protocol of Microsoft 
[MICR04]. This section mostly concentrates on SAML, which has got a wider sup-
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port in the industry. WS-Federation is also briefly introduced. An extensive study 
on federating protocols is available, e.g., in [IDAB07b]. 
The Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) standard of Oasis Open defines 
an XML-based framework for describing and exchanging security information be-
tween on-line business partners [RAGO06]. Being an open standard, it is sup-
ported by several software vendors, making it a prominent candidate as a widely-
used technical protocol for federated identity.  
SAML makes use of features such as HTTP redirects and HTTP POSTs, which 
make SAML currently mostly intended for the web environment. SAML is a zero-
footprint protocol, meaning that an end user only needs a standard web browser 
[PFIZ02]. This is an important feature, since it is evident that end users are reluc-
tant to install any protocol-specific software in their clients [GROS03].  
SAML version 1.1, released in September 2003, was adopted by Liberty Alliance, 
a global organisation of players in IT, finance, telecommunications, media, manu-
facturing, government and education [LIBE07]. Liberty Alliance introduced the 
Liberty ID-FF 1.2 in November 2003. In higher education and research, Internet2, 
a networking consortium comprising more than 200 U.S. universities [INTE07], 
introduced Shibboleth, which specifies and implements a profile of SAML1.1, in 
summer 2003.  
The security of SAML-based protocols has been a subject for research. Gross 
[GROS03] identified vulnerabilities and proposed attacks on Browser/Artefact pro-
file of SAML version 1.0. Pfitzmann et al [PFIT03] discovered a vulnerability to a 
man-in-the-middle attack by a malicious Service Provider on one of the profiles in 
the Liberty version 1.0 specification. The vulnerability was fixed in the next speci-
fication release.  
Version 2.0 of SAML, released in March 2005, was influenced by both Liberty and 
Shibboleth.  SAML 2.0 works in the environment of standard web browsers. This 
short introduction is based on SAML 2.0 technical overview [RAGO06].  
SAML has four main components; assertions, protocols, bindings and profiles. As-
sertion is a statement about a subject, such as an end user, expressed in XML. In 
SAML 2.0, one assertion may carry any number of statements of three kind; au-
thentication statements (the subject was authenticated with a password), attribute 
statements (the subject’s name is Bob Smith) and authorisation statements (the 
subject is entitled to a certain transaction in the service).  
SAML protocols define seven request/response pairs making use of the assertions. 
Authentication request protocol is used when a Service Provider asks an Identity 
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Provider to authenticate a subject. Single logout protocol carries out the logout in 
single sign-on scenario (see Section 3.5). Assertion query and request protocol de-
fines a set of protocols for obtaining SAML assertions. Artefact resolution protocol 
is used, when assertions are obtained by a reference (called an artefact). Name 
identifier management protocol is used for managing the identifier linking partial 
identities in the Identity and Service Provider or to cut an existing link. Name iden-
tifier mapping protocol makes it possible to link partial identities of an individual 
between several Identity and Service Providers. 
SAML Bindings define how the protocols above are mounted on underlying trans-
port protocols. HTTP redirect, HTTP POST and HTTP Artefact bindings utilise a 
web browser’s HTTP redirect or HTTP POST functionalities to pass on an asser-
tion or artefact. SAML SOAP binding makes use of SOAP protocol directly be-
tween the Identity and Service Provider, whereas reverse SOAP (PAOS) makes the 
browser pass the SOAP messages. Finally, SAML URI binding defines means for 
retrieving existing SAML assertions by resolving a URI. 
In previous paragraphs, assertions with three kinds of statements, seven protocol 
definitions for carrying the assertions, and six bindings for carrying the protocols 
were shortly described. SAML profiles define how the other components shall be 
combined to make products interoperable. Eight profiles are defined, including 
profiles for single sign-on and single logout, Identity Provider discovery for pick-
ing up the correct Identity Provider and so on. 
WS-Federation [LOCK06] is another well-known industry standard for federated 
identity. WS-Federation covers mainly web services based scenarios where two 
servers communicate using SOAP protocol.  WS-Federation defines also a Web 
Passive Requestors profile to support browser-based scenarios, providing function-
ality that is comparable to SAML. 
WS-Federation is based on Oasis Open’s standards WS-Security [NADA06] and 
WS-Trust [NADA07] and extends them to cover federated identity scenarios. WS-
Trust defines a service model called Security Token Service, implementing a pro-
tocol for requesting and issuing security tokens. A security token is a collection of 
attributes, dubbed claims in the WS-Trust specification.  The token format of WS-
Trust is flexible and, for instance, SAML assertions can be used as security tokens.  
Using Security Token Service, it is possible to construct the model of an Identity 
Provider and a Service Provider (called Resource Provider in the specification) as 
presented in Section 4.1. [GOOD07] 
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4.2.2. Schema for Attributes 
In addition to the federating protocol, the Identity and Service Providers have to 
agree on the attributes that are exchanged. The specification for attributes is often 
called a schema, and it covers both the syntax (for instance, the attribute’s value 
consists of characters a-z, A-Z) and the semantics (for example, the attribute de-
scribes its holder’s home postal address). 
The concept of schema has its origins in LDAP directories (Light-weight Directory 
Access Protocol), and their way to construct their schema as object classes. Indeed, 
the SAML-based protocols re-utilise the object classes well known in the LDAP 
world, such as Person [RFC4519], OrgPerson [RFC4519] and InetOrgPerson 
[RFC2798]. Whereas Internet standards-based schemas provide a good basis for 
interoperability, they often have to be supplemented by context-specific attributes. 
For instance, in higher education, Educause has specified an additional object class 
called eduPerson [INTE06], specifying concepts peculiar to higher education, such 
as a person’s role as a student, staff member or an alumnus. Furthermore, Trans-
European Research and Education Networking Association Terena has supple-
mented eduPerson with European specialties, such as those related to the Bologna 
process [TERE07].  
 
Figure 10. The schema onion 
Putting the object classes together results in a schema onion (Figure 10). The 
widely supported common schemas are in the core of the onion, surrounded by ob-
ject classes specific to a certain business or geographic location. In the outmost 
sphere, there are attributes that are perhaps used only by one or some Identity and 
Service Providers, limiting their use in federated transactions. In the figure, funet-
EduPerson [CSC06] refers to the schema containing Finnish specialities, and tut-
Common object classes 
(Person, OrgPerson,  
InetOrgPerson) 
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tutPerson 
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Person are attributes that are defined and used locally in the Tampere University of 
Technology. 
In a federated scenario, an Identity Provider decides which attributes to adopt and 
populate for its end users. The identity federation may agree that some attributes 
are mandatory and the rest are optional. However, individual Service Providers 
may set additional requirements for attributes; for example, an employer may sign 
in to the extranet services of a occupational health service only if his Identity Pro-
vider is able to release his national identification number, which is used as his 
unique identifier in the Service Provider. In the end, this results in a demand-and-
supply markets of attributes; Service Providers try to find out what are the attrib-
utes available in an Identity Provider, and Identity Providers try to decide, what at-
tributes they should populate in order to serve the Service Providers needs.  
4.2.3. Security Infrastructure 
The Internet provides an insecure transport for messages, and intermediate parties 
are able to capture, tamper and replay messages on it. Extra protection for mes-
sages exchanged by Identity and Service Providers has to be implemented, in order 
to provide confidentiality for the assertions exchanged and to ensure their integrity 
(that they are genuine messages sent by the other party) and authenticity (that they 
are not replays of earlier messages [ANDE01:11]). 
There are many cryptographic mechanisms to provide confidentiality, integrity and 
authenticity services for assertions. Timestamps and nonces can be used for coun-
tering replay attacks. Symmetric cryptography can provide protection against con-
fidentiality threats. A common denominator for a large-scale use of federated iden-
tity seems to be making use of public key cryptography and PKI to ensure the 
identity of the communicating parties and exchanging the symmetric key that is 
used to ensure confidentiality of the assertions. 
The usability of PKI has hampered its use for authenticating individuals. However, 
in federated identity, an end user does not have to have a public key of his own; it 
is sufficient that the Identity and Service Providers are able to exchange messages 
secured by a public key cryptosystem and the certificates issued to the servers. The 
only step where an end user faces a certificate is when he uses his web browser to 
enter the Identity and Service Providers, which are expected to use SSL connec-
tions with the web browser. 
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4.2.4. Trust 
As McKnight and Chervany have shown, there are various definitions of trust in 
different disciplines. In this thesis, McKnight’s and Chervany’s definition of trust-
ing intention has been adopted: trust is the extent to which one party is willing to 
depend on the other party in a given situation with a feeling of relative security, 
even though negative consequences are possible. This definition includes that (a) 
there is a prospect of negative consequences (i.e., a risk); (b) the truster is depend-
ent on the trustee and (c) willing to be that with feelings of security; (d) the truster 
cannot control the trustee, and (e) the trust is situation-specific (e.g., covers man-
aging identities, not flying an airplane). [KNIG96] 
Federated identity cannot establish trust – it can only communicate it 
[WIND05:130]. Among isolated, centralised and federated identity management 
models, federated identity is the one that requires the most trust assumptions 
[JØSA05]. Because of its non-technical nature, establishing trust is maybe the 
most difficult engineering problem in federated identity. There are incomplete or 
no technical means to ensure that the trusted party is actually trustworthy. Having 
faced the limits of engineering, it is necessary to find non-technical means to estab-
lish trust between the parties, this being when the lawyers are called in.  
The organisational and contractual aspects of an identity federation will be covered 
in Section 5. In brief, a Service Provider must trust that the authentication carried 
out by the Identity Provider has been done as reliably as the Service Provider ex-
pects and the attributes provided are up-to-date. The Identity Provider must trust 
that the Service Provider does not use the attributes in a way that infringes the end 
user’s privacy. And the end user must trust that neither the Identity Provider nor 
Service Provider is endangering his privacy. 
Federated identity management is a triangle where the Identity Provider releases 
the end user’s possibly sensitive personal data to the Service Provider. Typically, 
the end user has a relationship with the Identity Provider; for instance, he might be 
an employee, a customer or a student of the organisation. The end user trusts the 
Identity Provider at least to the extent that lets it process his personal data, but the 
Service Provider may be new for him. The Identity Provider, on the other hand, 
has a business relationship with the Service Provider, either directly or via an iden-
tity federation as will be explained in Section 5.  
For example, the employer has outsourced the occupational health care and buys it 
from a company providing health care services. The parties have agreed that self-
service in the web and federated identity management is used when employees re-
serve their appointments to the reception. During the first login, the employer (the 
Identity Provider) provides the health care company (the Service Provider) with 
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necessary personal data, including the employee’s national identification number, 
which is considered sensitive in several European countries [OTJA06]. The em-
ployee, however, may not have previous knowledge of the company but uses the 
service of necessity. 
This leads us to the question of transitivity of trust, which will be introduced in de-
tail in Section 5.2. In short, if the end user trusts the Identity Provider, and the 
Identity Provider trusts the Service Provider, does the end user trust the Service 
Provider? If the answer is an exclusive yes, how long chains are we able to con-
struct (for instance, see the discussion of interfederations in Section 5.4). If the an-
swer is a definite no, difficult occasions may be encountered. For instance, if an 
employee does not trust a Service Provider but his employer expects him to log in 
to it (and, thus, to release his personal data to it), does the employee refuse to do 
his job and can be fired? Or, in the case of an outsourced occupational health care 
service, how can he use the service his employer is obliged to offer to him? Luck-
ily, in European Union, the law protects the end user strongly. The data protection 
directive’s implications to federated identity management will be covered later in 
Section 4.3. 
It is worth noticing that the division of responsibilities described in Section 4.1 
makes it easier for the parties to trust each other. There are mechanisms in place to 
control which attributes are released to a Service Provider. Sensitive attributes, es-
pecially passwords, do not have to be exposed to a Service Provider at all. Other 
privacy-enhancing properties are introduced in the Section 4.3. 
4.2.5. Previous Research 
Others have also presented requirements for federated identity management. 
Damiani et al [DAMI03] have proposed a broader model for identity management, 
covering issues such as identity lifecycle management and support for mobile de-
vices. Damiani’s proposal is more complete and is not limited to the requirements 
for federated identity management. He and Zhang present a framework with three 
requirements; user convenience, controlled information disclosure and preserving 
the privacy of the user [HE05]. 
Subenthiran et al [SUBE04] have proposed some more specific requirements, such 
as self-service for an end user and identity life-cycle management for the organisa-
tion maintaining the identities. In this thesis, all these requirements are considered 
part of organisational identity management. Mobility and roaming, a requirement 
proposed by Subenthira, is in this thesis considered an application of federated 
identity management and will be covered in Section 6.2.3. Scalability is a natural 
requirement for a system. Finally, Subenthiran identifies the billing of services as 
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one of the requirements – an aspect that is indeed necessary for commercial ser-
vices. 
Jøsang et al [JØSA05] have studied trust requirements in federated identity. They 
have also identified the scenario, where two or several Service Providers band to-
gether to share user identities. Jøsang et al require that Service Providers do that 
only on user consent and adhere to the accepted policy. Furthermore, care should 
be taken to make sure the mapping of identities between Service Providers is cor-
rect. 
During recent years, trust negotiation has been a topic for research. Trust negotia-
tion deals with concepts such as formulating security policies and credentials, de-
termining whether particular sets of credentials satisfy the relevant policies, and 
deferring trust to third parties. A trust negotiation consists of iteratively disclosing 
certified credentials as depicted in Figure 11. During negotiation, parties incremen-
tally establish trust by disclosing credentials to verify properties of the negotiating 
parties. [BERT04] 
Figure 11. Trust negotiation process [BERT04]. 
Trust negotiation is intended for parties which do not have pre-existing direct trust 
relationships, although they must both trust the same trusted third parties. 
[BERT04]. However, they need to have an agreement on language and system re-
quirements as presented by Bertino et al, including semantics for the policies and 
credentials, certification authorities and other trusted third parties, privacy protec-
tion mechanisms etc. These are also requirements for federated identity. A topic 
for future research is how federated identity and trust negotiation could leverage 
each other. 
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This section has discussed the requirements of federated identity and concluded 
that trust between the Identity and Service Providers and an end user is a necessity 
– a property to which Sampath et al [SAMP06] refer as the system trust. In addi-
tion to that, for transactions between people in the networked world, there is a re-
quirement of trust between end users of the system, dubbed by Sampath et al as in-
terpersonal trust. In their paper [SAMP06], Sampath et al present a reputation-
based architecture, where the trust of an end user can be measured as a function of 
observations by peer users, recommendations of Service Providers and history of 
evidence of the user. End users get their good or bad reputation little by little, de-
pending on how they behave in the Services, and their measured trust becomes part 
of their identity. 
4.3. Privacy Considerations in Federated Identity Management 
Whereas schemas define syntax and semantics for attributes and federation proto-
cols, like SAML, how to exchange them, neither of the two explains how to com-
ply with the privacy laws in an attribute exchange. This is the point where the 
scope of this thesis must be widen from technical perspective to cover also the le-
gal sides of federated identity management. 
In Section 4.3.5, a survey will be made on previous research available on privacy 
in federated identity management. Research articles provide important impulses to 
further research and development work in federated identity. However, the con-
crete problems practitioners need to solve are how to make their implementation 
compliant with current legislation.  
In the European law, the data protection directive [EP95] regulates the processing 
of personal data and sets the legal basis for federating identities as well. In Finland, 
the personal data act [PF99] implements the data protection directive in the na-
tional Finnish legislation.  
Publication 5 provides an interpretation of the data protection directive in the con-
text of federated identity. It arose from the practical need to understand how feder-
ated identity can be deployed into production without infringing the privacy laws. 
This Section 4.3 is based on the publication, which has also been the basis for the 
federation deployments the author has been involved in. 
4.3.1. Definitions in the Directive 
Article 2 of the data protection directive defines personal data as any information 
that relates to an identified or identifiable natural person. Any attribute, that can be 
considered uniquely identifying, such as a username, email address and social se-
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curity number, are personal data. An individual may be identified by a set of at-
tributes, such as “female”, “lecturer” and “Software systems laboratory of the 
Tampere University of Technology”, provided that there is only one or a very 
small set (called an anonymity set [PFIT05]) of them. Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party of European Commission points out that the possibility of identify-
ing an individual no longer necessarily means the ability to find out his or her 
name [ARTI07]. The definition of personal data is very wide, covering pseudo-
nyms, cookies, IP addresses, log entries identifying an individual etc. According to 
the UK Information commissioner, in the context of the on-line world, the infor-
mation that identifies an individual is that which uniquely locates him in that 
world, by distinguishing him from others [UKIC07:12]. 
In the directive, processing of personal data is defined as any operation or set of 
operations which is performed upon personal data, such as collecting, storing, dis-
seminating and so on. It is clear that user accounts in an Identity Provider are per-
sonal data, and, therefore, the Identity Provider processes personal data. The Ser-
vice Provider processes personal data, if the attributes provided by the Identity 
Provider together with other records collected by the Service Provider relate to an 
identified or identifiable individual. 
4.3.2. Purpose of Processing Personal Data 
The dependency on the purpose of processing personal data is fundamental to pri-
vacy laws in Europe. According to the data protection directive, (Article 6) Mem-
ber states shall provide that personal data must be (b) collected for specified, ex-
plicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible 
with those purposes. 
The purpose of processing personal data in the Identity Provider typically follows 
the organisation’s charter. For example, in higher education institutions, personal 
data are processed to support research and education in the institution, in banks to 
provide banking services to a customer and take care of his customership.  
Releasing personal data from an Identity Provider to a Service Provider is process-
ing personal data. Following the article cited above, the Service Provider must 
specify beforehand, for what purposes it is going to collect personal data. Releas-
ing personal data from an Identity Provider to the Service Provider is possible 
only, if the purpose specified by the Service Provider is compatible with the pur-
pose of processing personal data in the Identity Provider.  
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4.3.3. Relevance of Attributes 
According to the data protection directive (Article 6) Member states shall provide 
that personal data must be (c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to 
the purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed. 
When releasing personal data from an Identity Provider to a Service Provider, both 
parties are responsible for taking care that only relevant personal data are released 
by an Identity Provider to a Service Provider. An Identity Provider is responsible 
for finding out which attributes the Service Provider needs and making sure that no 
more than adequate attributes are released. The Service Provider may gather only 
relevant attributes. The relevance of attributes depends on the context: For gov-
ernment and health care services, social security number is probably often a rele-
vant attribute as it is used for identifying individuals. Then again, for schools and 
universities, social security number is often excessive, because schools use student 
numbers instead.  
4.3.4. Informed Consent 
According to the directive, an individual’s consent is the basis for processing per-
sonal data. (Article 7) Member States shall provide that personal data may be 
processed only if:  
(a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; 
(b) processing is necessary for performance of a contract to which the data subject 
is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering 
into a contract; or  
(c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the 
controller is subject; or  
(d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data sub-
ject; or 
(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public 
interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third 
party to whom the data are disclosed; or 
(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by 
the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, ex-
cept where such interests are overridden by the data subject which require protec-
tion under Article 1(1). 
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Regarding article 7, several scenarios in federated identity probably fall to some 
other category than a). However, another fundamental of the data protection direc-
tive is informing the data subject on processing his personal data. (Article 11) 
When the data have not been obtained from the data subject; Member States shall 
provide that the controller or his representative must at the time of undertaking the 
recording of personal data or if a disclosure to a third party is envisaged, no later 
than the time when the data are first disclosed provide the data subject with at 
least the following information, except when he already has it: 
a) the identity of the controller and of his representative, if any; 
b) the purposes of the processing; 
c) any further information, such as the categories of data concerned, the recipi-
ents or categories of recipients, the existence of the right of access to and the 
right to rectify the data concerning him 
in so far such further information is necessary, having regard to the specific cir-
cumstances in which the data are processed, to guarantee fair processing in re-
spect of the data subject. 
Thus, when personal data is released for the first time, the Identity and Service 
Provider are responsible for providing the end user with the information above. A 
convenient way to do it is to combine it with the step when an Identity Provider 
asks user consent for attribute release. Services in the Internet typically take care 
of the responsibility by publishing their privacy policy, answering the questions. A 
way to organise the responsibility in practice is presented in Publication 5.  
There are already mechanisms available for publishing the privacy policy of a ser-
vice. The Platform for Privacy Preferences Specification (P3P) is a W3C specifica-
tion [WENN06], enabling sites to express their privacy policies in a standard ma-
chine-readable format retrievable by user agents. In the HTTP headers, a web 
browser gets a reference to a web site’s privacy policy, expressed in XML.  Based 
on the policy, a user agent may take automated actions, such as show or reject the 
web page or prompt the user. 
4.3.5. Research on Privacy in Federated Identity Management 
Liberty Alliance has also published guidelines on privacy and EU data protection 
[LIBE05]. The work was independent and done at the same time, and confirms 
both the author’s results and the importance of the topic for real-world deploy-
ment. 
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Privacy in federated identity management has been a subject for research. Pfitz-
mann and Waidner [PFIZ02, PFIT03b] have listed the following privacy require-
ments, some of which are overlapping with the author’s; user consent for attribute 
release, ability for an end user to pick up one of his/her several roles or identities in 
a service, protection against traffic analysis (for instance, the service URL the end 
user is accessing) and ability to support multiple attribute providers (called wal-
lets), which may be also local to the end user’s machine. Unlike the author’s study, 
Pfitzmann’s and Waidner’s paper does not use the EU data protection directive as 
the starting point. 
Ahn and Lam noticed that federated identity management lacks a well-defined 
standardised structure for privacy policies and a mechanism to match the policy 
and a user’s consent. They propose PREP, a language that an Identity Provider 
uses to maintain the end user’s consent and preferences for attribute release. When 
releasing attributes, the Identity Provider compares the attributes requested by the 
Service Provider to the preferences set by the end user. [AHN05] 
Mont et al [MONT03] have expressed their concern that once an attribute has been 
released to a Service Provider, there are few technical means to control that the at-
tribute is not leaked to a third party or used in a way that conflicts with the privacy 
policy. They propose a “sticky” privacy policy that is strongly associated to the at-
tribute by means of encryption; a Service Provider cannot access the attribute 
value before it gets a decryption key from a trusted third party called Tracing and 
Auditing Authority (TAA). For accountability, TAA keeps log of to whom it has 
provided the decryption key. The architecture makes use of identifier-based en-
cryption, Trusted Computing Group technology and tagged operating system tech-
nology. 
Clauss et al [CLAU05] have presented attack goals and models for privacy 
breaches and propose related protection methods. According to Clauss et al, in an 
attack against privacy, the attacker tries to find out information on a user that this 
user does not want to disclose. As a means for an attack, the attacker can use a da-
tabase he may have access to, or by observing the communication and interactivity 
the victim is a part of. For instance, if the attacker is able to observe a victim’s en-
crypted web traffic and simultaneous changes in a database he has access to, he 
may have committed a successful attack. 
Finally, concerns on privacy have initiated a new concept of user-centric identity 
management, which Bhargav-Spantzel et al define as giving an end user control on 
his attributes, in particular on the aspect of releasing attribute information 
[BHAR06]. In their publication, Bhargav-Spantzel et al have presented the re-
quirements of user-centric identity management. Examples of user-centric identity 
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management implementations are the OpenID platform [RECO06, RECO06b] and 
Windows CardSpace [CHAP06]. 
4.4. Federated Identity and Reliability of Authentication 
It is often questioned, how federated identity management relates to the reliability 
of authentication. Some people have the opinion that because of the risk of an 
identity theft, it is safer to have separate identity islands. Identity and authentica-
tion (i.e., verification of identity) are two distinct, although connected, issues, as 
presented in Figure 12. Federated identity can be implemented with weak or strong 
level of authentication. Using the SAML protocol and SAML authentication con-
texts (see Section 4.2.1), the Service Provider can ask the Identity Provider to con-
duct the authentication on a level that fulfils the Service Provider’s needs. 
 
Figure 12. Scope of user identity and reliability of user authentication 
[GNOM07] 
In Publication 4, it was proposed that introducing federated identity management 
also increases the need for strong authentication (the arrow in Figure 12); as more 
services are available with single authentication credentials, the damages caused 
by an identity theft become larger. Madsen et al confirm the results in their paper 
[MADS05], where they present ways how federated identity helps to address cer-
tain aspects of the identity theft problem. Madsen et al also point out that federated 
identity may even increase the reliability of password-based authentication, be-
cause the frequency of authentication decreases and users can be educated to give 
their passwords only to the Identity Provider. The quality of passwords can also be 
expected to be higher, if end users have fewer passwords to remember. 
As concluded by Madsen, federated identity can even accelerate the introduction 
of authentication mechanisms that are stronger than passwords. Because authenti-
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cation is carried out by Identity Providers, the Service Providers do not have to set 
up the necessary technology and provide end users with, for example, the hardware 
tokens necessary for strong authentication. Instead, the task can be carried out by 
dedicated Identity Providers, who serve several Service Providers and are special-
ists in authentication and identity management.  
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5. IDENTITY FEDERATION  
Section 4 discussed federated identity management mostly from the technical point 
of view. This section introduces the organisational aspects of federated identity 
and the concept of an identity federation. 
5.1. Definition 
In this thesis, the identity federation definition by inCommon, the federation of the 
US higher education, has been adopted. A federation is an association of organisa-
tions that come together to exchange information, as appropriate, about their users 
and resources in order to enable collaborations and transactions [INCO07]. This 
definition points out that an identity federation is an organisational entity, “an as-
sociation of organisations”, not a technical entity. This is essential, because the 
goal of a federation is to establish trust (see Section 4.2.4) and trust is between or-
ganisations, not between technical artefacts. The association has a purpose; to en-
able collaborations and transaction, and a plan how to reach the purpose; to ex-
change information about their end users and resources. Whether a federation is 
actually an association as defined in civil law is another story. The legal form of a 
federation will be discussed in Section 5.2. 
In literature, there are other definitions for a federation as well. Madsen et al define 
a federation as an establishment of business agreements, cryptographic trust and 
user identifiers or attributes across security and policy domains to enable more 
seamless cross-domain business interactions [MADS05]. Jøsang et al define a fed-
eration as the set of agreements, standards and technologies that enable a group of 
service providers to recognise user identifiers and entitlements from other service 
providers within a group [JØSA05]. 
An identity federation, or a federation in short, is the concept used in research pa-
pers [e.g., MADS05, BERT06]. Liberty Alliance, however, uses the term Circle of 
Trust (CoT) instead of federation [LIBE07b]. The term federation, as understood 
by Liberty Alliance, is the transaction that links together two partial identities of an 
individual. From a technical perspective, according to Liberty Alliance, a federa-
tion happens when an Identity Provider provides a pseudonym of an end user to a 
Service Provider, causing the end user’s partial identities in the Identity and Ser-
vice Providers to be linked. The reverse action, where linking of the partial identity 
is undone, is called defederation. 
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5.2. Federation Patterns 
This section presents four patterns for the contractual framework of a federation. 
This section is based on Publication 5, which was written based on the concrete 
need to give a legal shape for the use of federated identity. When deploying feder-
ated identity in Finnish higher education in 2004-2005, decisions had to be made 
on what kind of contractual shape was needed, what kinds of contracts the joining 
institutions had to sign, how the federation was governed and so on. Later, Liberty 
Alliance has also provided guidance in the contractual framework of a federation 
[LIBE07c]. 
Section 4.2.4 defined trust as the extent to which one party is willing to depend on 
the other party in a given situation with a feeling of relative security, even though 
there is a risk of negative consequences. This holds true for organisations joining a 
federation, as well. A key element in assessing and managing the risk is having a 
contractual relationship with the other federation participants. The contract makes 
it explicit what are the rights and obligations for the organisations, what are the 
consequences in case of a breach of the contract and how the federation is gov-
erned.  
Phillip Windley has presented three federation patterns [WIND05:125] and be-
lieves that organisations will explore all the three patterns in a sequence. 
Windley’s results confirm the results presented in Publication 5. In this section, 
Windley’s terminology is used. 
This section analyses also the trust properties of the federation patterns presented. 
Some of the patterns require transitivity of trust, which makes trust establishment 
more difficult. Transitivity of trust means that if organisation a trusts organisation 
b and organisation b trusts organisation c, organisation a trust organisation c as 
well. If predicate τ(a,b) is used for denoting “a trusts b” and a, b and c belong to a 
set X, transitive of trust can be defined using predicate logic: 
 V a,b,c C X, τ(a,b) ^ τ(b,c) => τ(a,c) 
Ad hoc federation (Figure 13) is characterised by bilateral relationships of organi-
sations wishing to enter a federated identity arrangement. Based on our definition, 
this is strictly speaking not an identity federation (“an association of organisa-
tions”), but use of federated identity technology on a bilateral basis. The ad hoc 
federation is easy to set up, but does not scale, if there is a large number of organi-
sations with several Identity and Service Providers involved.   
The trust relationships (the dashed lines in the figure) of the organisations follow 
the contractual relationships and are strictly bilateral. There is no need for transi-
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tivity of trust. The organisations need not to be aware of any other organisations 
with whom their contract partner may have a trust relationship. 
 
Figure 13. Ad hoc federation is based on bilateral trust between organisa-
tions. Solid lines represent agreements and dashed lines trust relationships, 
which in this pattern are the same 
This pattern can be sufficient in simple setups, for example, when an organisation 
outsources some of its IT systems from a subcontractor. In that case, there is per-
haps just one Identity and Service Provider, and the necessary agreements for bi-
lateral trust can be part of the outsourcing contract. 
A hub-and-spoke federation is dominated by a large company in the centre, set-
ting the rules of the federation for their own advantage. Small players have few 
chances to affect the dominating central organisation, but they will participate out 
of necessity.  
 
Figure 14. Hub-and-spoke federation has a dominating organisation in the 
middle 
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As mentioned in Publication 5, a hub-and-spoke federation (Figure 14) is typically 
organised as a service provided by a central organisation. Each federation partici-
pant signs a service agreement with the organisation in the middle, which is able to 
set the federation rules. Federation participants are highly dependent on the organi-
sation in the middle; if they want to change the organisation, they, effectively, have 
to set up a new federation.  
A hub-and-spoke federation is based on transitive trust. Each federation participant 
trusts the organisation in the middle and, transitively, any other participant with 
whom the central organisation has a trust relationship. The organisation in the mid-
dle decides who is accepted to join the federation and who is not.  
Identity network is an independent entity founded and focused only on the tech-
nical and administrative aspects of the identity federation. It gains support when a 
sufficient number of individual participants become frustrated with the challenges 
of the ad hoc federation or the hub-and-spoke federation.  
In an identity network, there are no organisations dominating the administration of 
the federation; the federation participants are able to affect the policy-making in 
the network. In an identity network (Figure 15), trust relationships (the dashed 
lines) are directly between the participants. The participants trust each other di-
rectly and there is no need for transitive trust.  
 
Figure 15. Identity network is a consortium of organisations which have 
signed a multilateral agreement 
As mentioned in Publication 5, an identity network can be organised as a consor-
tium, which is, by definition, an agreement, combination or group (as of compa-
nies) formed to undertake an enterprise beyond the resources of any one member 
[MERR07]. In a consortium, federation participants sign a multi-lateral agreement, 
defining the governance of the federation. In the figure, the crossing of the solid 
lines in the center reflects the multi-lateral agreement. In a consortium, participants 
have direct contractual relationships with each other. 
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Liberty Alliance has also published a contractual framework for Circles of Trust 
[LIBE07c]. In the document, Liberty Alliance has further split the identity network 
into two alternative patterns; a consortium and a collaborative model. The consor-
tium model was as presented above. In the collaborative model, federation partici-
pants create a separate legal entity (such as an association or a company), which is 
dedicated to the administration of the federation, and each participant has a vote. 
Additionally, federation participants may have a separate service agreement with 
the legal entity. The figure of the collaborative model is similar to that of the hub-
and-spoke federation (Figure 14).  
Theoretically, also other kind of federation patterns can be constructed. In a mesh 
federation, organisations establish arbitrary transitive trust relationships. An or-
ganisation joins the federation by entering into a contract with any federation par-
ticipant. In a mesh of organisations, any two organisations are connected via in-
termediate federation participants. 
 
Figure 16. In a mesh federation, organisations have arbitrary transitive trust 
relationships  
In a federation mesh (Figure 16), there is at least one pair of federation participants 
with the shortest trust path traversing two organisations, making trust establish-
ment more difficult than in a hub-and-spoke federation (Figure 14). Administering 
a federation mesh is also challenging as there is no single point in the mesh where 
all the contractual relationships face. 
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Table 4. Summary of federation patterns and the maximum number of trust 
transits 
Federation pattern Maximum number of 
transits 
Ad hoc federation 0 
Hub-and-spoke federation 1 
Identity network 0 
Mesh federation n 
The four federation patterns and their needs for transitivity of trust are presented in 
Table 4. The second column presents the maximum number of trust transits in a 
federation representing the pattern. Ad hoc federation and identity network are the 
two federation patterns where all the federation partners have direct trust relation-
ship with each other and transitive trust is not necessary. In a hub-and-spoke fed-
eration, every federation participant needs to trust the organisation in the middle 
who mediates trust between the participants. In a mesh federation, there is at least 
one pair of participants who have at least two intermediaries in their trust fabric. 
5.3. Administrations of a Federation 
Federation participants are responsible for operating their Identity and Service Pro-
viders and having a proper organisational identity management in place. As pre-
sented in the previous Section 5.2, in the hub-and-spoke federation and identity 
network, there is an organisation on top taking responsibility on administering the 
federation itself.  
This section presents some of the responsibilities in the administration of a federa-
tion, splitting them into the categories of coordination and operations. This model, 
which was shortly introduced in Publication 5, is based on practical experience of 
identity federations. Lately, in a project that the author has been involved in, the 
state government of Finland has proposed the adoption of a similar model 
[MINF07]. 
5.3.1. Coordination of a Federation 
The coordinator of a federation is the organisation in the middle in the hub-and-
spoke federation and the consortium or the legal entity in the identity network. 
There is no coordinator in the other models. The federation coordinator is respon-
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sible for the policies of the federation. The policy is made binding by incorporating 
it to the agreement the participating organisations commit to when joining the fed-
eration. 
The membership policy defines who is eligible to join the federation and what 
kind of procedure is in place for organisations joining and leaving the federation. 
For example, in a federation for higher education, only higher education institu-
tions may be eligible to join as full members. Other organisations, like commercial 
content providers, may join as partners who are able to register only as Service 
Providers, not Identity Providers, to the federation. 
The federation participants need to have a sufficient level of trust of each other re-
garding, for instance, organisational identity management as described in Section 
4.2.4. The policy of the federation needs to cover the levels of assurance for the 
quality of identity management in the eligible participants and best practice for 
implementing privacy mechanisms, as introduced in Section 4.3. If there is peering 
with other federations (see Section 5.4), the coordinator is the party that makes the 
decision on behalf of the federation. 
The federation coordinator is also responsible for organising the daily operations 
of the federation, as introduced in the next Section 5.3.2. As in any other service, 
the coordinator may decide to do the operations by itself or outsource them. The 
federation coordinator must also cover the costs of running the federation, includ-
ing the outsourcing contract of the federation’s operations, if any. The costs of a 
federation can be covered by fees to the federation participants, depending on the 
context.  
5.3.2. Operations of a Federation 
The operator of a federation is responsible for the daily technical operations of a 
federation, following the policies set by the federation coordinator. The obligations 
and responsibilities, such as the expected service level, are specified in an agree-
ment between the coordinator and the operator.  
From a technical perspective, an identity federation can be decentralised or central-
ised (Figure 17). In a centralised setup, there is an Identity Provider to which all 
the Service Providers redirect their end users for authentication. The Identity Pro-
vider acts as a proxy (IdP proxy), redirecting end users to their own Identity Pro-
viders, maintained by the federation participants, and relaying related assertions 
back and forth. In such a centralised setup, it is the responsibility of the federation 
operator to maintain and operate the IdP proxy, whose availability and security are 
crucial for the federation. In a decentralised setup, there is no IdP proxy but the 
Identity and Service Providers communicate with each other directly. There may 
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be, however, a need for a separate service that discovers the Identity Provider to 
which the end user should be redirected for authentication. 
 
Figure 17. The technical setup of a federation can be decentralised (a) or 
centralised (b) 
Maintaining a record of the Identity and Service Providers in the federation is 
the fundamental duty of the operator. The record may contain, for instance, the 
Providers’ technical addresses, supported protocols and profiles, certificates and 
contact persons. In a decentralised setup, the record is a file, for example, a signed 
XML document as defined in SAML metadata specification [CANT05]. The op-
erator distributes the federation metadata file to all the Identity and Service Pro-
viders in the federation. In a centralised setup, the record is a configuration file in 
the centralised IdP proxy. 
When a federation participant registers a new Identity or Service Provider to the 
federation, the Provider must fulfil the requirements set by the federation policy.  
For example, the Identity Providers have to qualify certain minimal requirements 
for the identities of its end users regarding the freshness of the end users’ attributes 
as described in Section 3. Furthermore, the Identity Provider has to provide a cer-
tain level of authentication for its end users. The operator of the federation takes 
necessary steps to make sure the requirements are met, such as external audit or a 
self-audit conducted by the federation participant. 
As described in Section 4.3.3, a consequence of the data protection directive is 
making sure that only attributes relevant for the service are released from an Iden-
tity Provider to a Service Provider. Maintenance of a list of attributes consid-
ered relevant for a service is one task for the federation operator. The list of re-
quired attributes can be included to the SAML 2.0 metadata file. 
Providing test servers for federation participants is a task that may be beneficial 
to be done centrally by the operator. When a federation participant is going to reg-
ister a Service Provider to the federation, the participant is able to test the Service 
Provider with the operator’s test Identity Provider, which is configured as produc-
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tion level Identity Providers in the federation, and vice versa. Furthermore, the ex-
pertise regarding problem solving is likely to accumulate to the federation opera-
tor, and, by providing a helpdesk, this expertise can benefit the federation partici-
pants in resolving problems, both when registering a new Identity or Service 
Provider and during operations of the federation. 
An additional service that can be centralised in a federation is monitoring the 
Identity and Service Providers in a federation. While each federation participant is 
expected to maintain its own Identity and Service Providers, it may be more effi-
cient to set up a centralised service that regularly polls the Identity and Service 
Providers in a federation and uses a pre-defined procedure to raise an alarm, when 
some of them are not working properly. 
5.4. Interfederations 
So far, this thesis has studied a setup where organisations willing to enter federated 
transactions form a federation, and identities are shared between participants of the 
federation. Now it is time to shortly introduce another layer of abstraction, a fed-
eration of federations.  
It is obvious that a single federation cannot cover all the parties willing to enter 
federated transactions. Federations will rise, covering certain geographical areas 
or/and business, and the federations are willing to establish greater fabrics. The 
terminology in the area is not yet well-established; concepts like interfederation, 
confederation, cross-federation and federation peering are used. 
Four Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark) each have a na-
tional identity federation or a federation project for higher education. In order to 
support collaboration of Nordic researchers and university teachers, the four coun-
tries are committed to forming a confederation, where the end users in one country 
are able to access Service Providers in other countries. The Kalmar Union, which 
is the proposed name of the confederation, will be established by the coordinators 
of the four federations by signing a consortium agreement. The work is described 
in more detail in [TVET07]. 
Other interfederation proposals have been presented to interconnect the inCommon 
federation of the US higher education with the E-Authentication federation of the 
US federal government [ROTM06]. The eduroam confederation and the project 
Fidelity are two more interfederation projects, which will be introduced in Sections 
5.5.3 and 5.5.4. 
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5.5. Federation examples 
This section presents some examples of federation projects and operational identity 
federations. The examples spread over higher education, banking and telecommu-
nications industry. 
5.5.1. The Haka Federation of Finnish Higher Education  
The Haka federation [CSC07] is the identity federation for Finnish universities, 
polytechnics and research institutions. End users in the federation are students and 
employees of the organisations. The proposal for establishing the federation was 
done in February 2004 and the federation was formed in May 2005, when the first 
universities signed the federation service agreement. The federation became opera-
tional in August 2005, when the first Identity and Service Providers were regis-
tered. The author has been strongly involved in establishing the federation. Ac-
cording to available information, the Haka federation was the first SAML-based 
identity federation in Finland, and the second13 after SWITCHaai [SWIT07] in 
higher education in Europe [REFE07]. 
 
Figure 18. Organisation of the Haka federation 
The Haka federation is a hub-and-spoke federation with CSC, the Finnish IT Cen-
ter for Science in the middle (Figure 18). CSC is both the operator and the coordi-
nator of the federation, and any joining participant signs a federation service 
agreement with CSC. In order to balance CSC’s strong position, the federation has 
an advisory committee and an operations committee to whom CSC has to listen in 
                                                
13 Before SAML, some countries, such as Norway, Spain and the UK, have had federations based 
on proprietary protocols.  
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predefined circumstances, such as in changing the requirements for joining partici-
pants.  
The federation has two participant categories, members and partners. Universities, 
polytechnics and research institutions are eligible to join the federation as mem-
bers, and they are able to register both an Identity Provider and Service Providers 
to the federation. Federation partners, such as library content providers, may regis-
ter only Service Providers.  
From technical perspective, the Haka federation is decentralised (See Figure 17 a) 
and currently makes use of Shibboleth, a SAML-based federating protocol de-
signed and implemented by Internet2 [INTE07] and the funetEduPerson schema 
[CSC06]. Currently, there are 29 Identity Providers and 53 Service Providers regis-
tered to the federation, and the number of logins is  around 300 000 per month. The 
Haka federation is presented in detail in Publication 5. 
5.5.2. TUPAS of the Finnish Banks 
For banks, the Internet has become a standard way of providing banking services, 
and customers are used to logging in to the bank’s Internet service. Becoming a 
customer of an Internet bank in Finland requires signing a contract with the bank 
and receiving credentials for authentication. Currently, the banks use one-time 
passwords for authentication. 
Banks have also started to provide authentication of their customers as a service to 
third parties. TUPAS [FBA05] is a proprietary specification developed and pub-
lished by the Finnish Bankers’ Association. TUPAS specifies an interface between 
the Finnish Internet banks and third party services (such as public sector services), 
making use of the HTTP POST method for passing their customers identity to third 
party web services. The integrity of the message exchange is ensured by a symmet-
ric key and authenticity by timestamps and nonces. Each bank has an independent 
implementation of the TUPAS interface. Currently, seven Finnish banks provide 
the TUPAS service. 
The TUPAS service is an ad hoc federation where the bank is one of the two par-
ties. The bank sets the rules of the service, including prices for the third parties. 
Bank customers are not charged for utilising the TUPAS interface to authenticate 
to third party services. The attributes passed in the federation are minimal, consist-
ing only of the Finnish national identification number (formerly known as social 
security number, carrying the birth date and sex of the customer) and the name of 
the user for convenience. The only role data that can be extracted from the transac-
tion is that the user is a customer of the bank. 
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A problem of TUPAS for a third party is that in order to cover all the Internet bank 
customers he has to sign a contract and implement and configure the interface to 
all the seven Internet banks one by one. A public sector service called VETUMA 
has solved the latter problem by adding another layer to the architecture, hiding all 
the seven banks behind one technical interface. Still, the third party has to sign 
contracts with all the seven banks. Thus, VETUMA, as it is currently organised, 
does not make a change to the ad hoc pattern of the federation . 
5.5.3. The Project Fidelity 
In the previous Section 5.5.2, an identity federation based on Internet banks was 
introduced. Other potential private sector players in federated identity management 
are telecommunication operators, who also have tight relationships with their cus-
tomers. This includes face-to-face authentication of the new customers, up-to-date 
customer records for billing and credentials for strong authentication such as SIM 
cards. Thus, teleoperators are potential actors in federating their customers’ identi-
ties to third party services. 
An example of a teleoperator-initiated identity federation was project Fidelity, 
which started in 2005 and concluded in 2006. Project Fidelity belonged to the 
Eureka cluster programme Celtic, which initiates and stimulates R&D programmes 
in telecommunication systems and services [CELT07].  
The Project Fidelity introduced an ad hoc federation with the teleoperator as the 
Identity Provider and services such as ‘Find the nearest restaurant’, ‘Book a hotel 
room’, ‘Purchase a game’ and ‘Student interchange’ as Service Providers. In the 
project, four identity federations, one in Norway, Finland, France and Spain each, 
were set up. In order to let customers from the Norwegian, Finnish, French and 
Spanish federations use services in other countries, the four federations were inter-
federated. The federations used Liberty Alliance specifications as the federating 
protocol. [QUIN06] 
5.5.4. The Eduroam Confederation 
All the examples above are intended for web-based application access. Eduroam, 
being part of the European Commission-funded GEANT2 project, is an example of 
a federation for network access. The eduroam confederation was established in 
January 2007 as an international interfederation of national eduroam federations. 
Eduroam aims at serving nomadic end users in European higher education. Stu-
dents and employees are able to use their home institutions’ (Identity Provider) 
credentials to attach to a wireless or wired network in an institution they are visit-
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ing (Service Provider). On a national level, the institutions form a hub-and-spoke 
federation by signing a federation agreement with the national research and educa-
tion network (NREN). The NRENs, in turn, form the international identity network 
by signing the multilateral confederation policy. As the result, students in, say, 
Tampere University of Technology (TUT), are able to use their TUT-provided 
usernames and passwords to log in to the wireless LAN in the University of Porto. 
The federation currently makes use of RADIUS as the federating protocol. 
[WIER05] 
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6. MAKING USE OF FEDERATED IDENTITY 
MANAGEMENT 
Sections 4 and 5 have introduced the technical foundations of federated identity 
management and the concept of an identity federation as the association of organi-
sations utilising federated identity. This section makes a walk-through to making 
use of federated identity management in applications. Finally, some subjects for 
further research are proposed. 
First, a look is taken into the kinds of functionalities federated identity manage-
ment provides to a service, and, then, some service categories for federated identity 
management are examined. 
6.1. Benefits of Federated Identity Management 
This section introduces three basic functionalities federated identity can provide 
and how they benefit services and their developers and administrators. The three 
services; authentication, identity provisioning and authorisation, are in the order 
that is likely when making use of federated identity. The benefits are related to 
those introduced in Section 3.1, but now in a cross-organisational context. 
6.1.1. Authentication and Single Sign-on 
When federated identity is used for authentication, an end user is not given sepa-
rate credentials (e.g., username and password) for each new service introduced. In-
stead, the end user is able to utilise the credentials used by the Identity Provider for 
authentication. Whether this also leads to single sign-on (the need to authenticate 
only once) is a separate issue and depends on the system configuration. 
For an end user, being able to use a single set of credentials for all the services is a 
major benefit of federated identity. If username and password are used for authen-
tication, it is easier to remember only one username and password, when it is used 
in a large variety of services on a regular basis. This increases both information se-
curity and usability. 
A Service Provider does not have to care about forgotten passwords because it is a 
responsibility of the Identity Provider. If an end user has a problem with his user 
account and password, the first-level support is provided by his home organisa-
tion’s helpdesk. The Identity Provider, in turn, may introduce additional quality 
requirements to the single password the user has. This can include, for example, 
minimum password length, resistance to dictionary attacks and periodic renewals, 
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depending on the policy of the organisation and the federation. Since the end user 
has only one username and password, it is fair to expect that he obeys the security 
best practice and does not write his password down in a small piece of paper next 
to his workstation. Introduction of stronger authentication is also easier, because it 
can be done in one place, i.e., in the Identity Provider. 
6.1.2. Identity Provisioning 
Using federated identity for identity provisioning means that when a new user en-
ters the organisation and his identity is created in the Identity Provider, the attrib-
utes provided by the Identity Provider are used for creating an identity for him also 
in a Service Provider. When the attributes are changed in the Identity Provider, the 
changes are reflected to the Service Providers. This can take place, for example, 
when the end user signs in to the service the next time, utilising the attribute asser-
tions provided by the Identity Provider during the browser-based attribute ex-
change. Alternatively, some backend channel, such as the SOAP binding of SAML 
or SPML (Service Provisioning Markup Language) [COLE06] can be used for 
regular user data updates, for example, every night. 
From an information security perspective, de-provisioning is even more critical 
than provisioning. For instance, if an employee is fired, the Identity Provider takes 
care of closing his account as described in Section 3.2, and the end user is no more 
able to log in to the service. However, unless de-provisioned, his identity in the 
service remains unchanged. This may be problematic, if he is part of a workflow in 
the service. For example, in an invoice management service, invoices may be still 
circulated to the fired employee for approval.  In such services, a backend channel 
for de-provisioning is necessary. 
As mentioned in Section 3.1, provisioning and de-provisioning reduce overlapping 
work in an organisation. New end users do not need to be created manually to a 
service, which generates a significant amount of work in an organisation. Once 
federated identity is introduced for authentication, it is lucrative to extend its use to 
provisioning and de-provisioning as well. 
6.1.3. Authorisation 
As introduced in Section 2.3, authorisation means an end user’s permission to 
carry out an action in an information system. Federated identity management may 
have a role in taking care of authorisation in a service. In cross-organisational en-
vironments, utilising federated identity for authorisation makes it easier to base 
end user’s  privileges on up-to-date identity data as provided by the Identity Pro-
vider. As mentioned, role-based access control (RBAC) is powerful in complex 
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environments such as in an identity federation. Different ways of implementing 
RBAC in the context of federated identity are presented and discussed next. 
 
Figure 19. Role-based access control in federated identity  
Figure 19 is a refined version of Figure 5 in page 15. The figure proposes three dif-
ferent ways (the dashed lines) to split the responsibilities related to authorisation 
between the Identity and Service Provider. The alternatives are further clarified in 
Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20. Splitting the responsibility of authorisation in federated identity. 
The first alternative (a) makes the service fully responsible for authorisation. Fed-
erated identity is used just for authenticating the user and providing his identifier to 
the service, and the rest is up to the service. An end user needs to use some out-of-
band mechanism (for instance, a written or electronic application form) to acquire 
proper authorisations to use the service. As the outcome of the authorisation proc-
ess, the service administrator may, for example, add required privileges manually 
to the user’s account.  
Roles Privileges Service Users 
Worker 
Superior
Create/ 
update report 
Approve re-
port Travel expense 
report manage-
ment system 
(a) (b) (c) 
IdP SP 
Bob Smith has a permis-
sion to approve travel 
expenses 
He is Bob Smith 
(a) 
IdP SP 
Every superior has a 
permission to approve 
travel expenses 
He is a superior 
(b) 
IdP SP 
He has a permission to approve travel 
expenses  (c) 
 78 
 
The second alternative (b) uses a role attribute to split the responsibility of authori-
sation between the Identity Provider and the service. The Identity Provider, which 
knows the end user and his position in the home organisation best, assigns him a 
role attribute. Based on the role attribute, the service decides what kind of permis-
sions (if any) the end user has in the service.  
The third alternative (c) makes the Identity Provider fully responsible for authori-
sation. All the service needs to do is to trust the Identity Provider in its judgement. 
In other words, the Policy Decision Point (PDP) is placed in the Identity Provider 
and the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) in the Service Provider, whereas in alter-
natives (a) and (b) they are both placed in the Service Provider. 
The alternative (a) represents the traditional scenario, where end users use out-of-
band means to get a permission to use the system. When federated identity man-
agement is introduced to a service, it is likely that it is used for authentication at 
first, making the alternative (a) a starting point. Later, the service may move to-
wards the alternatives (b) and (c). 
The alternative (b) contains an elegant division of responsibility. By definition, the 
Identity Provider is the party that knows best its end users and their position and 
role in the home organisation. The Service Provider is the party that is the special-
ist of the service and is also given the control regarding who may use it. Compared 
to the alternative (a), this alternative increases the functionality and complexity 
that needs to be implemented in the Identity Provider. On the other hand, in the 
home organisation, maintenance of the role information can be integrated to the 
organisational identity management architecture as was described in Section 3.6.   
As a downside, the alternative (b) expects a common vocabulary for roles that both 
the Identity and Service Provider (or, in a federation of several organisations, all 
the involved Identity and Service Providers) use. This may be possible for simple 
roles, but defining and maintaining a complete vocabulary for roles in a multi-
organisational context may turn out to be simply too difficult. However, if a vo-
cabulary exists and is sufficient for assigning permissions in the service, this is a 
very light-weight way of implementing access control in federated services.  Con-
sider, for instance, an extranet service that is available for any end user employed 
by the Human Resources unit of any home organisation.14 
The alternative (c) removes the need for a common vocabulary for roles. Instead, 
in a simple setup, each service defines an entitlement value that is considered as a 
permission to use the service and it is a responsibility of the Identity Provider to 
                                                
14 In this case, any end user with the role ”organizational unit (ou) = HR management” would have 
read privileges. In practice, there is no vocabulary for the ou attribute, but maintaining a couple of 
alternative ou values is still easier than using the alternatives (a) or (c), instead. 
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populate the value for those end users who are permitted to use the service. In 
more complex setups, an authorisation assertion can be passed from an Identity 
Provider (PDP) to a Service Provider (PEP) using, for instance, a SAML authorisa-
tion statement or XACML (Extensible Access Control Markup Language)  re-
sponse context [MOSE05].  
From an Identity Provider’s perspective, the difference between the alternative (b) 
and (c) is that in (c), introducing a new service to a federation requires that each 
Identity Provider needs to assign a new privilege to each end user of the service. In 
alternative (b), the service makes use of the existing set of role values, and if the 
values are already populated in an Identity Provider, no new attribute values need 
to be assigned to the end users in the Identity Provider. Additionally, in both alter-
natives (b) and (c), each Identity Provider needs to be configured to release proper 
attributes to the new service, but it is a relatively easy task and can be delegated to 
the operator of the federation, as proposed in Section 5.3.2. 
The need to assign new entitlement values for the users of each new service makes 
the scalability of the architecture (c) weaker than the alternative (b). However, in-
tegration to the organisational identity management and internal use of RBAC may 
ease this work in the Identity Provider. For instance, if the end user has a role of a 
supervisor inside the organisational identity management and, according to the 
company policy, supervisors are permitted to approve travel expenses, the organ-
isational identity management can automatically populate him the entitlement for 
approving travel expenses. 
In a cross-organisational context, Identity and Service Providers are in separate or-
ganisations. A potential obstacle in adoption of alternatives (b) and (c) is the tradi-
tional way of thinking that the service owner needs to have the final word regard-
ing who is permitted to use the service. In the alternative (a) this is the case, when 
the service administrator, for instance, authorises each end user one by one. The 
authorisation may be very nominal, for example, receiving an application, signed 
by the applicant and his supervisor in the Identity Provider, filing the application 
and assigning necessary privileges to the end user manually.  Considering this sce-
nario, a leap to the alternatives (b) and (c) may feel long, because the manual au-
thorisation is replaced by automated grant of necessary privileges based on an as-
sertion from the Identity Provider. However, effectively, the only thing that is 
changed is that routine work is automated, increasing the efficiency as a whole. Of 
course, the Service Provider needs to trust the assertions that carry the end users’ 
permissions, but this belongs to the nature of federated identity management, as 
explained in Section 4.2.4. 
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As a final remark, the alternatives (b) and (c) open new possibilities in preserving 
the end user’s privacy. For authorisation purposes, the Identity Provider needs not 
reveal the end user’s identity to the service. It is enough to provide an assertion 
that contains the role or privileges of the end user, not his identity. In a way, this is 
close to the idea of using authorisation certificates instead of binding an end user’s 
privileges to his name, as presented in SPKI [RFC2693] and SDSI [RIVE96]. Con-
trary to the traditional approach where end users have their identities in each ser-
vice, this could reduce unnecessary processing of personal data in services in the 
Internet.  
What is said above applies to processing personal data for authorisation purposes 
only. Of course, there are services which still need to know the identity of the user, 
for example, to maintain his profile in the service or to send him notifications by 
email. Also the accountability requirements may imply that the identity of a user 
should be easily traced.  
6.2. Services Relying on Federated Identity 
Publication 5 presents some typical service categories benefiting from federated 
identity in higher education. For completeness, this section provides a more ge-
neric view on what kind of service categories can benefit from federated identity 
management. 
6.2.1. Application Service Provisioning 
Earlier, organisations used commercial software by acquiring a license to use it in 
their own server. Nowadays, organisations often increase their efficiency by focus-
ing on their core business, and activities, such as maintenance of information sys-
tems, are outsourced. Application Service Provisioning (ASP, a.k.a Software as a 
Service, SaaS) means that an organisation purchases an application as a service 
from another organisation that is focused on its maintenance. The software runs in 
the machines of the ASP provider. The end users in an organisation typically use a 
web browser to use the service. 
Software running as ASP is becoming richer in functionality, and all the more end 
users in the organisation need to use it. This incorporates workflow applications, 
such as circulation of invoices, and self-service interfaces to applications, such as 
an employee self-service access to the HR system. It is typical that all these ser-
vices expect a large number of end users to log in. Without federated identity man-
agement, the end users would be expected to learn another username and password 
for each service. If an end user needs to log in, for instance, to the HR system just 
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a couple of times a year to propose the date for his summer vacation, it is obvious 
that remembering the username and password is a problem. 
In federated access to ASP services, an end user uses his existing username and 
password and the organisation’s Identity Provider to sign in to the ASP service. In 
addition to authentication, federated identity can be utilised to provision a new end 
user to the service. Furthermore, depending on the service, an end user’s authorisa-
tion to use the service can be done on the Identity Provider side as was introduced 
in Section 6.1.3, and there is no need to manage the end users’ privileges manually 
in the service. 
6.2.2. Extranet Services 
In the networked world, organisations collaborate with each other, forming part-
nerships and supply chains where individuals from different organisations work 
closely together in order to conduct business. This often incorporates providing 
customers or suppliers with access to the organisation’s business systems via web- 
based extranet services. End users representing other organisations need to be au-
thenticated and authorised to use the organisation’s information systems. 
The organisation employing a person is the one that knows best the issues related 
to his employment. If an employee resigns, the employer removes his entry from 
the base registry as described in Section 3.2. In the business environment of the 
organisation, the end user’s authorisation to use the business partner’s extranet ser-
vices ceases as well. Utilising federated identity to enforce access control provides 
extranet services more protection against orphaned accounts that are potentially 
misused. 
6.2.3. Mobility and Roaming Network Access 
In addition to web-based applications, federated identity can be utilised in network 
access itself. Subenthiran et al define terminal mobility as a user being able to 
change location or access technique (WLAN, UMTS, Bluetooth etc.) while keep-
ing the same terminal. With roaming, the users are able to obtain access from a vis-
ited network different from the home network they have subscribed to [SUBE04]. 
The eduroam confederation mentioned in Section 5.5.4 is an example of a federa-
tion providing roaming service. 
The eduroam federation, as it is nowadays, utilises RADIUS as the federating pro-
tocol [GEAN06]. An end user’s credentials are passed to the Identity Provider on a 
RADIUS request/response pair carrying some of the various EAP authentication 
protocols available, such as EAP-TTLS and EAP-TLS. The Identity Provider sends 
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an acknowledgement as a response to the request, if the credentials are success-
fully verified. The requests and responses are passed between the Identity and Ser-
vice Provider via a hierarchy of RADIUS proxy servers.  
A downside of the current eduroam setup is that it does not cover authorisation. In-
stead, authorisation is implicit; if authentication succeeds (typically, if the end user 
has an account in the Identity Provider and knows the password), the end user is 
authorised to access the network provided by the Service Provider.  
Publication 6 introduced a refinement to this architecture, introducing the HTTP-
based SAML as a replacement for RADIUS as the federating protocol. The archi-
tecture was implemented and is currently used in the University of Helsinki 
[HUPN07]. A SAML-based architecture made it possible to use SAML attribute 
assertions for authorisation of network access. For example, on its premises, the 
University of Helsinki could allow roaming WLAN access only to staff members 
of other Finnish universities, but not to students. A downside of the architecture is 
that it lacks layer 2 encryption, which is nowadays commonly ensured by IEEE 
802.11i protocol [IEEE04], also known as WPA2. 
The idea of using SAML in network access control, which was introduced in 
Publication 6, is being further elaborated in the European Commission-funded 
GEANT2 project, whose activity DAMe (Devolved Authorisation Methods for 
eduroam) considers using SAML and XACML assertions and the DIAMETER 
protocol [RFC3588] for authorisation in network access. As a result, a new NAS-
SAML architecture is being specified, making it possible for an eduroam Service 
Provider to utilise attributes provided by an Identity Provider in the access control 
decision. [CANO07] 
6.3. Future research 
Finally, some topics for further research are suggested in this section. Federated 
identity management is still a young subject of interest, and various problems need 
to be addressed. 
Auditing and reporting was introduced as one basic concept of identity manage-
ment in Section 2.4. For audit purposes, it is necessary to have tools for investigat-
ing who has certain privileges to a system and what actions an end user has done in 
a system. In commercial services, accounting may be necessary for billing pur-
poses, too. 
A cross-organisational use of federated identity introduces additional complexity 
for reporting tools. If an end user’s identity and privileges are maintained by sepa-
rate entities (see alternatives (a) and (b) on Section 6.1.3), providing an aggregated 
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view of an end user’s privileges means fetching and combining identity informa-
tion from several Service Providers. If the Service Providers are placed in separate 
organisations, this may incorporate release of personal data between several person 
registries. Further research is necessary to understand the related technical and le-
gal challenges. 
Section 4.1 introduced a bipolar architecture for federated identity management, 
having an Identity Provider responsible for end user identity and authentication 
and a Service Provider that consumes identity assertions issued by the Identity Pro-
vider. Extending this model to a multipolar architecture would provide new re-
search and engineering challenges. 
In a multipolar architecture, issuance of authentication, attribute and authorisation 
assertions could be done by different entities or even organisations. In the world of 
networking and collaboration, it is usual that the organisation responsible for an 
end user’s identity does not control all his roles and privileges. For instance, in 
universities, there are formal and informal collaboration groups, often termed Vir-
tual Organisations, which span multiple organisations. 
The SAML standard supports a multipolar architecture and the first proposals for 
multipolar architectures have already been presented [e.g. ROBI06, CHAD07]. 
Still, there is work to do in studying the different approaches and engineering them 
to production level services. A multipolar architecture could also open new oppor-
tunities for commercial services related to federated identity management. For ex-
ample, a commercial company could develop a workflow engine for applying and 
granting privileges to end users in an organisation. The engine would have a web-
based self-service interface for end users applying for privileges. The customer 
representatives responsible for granting the privileges could have a separate web 
interface for handling the applications and printing out reports on current privi-
leges. The engine could then be provided as a service that provides authorisation 
assertions to Service Providers. 
Ability to delegate privileges was mentioned as one dimension of identity man-
agement in Section 2.3. There are use scenarios for delegation in federated identity 
management, too. For instance, using the well-worn example of travel expenses, 
the person with privileges to approve travel expense reports might need to delegate 
his role or privileges when he is off for a holiday. Additional research and engi-
neering is suggested for finding out how to technically implement delegation and 
what kind of functional entities (such as a Delegation Authority [GOMI05]) should 
be introduced to an identity federation. 
The current SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) based email system of Internet 
is suffering from unsolicited bulk email a.k.a. spam, which consumes resources 
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and is annoying for end users. Currently, spam messages are usually sent by 
hacked computers which have been turned into open relays for the SMTP traffic 
that the spammers generate. 
In an identity federation, Service Providers have a mechanism to authenticate the 
Identity Providers (possibly, via interfederations) and Identity Providers are re-
sponsible for identifying and authenticating the end users. A possible topic for fur-
ther research is how this could be utilised for preventing spam. For instance, in or-
der to drop a letter to the receiver’s mailbox, the sender would be redirected to his 
Identity Provider for authentication. A Service Provider built in the receiver’s mail 
server would rely on the user authentication carried out by the Identity Provider. 
The end user would be allowed to drop the email directly to the receiver’s mail 
server. Dropping letters directly to the receiver’s mailbox would also increase con-
fidentiality of the current Internet mail. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
As more and more information systems keep records on their end users and expect 
them to log in, identity management has become a subject of interest for research-
ers and practitioners. This thesis focused on identity management in an organisa-
tion maintaining end users’ identities in several information systems. In organisa-
tional identity management, functions in the organisations are rationalised so that 
end users (e.g., employees, students, customers, patients) have a single identity that 
spans all or at least the most prominent information systems in the organisation. In 
cross-organisational identity management, the identities are used also in informa-
tion systems provided by other organisations. 
Developing organisational and cross-organisational identity management improves 
the organisation’s information security, as changes in an end user’s identity (such 
as the departure of an employee) are reflected to other information systems in a 
timely manner. An end user has a single set of credentials, and if stronger authenti-
cation means are needed, they can be introduced to several information systems in 
one go. Having a single view of an end user’s identity lays also ground for audit-
ing. 
Identity management can be used for developing an organisation’s efficiency. The 
amount of maintenance of overlapping (and soon also conflicting) data on the same 
individuals in different information systems is reduced. A change in an end user’s 
identity flows from his home organisation’s authoritative data sources to other sys-
tems in the organisation and in other organisations. Finally, investing in organisa-
tional and cross-organisational identity management opens new business opportu-
nities or new ways of organising functions that would not have been possible 
otherwise. 
In an organisation, the first action to take is improving organisational identity man-
agement. Metadirectories, virtual directories and other technical constructs are 
used to establish a single view of an end user’s identity in the organisation. In the 
next step, it is then easier to introduce new, more reliable authentication mecha-
nisms (such as PKI and smart cards) because, being part of the single identity, they 
can be introduced to several information systems at once. High-quality organisa-
tional identity management is also a requirement for cross-organisational identity 
management, which enables information systems in other organisations to rely on 
an end user’s identity in his home organisation. 
Improving identity management is not just installing metadirectories or Identity 
and Service Providers for federated identity. Introducing an identity management 
architecture is an actively managed project, where parties agree on responsibilities, 
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policies, processes, technical specifications and standards and syntax, semantics 
and vocabularies for personal information exchanged. This applies both to organ-
isational and cross-organisational identity management. 
Identity management is based on trust. In organisational identity management, trust 
is between the organisation’s IT services unit, maintaining the centralised identity 
management system, and other units that rely on and make use of the identity man-
agement system. In cross-organisational identity management, the trust is between 
organisations who establish a federation, “a circle of trust”, to exchange informa-
tion about their users and resources.  
Additionally, an end user needs to trust the way his identities are managed in the 
organisations. After all, an end user is the principal whose needs and daily routines 
identity management serves. If implemented properly, identity management can 
greatly ease an end user’s interactions with different information systems. On the 
other hand, having a single view on an end user’s identity also raises new concerns 
on his privacy. Attention should be paid to this at both a technical and a policy 
level.  
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8. AUTHOR’S CONTRIBUTION 
In their article regarding research on IT, March et al present four classes of re-
search outputs; constructs, models, methods and instantiations. Constructs form 
the vocabulary of a domain. They constitute a conceptualisation used to describe 
problems within the domain and to specify their solutions. A model is a set of 
propositions or statements expressing relationships among constructs. In design ac-
tivities, models represent situations as problem and solution statements. A method 
is a set of steps (an algorithm or a guideline) used to perform a task. They are 
based on a set of underlying constructs and models. Instantiation is a realisation 
of an artefact in its environment, operationalising constructs, models and methods. 
Instantiations demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the models and 
methods they contain. [MARC95] 
On the other hand, March et al present four kinds of research activities; build, 
evaluate, theorise and justify. Build refers to the construction of the artefact, dem-
onstrating that such an artefact can be constructed. The basic question is: does it 
work? Evaluate refers to the development of criteria and the assessment of artefact 
performance against those criteria. The basic question is: how well does it work? 
Build and evaluate are the two basic activities in design sciences (cf., innovation 
implementation and assessment in Section 1.4). 
Given an artefact whose performance has been evaluated, it is important to deter-
mine why and how the artefact worked or did not work within its environment. 
Theorising explicates the characteristics of the artefact and its interaction with the 
environment that result in the observed performance. Given a theory, we must jus-
tify that explanation, that is, we must gather evidence to test the theory. Theorise 
and justify refer to the two basic activities of natural sciences (cf., methods creat-
ing theory and methods testing theory in Section 1.4). [MARC95] 
Given the categories for research output and research activities by March et al, the 
research results of Publications 1-6 can now be presented in Table 5. Numbers in 
the table refer to the corresponding publication. The publications are then exam-
ined one by one in the order of publishing, evaluating their research results and the 
author’s contribution. 
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Table 5. Results of Publications 1-6 using the research framework by March 
et al 
Design sciences Natural sciences Activities/ 
Outputs 
Build Evaluate Theorise Justify 
Constructs     
Model 5 5 5  
Method 4, 5, 6 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 3, 4, 5, 6 3 
Instantia-
tion 
2, 4, 5, 6 1, 2, 5, 6 2, 5, 6  
Publication 2, “Lessons Learned in PKI Implementation in Higher Education” 
(published in 2002) was the first of the six publications. For the publication, an ex-
perimental PKI deployment was built and evaluated in Finnish higher education. 
As a result of theorising, the seven conclusions presented in the publication were 
drawn by the project team, Mr Pekka Linna being the secretary. The author was re-
sponsible for the publication and the reasoning presented. 
Publication 4, “Towards Cross-organisational User Administration” (published in 
2003) was an early result of the HAKA project. Based on an early Shibboleth 
document [ERDO02] of Internet2, the publication presented a method for cross-
organisational identity management. At the time, there was little prior work avail-
able.  
Publication 6, “Roaming Network Access Using Shibboleth” (published in 2004) 
was based on Mr Viljo Viitanen’s idea and implementation. As March has noted, 
an instantiation may actually precede the complete articulation of its underlying 
constructs, models and methods [MARC95]. The author was responsible for evalu-
ating the idea and theorising it and drawing the connections to other roaming-
related work done.  
Publication 5, “Organising Federated Identity in Finnish Higher Education” was 
published in 2005, when the Haka federation was rolled out. The publication theo-
rised several non-technical issues, such as how to organise a federation, how to 
formulate the organisations’ responsibilities and how to comply with privacy laws. 
According to Järvinen, an innovation may cover not only technical artefacts, but 
also organisational innovations [JÄRV00]. The model and methods were imple-
mented in the Haka federation.  
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Publication 3, “An Empirical Study on the Usability of Logout in a Single Sign-On 
System” (published 2005) was a spin-off in the work that the author had done with 
organisational and cross-organisational single sign-on systems. Having realised 
that few single sign-on systems covered logout at all, the author got an idea of 
studying the subject from an end user perspective. This publication was the au-
thor’s voyage to empirical sciences; together with a usability researcher, the author 
studied end user’s expectations on logout in a single sign-on scenario, created 
theories and justified them in usability tests. Mrs Inka Vilpola was responsible for 
the empirical methodology used in usability research and the author was responsi-
ble for the substance of the study.  
Publication 1, “Study on Organisational Identity Management in Finnish Higher 
Education” (published in 2006) completed the big picture of the thesis. Current 
identity management implementations in Finnish higher education institutions 
were evaluated against defined criteria. The work was based on data that was gath-
ered over years in the workshops the author had organised to IT service centre 
staff. 
As shown in the table, research in this thesis falls mostly to the category of design 
sciences, whereas generic theories can be considered as belonging to natural sci-
ences, “explaining how and why things are” [MARC95]. In most cases, justifica-
tion of the theories has been done, effectively, by external parties who have ended 
up with similar theories [e.g. LIBE05, LIBE07c]. Research outputs are focused on 
models, methods and instantiations, whereas the constructs of the domain were al-
ready available. 
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Abstract 
In an organisation, various information systems store 
users’ personal attributes, such as usernames, roles and 
profiles. Over time, the users’ affiliation to the 
organisation may change and her attributes and 
authorisations in the systems should follow the changes. 
To enhance information security and efficiency, 
organisations have deployed metadirectories, which utilise 
predefined rules to synchronise personal data between 
systems. 
Higher education institutions are organisations with 
thousands of users, such as students and employees. This 
paper presents the results of a study on organisational 
identity management in Finnish universities and 
polytechnics. The study focuses on the integration level of 
the institutions’ base registries and the enterprise directory 
and on the scale in which other information systems rely 
on the enterprise directory in their user administration. 
Based on the results, generic conclusions on 
organisational identity management are drawn. 
Keywords: identity management, user administration, 
metadirectory 
1. Introduction 
Computer security deals with the prevention and detection 
of unauthorised actions by users of a computer system [7]. 
User accounts are widely used for distinguishing between 
the users and for deducing their privileges in a system. 
After having authenticated a user, the system uses some 
additional information, for example, access control lists, 
to find out if the user is authorised to carry out the 
operation. 
A user account is an example of an individual’s network 
identity: a real-life person abstracted in a computer 
system. In a computer system, identity is a collection of 
attributes describing a user as well as her properties and 
roles in an organisation. Some attributes, such as 
usernames, uniquely identify her; some attributes, such as 
her role as a student in the university, are useful in role-
based customisation and access control. 
The proliferation of electronic services has caused a rapid 
growth in the number of parallel, independent identities 
an individual has in an organisation. For example, in a 
university, a user may have a user account for her email, 
another in the Windows domain, a third one in a learning 
management system of a laboratory, a fourth one in the 
services provided by the university administration, such as 
travel expense reporting or student registry, etc. 
Furthermore, people also have identities without 
necessarily accounts for login, for example, in the 
building access system, telephone exchange and payroll 
system. 
All these partial identities represent the same real-life 
person, and, in an organisation, their changes are 
interrelated. For instance, when an organisation hires a 
new employee, she is entered into the payroll system, the 
building access system and the telephone exchange, and 
necessary user accounts with related passwords are 
created for her. If her role in the organisation changes (for 
example, a student becomes a staff member in a 
university) or she leaves the organisation, related updates 
in her identity should take place. Managing all the 
identities independently causes overlapping work in the 
organisation, and, usually, lowers data quality, as the 
updates are not necessarily propagated everywhere. 
Higher education institutions are organisations with 
thousands or tens of thousands of users. This has made 
identity management an issue too extensive to be 
neglected. According to a recent survey among European 
higher education institutions, heads of the IT services rank 
identity management as the most time-consuming issue 
they deal with [16]. In the US higher education, CIOs 
consider identity management as one of the most 
important IT issues for their institutions to resolve for 
strategic success [12].  
This paper studies organisational identity management in 
Finnish universities and polytechnics. The aim of the 
paper is to first present the current state of identity 
management and, based on that, find out typical 
phenomena, which can be generalised. The study is based 
on a comprehensive survey made among IT services of 
Finnish universities and polytechnics during 2003-2005.  
The second chapter of this paper provides some 
background information on identity management in an 
organisation. Chapter three describes the research context 
and methods, and chapter four presents the research 
results and discussion. In chapter five, activities aiming at 
improving organisational identity management in Finnish 
universities and polytechnics are presented. Chapter six 
concludes the paper. 
2. Identity Management in an Organisation 
User identity and account management has been a subject 
of work for IT practitioners for a long time. First, this 
chapter discusses the interconnection of organisational 
identity management and information security. Then, 
some basic principles and techniques of organisational 
identity management are introduced. Finally, the 
connection between organisational identity management 
and federated identity management is argued for.  
2.1. Identity Management and Information 
Security 
In an organisation, a change in a person’s position also 
changes her access rights in systems and creates needs to 
start using new systems or cease to use the ones she has 
been using before. The most evident change takes place as 
the person leaves the organisation. 
If a role change creates a need to start using a new 
information system, it is typically in the interest of the 
user to make sure she has all the tools, including the user 
accounts, necessary for her new position. For instance, 
when a new employee is hired, she or her supervisor will 
probably harass the IT services until necessary user 
accounts are created.  
The more critical issue affecting security is the closing of  
accounts, when the user is no more authorised to access 
them, for example, as an employee leaves the organisation 
or a student graduates. In opposite to account creation, the 
closing of accounts is typically not of interest to the 
account holder. It is either simply unimportant or the user 
would perhaps even like to continue using the familiar 
tools and email addresses – not to forget that fired 
employees may want to cause harm to the organisation. 
Thus, it is in the interest of the organisation to make sure 
that only authorised users have accessible accounts. This 
makes the importance of smooth organisational identity 
management not only an issue of efficiency, but also an 
issue of information security. 
2.2. Fundamentals of Identity Management in an 
Organisation 
In an organisation, different organisational units typically 
control information systems carrying personal data. For 
example, in a university, the HR department is often 
responsible for the payroll system, the student 
administration for the student registry, the IT services for 
Windows and Unix accounts and so on. In the 
maintenance of personal data, each organisational unit has 
typically deployed their processes to reflect their own 
needs. 
Polishing organisational processes is necessary for the 
implementation of organisational identity management. 
The focus has to be elevated from the organisational unit 
level to the organisational level, as the processes related to 
identity management cross the boundaries of 
organisational units. Techniques play quite a small role 
here; instead, experts from different parts of the 
organisation need to be gathered together in order to 
collect the understanding of how identity information 
should optimally flow in the organisation, when, for 
instance, a person is hired or fired. To initiate a change 
process that potentially affects several organisational 
units, the commitment has to be made in a sufficiently 
high level in the organisation. Thus, identity management 
is not an issue driven only by IT professionals. The 
support must come from the management of the 
organisation. 
Base registry is the database to which new people are 
added when they first enter the organisational identity 
management system. The identities for new persons are 
created in the base registry and then propagated to the 
other connected registries. There may be several base 
registries in an organisation; for example, the payroll 
system for employees in the organisation, the student 
registry for students in a school, the customer database for 
customers etc. Fundamental to the selection of a base 
registry is that it should by nature be the registry that is 
kept up to date. For example, the payroll system is 
probably up to date for employees’ data as the payment of 
salaries depends on it.  
In an organisational identity management system, new 
persons cannot be added to registries other than the base 
registry. However, other registries may be authoritative 
for some individual attributes. For example, the telephone 
exchange is a prominent candidate as the authoritative 
register for a person’s phone number, as the telephone 
exchange is responsible for the assignment of phone 
numbers in an organisation. In the same manner, the mail 
server is probably a tempting choice as the authoritative 
register for mail addresses. The phone numbers and mail 
addresses can then be propagated from the telephone 
exchange and the mail server to the other connected 
registries, such as the payroll system. However, an 
entirely new person cannot be entered to the identity 
management system by adding her directly to the 
telephone exchange or the mail server, unless the 
organisation has decided to promote either of these as a 
base registry in the organisation. 
Optimally, adding a new person to a base registry triggers 
a chain of events that causes her personal data being 
provisioned to all the other relevant registries. For 
example, adding a new employee to the payroll system 
causes also the creation of a new record in the building 
access system and the telephone exchange, the creation of 
a user account to the Unix or Windows system and so on. 
Different registries in an organisation are typically placed 
in different organisational units, depending on the units’ 
areas of responsibility. On the other hand, the units do not 
necessarily have the general picture on how the identity 
management system reflects changes between their 
registry and other registries in the organisation and how 
other organisational units use the data. Müller [15] has 
identified this as one potential problem of identity 
management systems. 
2.3. Implementations of Identity Management in 
an Organisation 
Organisations may use homegrown techniques to 
implement an organisational identity management system 
to synchronise the person registries. A common way is to 
set up an enterprise directory, which is “a core 
middleware architecture that may provide common 
authentication, authorization, and attribute services to 
electronic services offered by an institution” [3]. The 
processes used for feeding the enterprise directory with 
data from the base registries and other authoritative 
registries are called a metadirectory [3]. The technical 
implementation of the enterprise directory can be, for 
instance, a relational database or an LDAP directory that 
is accessed with standard LDAP protocol. To implement 
the metadirectory, the organisation may use, for example, 
scripting, such as Perl. 
Homegrown scripting has got commercial competitors. 
Companies have developed specific metadirectory 
products that have existing connectors and other tools to 
ease their integration to well known legacy systems, such 
as payroll systems, Windows and Unix systems, relational 
databases and LDAP directories. For instance, Microsoft 
has the Identity Integration Server 2003 product and 
Novell the Identity Manager product. 
There are several case studies available on the 
implementation of organisational user account 
management. Blezard et al [4] has presented, how they 
use available commercial tools to synchronise Unix and 
Windows accounts to the student registry in the 
University of New Hampshire. Anchan et al [2] has 
carried out the task by using an LDAP directory and SUN 
RPC in the Ringling School of Art and Design. Bellina [3] 
has collected generic practices for deploying enterprise 
directories and metadirectories in the US higher 
education. 
Independent of whether the organisation decides to use 
commercial metadirectories or homegrown scripting, the 
importance of well-defined identity management 
processes is equal. Neither commercial nor homegrown 
metadirectories can be deployed without clear 
organisational responsibilities and defined workflows for 
identity information. 
2.4. Crossing the Organisational Boundaries 
The networking of organisations has caused organisations 
to set up services (sometimes called extranet services) 
dedicated to their customers or partners. To decrease the 
maintenance burden of the extranet user accounts and to 
increase user convenience, the concept of federated 
identity management has become a topic of research [5, 
6]. 
In an identity federation, the organisations maintaining the 
user identity and authenticating them are called Identity 
Providers. When an end user logs in to a Service Provider 
in an identity federation, she is authenticated by her 
Identity Provider, which then federates her identity to the 
service in question.  
From the organisational identity management point of 
view, becoming a Service Provider in an identity 
federation means that the organisation can provide 
services to end users that it does not have in its own base 
registries. On the other hand, if the organisation joins the 
identity federation as an Identity Provider, the persons 
that have an identity in the organisation can also enjoy 
services provided by other organisations. 
Becoming an Identity Provider in an identity federation 
means that the quality of organisational identity 
management is not only an internal issue for the 
organisation any more. Instead, other organisations also 
become dependent on the freshness of user data in the 
organisational identity management system. Thus, having 
a properly implemented organisational identity 
management system is a requirement for joining an 
identity federation, and it is suggested that identity 
federations cover this issue in their policy documents 
[11]. 
3. Research Context and Methods 
In Finnish higher education, there are 20 universities and 
29 polytechnics in the administrative sector of the 
Ministry of Education. In universities, there are 157 200 
degree students and 26 600 employees. The largest one is 
the University of Helsinki with 36 800 degree students, 
and there are also five other universities with more than 
ten thousand students. On the other hand, the smallest 
universities have just a few hundred students. The 
polytechnics have altogether 130 900 degree students and 
10 900 employees. Regarding the size of polytechnics, the 
scale is not so wide as in the universities. The largest 
polytechnics have less than ten thousand degree students, 
while the smallest one has more than one thousand. [13, 
14] 
The study was conducted as a part of the “School in User 
Administration” workshops that will be introduced in 
detail in Chapter 5. The representatives of the Finnish 
higher education institutions’ IT service units were 
provided with a document template and asked to fill in the 
template with details on the present identity management 
system in place in their institution. To avoid 
misunderstandings, the basic concepts of identity 
management were first explained to the IT service staff. 
1. Organisational environment 
1.1. Description of the institution 
1.2. Description of user categories 
1.3. Administration of servers and workstations 
1.4. Applications 
2. Current identity management practices 
2.1. Scope of the description 
2.2. The big picture of identity management 
2.3. Degree of centralisation of identity 
management 
2.4. Opening of user accounts (students, staff, 
other users) 
2.5. Closure of user accounts (students, staff, 
other users) 
2.6. Contents of the enterprise directory 
2.7. Applications relying on the enterprise 
directory 
3. Implementation details 
3.1. Usernames 
3.2. Authentication means 
3.3. Email addresses 
3.4. Other 
Table 1. Contents of the study template. 
The document template is outlined in Table 1. First, some 
background information on the institution, its users and 
the administration of servers and services were asked. The 
second chapter consisted of the description of the current 
identity management system, including the services that 
were in the scope of the document, how the identity 
management was implemented in general, what kind of 
processes were defined for opening and closing the user 
accounts, what attributes about users were stored in the 
enterprise directory and which applications relied on the 
enterprise directory in their user administration. Finally, 
some implementation details were asked, such as 
namespaces, formats for usernames and email addresses 
and what kind of authentication means were available in 
the institution. 
Altogether, 30 institutions of the 49 participated in the 
study. Thus, 61 percent of Finnish higher education was 
covered by the study. How well the 30 institutions 
represent the entire population can be argued on; the 
institutions that have paid little attention to identity 
management perhaps did not participate the “School in 
User Administration” either. However, there were also 
institutions that did not participate the “School” as they 
considered they already have proper identity management 
in place.  
The survey does not form a snapshot of the situation in 
any particular point of time. Instead, the survey was 
conducted in the institutions one by one during the years 
2003-2005. It is evident that the first organisations have 
already made progress in improving their identity 
management since 2003. However, eventually, the results 
are expected to provide an overview on the current issues 
in identity management in Finnish higher education as a 
whole. 
4. Research Results 
This chapter presents the results of the study. First, some 
qualitative results regarding relevant organisational issues 
are presented. The quantitative results on the connected 
information systems and the level of integration to the 
base registries describe how deeply integrated identity 
management systems are in place in the institutions 
covered. Finally, some discussion based on the results is 
presented.  
4.1. Qualitative Results of the Study 
In Finland, universities and polytechnics differ slightly 
from each other as organisational entities. All the 
universities are state universities and, thus, government 
agencies. The organisational status of polytechnics in turn 
varies a lot; some are municipal institutions, while others 
are maintained by a federation of municipalities etc. For 
identity management, this has the consequence that all the 
universities have a payroll system of their own, whereas 
many of the polytechnics do not, as their salaries are paid 
by the municipality etc. Using the payroll system as a base 
registry is more difficult, as it is not in control of the 
institutions themselves. 
The organisation of the IT services also differs institution 
by institution. All the institutions have some kind of 
centralised unit that takes care of the common IT 
infrastructure, including network and Internet 
connectivity, some basic services such as DNS, email etc. 
In most polytechnics, IT services are part of the institute 
administration. In universities, the IT service units are 
either part of the university administration, like in the 
polytechnics, or independent institutes. For identity 
management, having IT services as a part of the university 
administration appears to make linking the enterprise 
directory to the student and HR registry easier as the 
related issues are internal for the administration of the 
university.  
Research is an integral part of the universities’ mission. 
For identity management, this means that the number of 
short periodic contracts and the turnover of employees are 
high; students are recruited as research assistants in a 
laboratory, and faculty members become post-graduate 
students. In some universities, up to more than half of the 
employees were reported to be students at the same time. 
Thus, attention must also be paid to the design of the 
identity management for users with two base registries. 
According to the study, most universities have found that 
in order to avoid confusion, providing one user account 
instead of two is preferable for users who are both 
students and employees. 
Polytechnics have applied research in their mission as 
well, but the tradition is still young and the number of 
researchers small. The turnover rate of employees is 
considerably lower in the polytechnics than in the 
universities. The number of users who are both students 
and employees is low, consisting typically of just some 
dozens of users.  
4.2. Information Systems Connected to the 
Identity Management System 
Institutions were asked to report the information systems 
whose identity management currently rely on the 
information in the enterprise directory. Results are 
depicted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Information systems relying on the enterprise 
directory. 
OS accounts means the operating system (Windows, Unix 
or Macintosh) accounts provided to the employees and/or 
students of the institution. 29 of the 30 institutions had the 
operating system accounts connected to the institutional 
identity management system. The study also indicated that 
in the universities, distributed maintenance of Windows 
and Unix systems is typical. In addition to the systems 
maintained by the IT services, several institutes take care 
of their own Windows/Unix environments. This study 
concerned the systems administered by the institutions’ IT 
service units. The only university in which the OS 
accounts were not connected to the institutional identity 
management was the one in which the maintenance of all 
Unix/Windows systems is taken care of by the institutes. 
All the 30 institutions reported that the mail accounts 
provided by the IT service unit are connected to the 
institutional identity management. 22 institutions reported 
that they have institutional Intranet (collection of web 
pages available only for affiliated users), all of them 
having it relying on the institutional identity management 
system. In addition, all the institutions providing remote 
network access (VPN, dial-up etc) had it connected to the 
institutional identity management; 23 institutions reported 
they have one.  
The student registry means here a web interface available 
for students for enrolment to courses, exams and so on. In 
16 of the 30 institutions, the students used the 
username/password in the enterprise directory for 
authentication in the enrolment services. In the rest, 
separate usernames/passwords issued by the student 
administration or some other attributes (for example, 
surname and the date of birth) were used for 
authentication. 
Learning management systems (LMS) are web-based 
tools to facilitate learning. There are several commercial, 
open source and homegrown products in use in Finnish 
universities [10]. The learning management systems are 
often maintained by institutes or institutional education 
technology units. In 9 of the 30 institutions, at least some 
of the learning management systems rely on the enterprise 
directory.  
The library management system is the information system 
that, e.g., keeps record on library patrons’ loans and 
reservations. Typically, nearly all students and employees 
use the institution’s library services and have a patron 
record in the library management system. All the Finnish 
universities and polytechnics use the Voyager library 
management system, which has well-documented 
interfaces for upload and update of patron data. However, 
at the time of the survey, none of the institutions had 
linked that to the institutional identity management 
system. Students and employees were given separate 
usernames and passwords by the library, and they had to 
remember to inform the library separately about changes 
in their personal data, such as the home address. 
4.3. Links between Base Registries and the 
Enterprise Directory 
To evaluate the connections between the enterprise 
directory and the base registries (the student registry and 
the payroll system), institutions were asked to describe, 
how they take care of closing user accounts when users 
leave the organisation.  The answers were sorted into 
three categories: automatic, manual batch processing and 
manual. Automatic means that no IT service staff 
intervention is necessary for closing an account. For 
example, a script is initiated automatically every night to 
identify and close unnecessary accounts. Manual batch 
processing means that some automation (e.g., scripting) is 
in place to assist the IT service staff, but the scripts are 
triggered manually, possibly also involving other manual 
operations (such as cutting/pasting text files extracted 
from the student registry). Manual processing means that 
the entire process is manual, including locating correct 
user accounts from the enterprise directory. 
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Figure 2. Account closure procedures for students. 
The results are depicted in Figure 2. For students’ 
accounts, 11 of the 30 institutions have automatic account 
closure in place. 15 institutions have manual batch 
processing, the frequency of which varies from once a 
week to once a year. 3 institutions use fully manual 
account closure, based on the notification provided by the 
student administration. One institution provides only 
periodic user accounts, which are closed in the end of the 
period unless renewed by the user. 
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Figure 3. Account closure procedures for employees. 
For employees’ accounts (Figure 3) the amount of 
automation was lower. 8 of the 30 institutions had 
automatic means for account closing, 4 institutions had 
manual batch processing. 18 of the 30 institutions had no 
technical tools for closing employees’ accounts. Instead, 
they relied on a notification by the HR department or the 
supervisor when someone left the organisation or asking 
the users or their supervisors regularly, if the accounts are 
still in use. Some organisations with a manual procedure 
reported that they have problems in getting the 
notifications. HR departments or supervisors are 
instructed to inform the IT services, but the organisation is 
lacking tools for making sure that the instructions are 
followed. 
4.4. Discussion  
From the results it can be deduced that information 
systems maintained by the IT service unit are most likely 
to be connected to the institutional identity management 
system. Services provided by the administration of the 
institution are to follow; student registry by the student 
administration and intranets provided by the 
communications administration. Services provided by 
institutes and libraries are less likely to be integrated to 
the enterprise directory.  
The further away the units are from the IT service unit, 
the less likely the services utilise the enterprise directory. 
In the organisation of an institution, institutes and libraries 
are independent units with longer distance and fewer 
contacts to the IT services and the university 
administration. Apparently, the institutes prefer 
maintaining user identities in their local systems by 
themselves, although they do not have the facilities, such 
as the student registry and the payroll system, to support 
the work. 
As Allen [1] has also shown, there may even be a lack of 
confidence between faculties and the administration in a 
university. Institutes do not trust the administration to be 
able to provide them high quality IT services, including 
services related to user identity. This is a potential barrier 
preventing institutes from connecting their information 
systems to the enterprise directory.  
Regarding links between the base registries and the 
enterprise directory, it is evident that the level of 
integration depends on the number of users and 
transactions. Automation does not necessarily make sense 
if the maintenance of an automated system is more time-
consuming than doing things manually. From Figures 2 
and 3 it can be deduced that fully or partly automated 
systems are more commonly used in universities, where 
the number of users and the turnover of employees is 
larger. A question for future research is where the break-
even point lies, where maintenance of an automated 
metadirectory becomes more efficient than manual 
updating.  
Figure 3 suggests that prompt closing of employees’ 
accounts is not considered a highly important issue. The 
majority of the institutions rely on manual account closing 
procedures, which, if not well documented and followed, 
do not fully guarantee that all users’ accounts are closed 
consistently. From the answers to the study it can be 
deduced that in universities, a major reason is the lack of 
the payroll systems’ integrity. In institutes, there are 
employees without written contracts of employment; new 
employees are hired and periodic contracts renewed, but 
the written contracts are signed later. In order to use the 
payroll system as a base registry, organisational processes 
need to be adapted into the latency. However, it should be 
beneficial for both the employer and the employee to have 
the contracts signed in due time, and, thus, the identity 
management should encourage the heads of the institutes 
to make sure that the contracts are signed and entered into 
the payroll system without unnecessary delays.   
In polytechnics, the number and turnover rate of 
employees is low, and, thus, the institutions have 
considered the automation of account closure processes as 
a secondary issue. Manual processes are preferred also 
because several institutions do not have control over their 
payroll system.  
5. Improving Organisational User 
Administration 
Institutional identity management has also been identified 
as an important issue among information managers in 
Finnish higher education institutions, and deliberate 
actions towards improving it has been taken. The issue 
that was earlier internal to the IT service units and often 
neglected has now become important, as more 
institutional and cross-institutional services become 
reliant on it. The Haka federation, the identity federation 
of Finnish higher education, has specified the high quality 
of personal data as a requirement for Identity Providers 
joining the federation [8]. 
In order to help institutions in improving their identity 
management, a set of workshops called “School in User 
Administration” has been organised. The “School” 
consists of three workshops for IT service unit staff 
members, distributed over a time period of one year. The 
idea is to gather IT staff from several organisations 
tackling with similar issues, present them some principles 
and best practices of identity management, and then use 
the collective pressure of the group to promote progress in 
the institutions. Practice has shown that the improvement 
projects are longer-lived in the institutions, if someone 
outside the institution regularly asks about the progress 
they are making.  
First schoolday 1/2005 
 Concepts (identity, authentication, authorisation, 
centralised identity management etc) 
Practices (base registries, authoritative registries, 
roles, unique identifiers etc) 
Processes (identity flows, involvement of 
organisational units etc) 
Techniques (metadirectories, LDAP directories, 
relational databases etc) 
CASE homegrown metadirectory (a representative 
of an institution presents their implementation of an 
enterprise directory relying on SunOne LDAP and 
Perl scripting) 
CASE commercial metadirectory (a representative 
of an institution presents their implementation 
based on Microsoft MIIS product) 
CASE RDB (a representative of an institution 
presents their identity management implementation 
utilising OpenLDAP as a front-end to a relational 
database) 
First homework given: analysis of the institution’s 
present identity management system 
Second schoolday 5/2005 
 Homework looked through in groups (each 
institution presents their current identity 
management system) 
Campus Web Single Sign-On (fundamentals, 
commercial and open source implementations) 
Federated identity management (principles and 
implementations, SAML, Shibboleth) 
Identity federation (principles, the Haka federation) 
Second homework: setting the goal for institution’s 
identity management system 
Third schoolday 11/2005 
 Homework looked through in parallel groups (each 
institution presents the goal for their identity 
management system) 
Novell’s products for identity management 
Eduroam: roaming network access 
Other current topics 
Table 2. Programme of the School in User 
Administration. 
At the time of writing, two rounds of the “School in User 
Administration” have been organised. The programme of 
the second round is outlined in Table 2. During the first 
and second round, more than 30 institutions have 
participated the school.  
In the “School in User Administration”, schooldays are 
supplemented by homework. As the first homework 
assignment, each institution is asked to assess the current 
state of the institutional identity management system. The 
research results presented in chapter 4 were based on 
these assessments. The second homework assignment is 
setting the target for institutional identity management. 
The target setting is technology-agnostic. The institutions 
are not asked to fix any particular product they will use; 
instead, they are asked to make their choices for 
organisational base registries and authoritative registries 
for attributes and to decide, which institutional 
information systems will be connected to the enterprise 
directory. Furthermore, the organisations are asked to 
sketch the processes related to the identity flow, starting 
with what happens in different organisational units, when 
a new person enters the organisation. 
The forerunners in institutional identity management have 
shown that improving institutional identity management is 
a several year project. Once the links between the 
enterprise directory and other registries are built, the work 
is focused on connecting new information systems to the 
enterprise directory and deepening the integration of the 
systems. For example, in one Finnish university, there is a 
project going on to pass the students’ course enrolments 
from the student registry to a learning management system 
for authorisation. The work utilises Shibboleth software 
and CourseID specification for course related roles, both 
activities of Internet2 [9]. 
6. Conclusions 
As information systems handling personal data have 
proliferated, the importance of identity management in an 
organisation has grown. Organisations have set up 
metadirectories, which take care of synchronising 
personal data between the enterprise directory and other 
registries, in order to make the data follow the 
individuals’ role changes in the organisation.  
This paper presented the results of a survey on the status 
of organisational identity management in Finnish higher 
education. It turned out that services provided by the IT 
service unit and the institution’s administration are most 
likely connected to the metadirectory. Identities in 
services provided by institutes and the library are usually 
managed independently, causing overlapping work and, 
possibly, the lack of data integrity in the institution as a 
whole. In the IT service units, economics of scale and 
links to the institutional base registries make it easier to 
make sure that the identity information in the enterprise 
directory is up-to-date. 
In an organisation, identity management was not found to 
be solely a technical issue. The flow of identity 
information crosses organisation unit boundaries, and 
different organisational units maintain the information 
systems, which potentially feed and utilise the enterprise 
directory. The design of processes and identity flows in 
the organisation has to be considered as part of the 
organisational identity management design. A series of 
workshops called “School in User Administration” was 
introduced as a way to help organisations to improve their 
institutional identity management. 
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Abstract 
A joint project for Finnish universities and polytechnics has 
studied the applicability of the public key infrastructure (PKI) 
and smart cards in higher education institutes. The nine pilots 
in the project have provided practical experience on the 
implementation of PKI and services relying on it. The project 
has identified motives for PKI deployment. Interdependencies 
of PKI and other topics such as user administration and inter-
institutional use of resources have been addressed. The 
project has summarised its experiences to seven conclusions.  
Keywords: PKI, smart cards, security 
1.  Introduction 
Cryptography has been used for hundreds of years when 
passing secret messages between parties through an 
unreliable channel. Traditional cryptographic algorithms use 
the same cryptographic key for encrypting and decrypting 
messages; the method is called symmetric cryptography. A 
new era of cryptography started in 1976, when Diffie and 
Hellman [2] discovered asymmetric cryptography (aka public 
key cryptography), in which a network user has two distinct 
keys, a public key and a private key. In order to make it 
available for everyone the user publishes his public key. The 
private key, on the other hand, shall be carefully protected 
from disclosure. The usage of the key pair depends on the 
asymmetric algorithm used. In the popular RSA algorithm 
[15] the public key is used for encrypting messages, and the 
messages encrypted with it can be decrypted only with the 
private key and vice versa.  
Public key cryptography as such is not enough. A method for 
ensuring the true owner of the private key is needed. The 
objective of Public key infrastructure (PKI) is to establish a 
binding between a public key and the identity of the person or 
object possessing the corresponding private key. This is being 
done with a certificate, which is a digitally signed statement 
made by a trusted third party about the ownership of the 
private key. The certificate binds a public key to the identity 
of the holder of the related private key. 
When not in active use, the private key is usually protected 
by a password and stored on the hard disk of the workstation, 
providing only limited security. A prominent enabler for PKI 
is a smart card, which functions as a tamper-resistant storage 
for the private key of the cardholder. Smart card is a credit 
card sized computer having enough computing power for 
running the decryption algorithm that utilises the private key. 
Because the private key is stored and even used in the on-
board microprocessor, it can never be revealed to attackers 
such as Trojan horses potentially occupying the workstation. 
Smart card is typically protected with a personal 
identification number (PIN) to prevent possible misuse. 
Public key infrastructure makes it possible to authenticate a 
network user without a password or any other secret 
information shared by the user and the authenticating system. 
Commonly used network security protocols such as Transport 
Layer Security (TLS) [1], Secure Shell (SSH) [19] and IP 
Security Architecture (IPSec) [6] already support PKI in 
authenticating the user. In addition to encrypting messages, 
PKI provides also non-repudiation services implemented by a 
digital signature. For instance the S/MIME protocol [14] 
implements digital signatures and encryption for 
confidentiality, authenticity and integrity in electronic mail. 
2. The national PKI in Finland and the FEIDHE 
project 
In Finland the public sector has been a driving force for PKI 
implementation. In 1996 the government stated, that 
electronic identification of a citizen belongs to the 
infrastructure of the information society [10]. A national PKI 
was implemented and Population Register Centre was 
nominated as the certificate authority (CA), that is the trusted 
party issuing certificates for citizens. The private key was 
stored in a smart card; a chip was embedded to the identity 
card issued to citizens by the Police. The first FINEID 
(Finnish Electronic Identity, [13]) cards were issued in 
December 1999. 
Launch of FINEID was noticed in universities as well, and 
people responsible for network security started considering 
the use of FINEID card to improve the reliability of 
authentication in the university network. Instead of having 
separate projects in each organisation, a joint project for 
universities and polytechnics was established. National 
student unions were involved, because the student cards 
issued to students by the unions were considered as a 
potential place for the chip. The goal of FEIDHE (Finnish 
Electronic Identification in Higher Education) was to 
investigate the applicability of the public key infrastructure 
and smart cards in higher education institutes. The project 
was chartered in June 2000, and it ended in March 2002. 
3. Piloting PKI 
Running pilots in the participating institutes was considered 
as an essential method for reaching the goals already in the 
beginning of the project. Member institutes of the project 
were encouraged to apply for pilots, which were independent 
projects driven by individual organisations. The role of the 
FEIDHE project was to co-ordinate the pilots i.e. to ensure 
that the pilots together had comprehensive coverage of the 
PKI application areas and to provide an inter-institutional 
communication channel for experiences and ideas the pilots 
had. The FEIDHE project also organised basic PKI training, 
made an inventory on the products available on the market, 
and arranged financial aid for the piloting institutes from the 
ministry of education and the ministry of transportation and 
communication. 
The project set four goals for piloting. A natural goal was to 
find out how PKI and the applications relying on it should be 
technically implemented in practice. The pilots were asked to 
document their implementations in order to make it possible 
for the others to follow them. The pilots also gathered data 
about the expenses of the implementation work, including the 
components that are available on the market or for free and 
the amount of work that needs to be done in order to get a 
working implementation. 
In the university networks a key player that can be easily 
forgotten is the user. Replacing passwords by a smart card 
and introducing new services on it means a significant change 
to the way people have been using networks for years. A 
separate study on the usability of a PKI relying on smart 
cards was done to find out the bottlenecks from the user 
perspective. Among other things usability inspection and 
testing in a laboratory and contextual inquiry in the real 
environment were carried out.  
These three goals served the ultimate goal, which was the 
comparison of the benefits of the system and the costs of its 
implementation and maintenance. A large-scale 
implementation of PKI in a higher education institute is 
clearly a significant investment, and a comprehensive 
understanding of whether or not it is worth of it is desirable 
beforehand. 
During the FEIDHE project nine pilots took place, all of them 
having something in common and something different from 
the others. Most pilots used the FINEID issued by Population 
Register Centre, but being independent of the certificate 
authority, however, was considered important. PKI was 
utilised mostly for authentication in common network 
security protocols such as Transport Layer Security (TLS), 
Secure Shell (SSH) and IPSec/IKE, but in one pilot digital 
signature was integrated into one of the processes in the 
financial administration of the university. The pilots had 
students, teachers and other staff members as the pilot group. 
In most pilots the number of pilot users was between 10 and 
50, the biggest one had about 650 users. 
Four pilots took place in universities and four in polytechnics. 
One pilot was organised by CSC, the company maintaining 
the Finnish research and higher education network. The 
external funding for the pilots was about 225 000 Euro, the 
rest was covered by the ordinary IT-budgets of the institutes. 
Eight man-years were used in the pilots and 16 in the project 
in total. 
4. Conclusions in FEIDHE 
The FEIDHE project has summarised its experiences on PKI, 
smart cards and related issues in a few conclusions [4]. The 
conclusions and related proposals of action are provided to 
the management of higher education institutes and the 
ministry of education in order to support their decision-
making. 
Conclusion 1: The basis of PKI has proved to be working, 
and in the future authentication of users can be based on it. 
However, implementations relying on smart cards still have 
some shortcomings. 
The cryptographic principles of PKI have been a subject for 
intensive research, and severe flaws have not been reported. 
PKI and certificates have been adopted in common network 
security protocol standards, and standards on the client side 
architecture make it possible for the implementations to 
interoperate. Products utilising PKI and smart cards are 
entering the market. 
Yet the implementations available have shortcomings. 
Support for smart cards in Unix and Linux workstations is 
inadequate and only a few smart card readers have drivers 
available [7]. However, open source projects are working to 
improve the situation [11, 20]. For workstations running 
Microsoft Windows there are commercial products to choose 
from. Unfortunately the products are not yet mature from the 
usability point of view, and the end users are hampered by 
complicated installation procedures or error messages, which 
are difficult to understand and may require understanding of 
PKI [17].  
The de facto standard for the architecture of a workstation 
with a smart card reader is PC/SC, which specifies the three 
software components needed [12]. The smart card resource 
manager implements the support for smart cards in general, 
and the reader handler is a driver needed for each smart card 
reader model used. The service provider is a middleware 
component enabling an application, such as a web browser, to 
interface a smart card with certificates. In a FEIDHE pilot ten 
teachers were asked to install a smart card reader and the 
three software components at the computers at their home. 
Despite of the written installation instructions tailored for 
them only three teachers succeeded at the first attempt [8]. 
Thus, the readers should be installed not by the end users but 
by the IT support until the products are mature enough from 
the usability perspective. That is difficult if the cards are used 
at home e.g. for distant working. 
Windows 2000 and its successors have built-in smart card 
support for certain smart card vendors and PKI can even be 
utilised for smart card logon [9]. However, FEIDHE project 
has experienced the Microsoft’s implementation of the smart 
card logon cumbersome, because it has requirements on the 
certificate contents. For example the certificates in a FINEID 
card don’t fulfil the requirements. Yet the FINEID and other 
compliant cards can be used for workstation logon, but an 
additional certificate needs to be installed in the card, causing 
extra work for the user and the network administration. 
Conclusion 2: There are problems with the security of public 
workstations. Related safety precautions and liability issues 
need to be solved before a large-scale deployment of PKI and 
smart cards in classrooms. 
Smart cards and PKI provide increased security for 
authentication, making it possible to implement more 
sensitive services to the users in the network. On the other 
hand, sensitive services provided are potential targets for 
attackers if the security of the system is compromised.  
A smart card is a tamper-resistant container for the private 
encryption keys, and in an appropriate implementation of a 
smart card the private keys can be considered to be safe. The 
workstation utilising the smart card, however, is seldom 
controlled completely by the user, and it is very difficult for 
the end user to track all the software running.  
An intruder, such as a worm or a Trojan horse could misuse 
the smart card and cause significant harm and damage to the 
user. For example smart cards are commonly blocked after 
entering three false PIN codes consecutively. A simple 
intruder could enter a random PIN code to the card three 
times, causing the card to be blocked. A complicated and 
much more dangerous intruder would alter the data sent to the 
card for encryption with the private key. As a result the 
intruder would have a document that the user has signed 
unintentionally.  
The security of a workstation can be improved by using a 
smart card reader with a PIN-pad so that the PIN code entered 
by the user bypasses the insecure workstation. However, an 
intruder is still able to tamper the data that is intended to be 
signed by the smart card. A smart card reader equipped by 
both a PIN-pad and a display would be necessary, causing the 
complexity and the cost of the reader to increase. In order to 
sign data with complex encoding, such as entire Microsoft 
Word documents, a sophisticated terminal would be needed, 
which may have security flaws in turn. 
In higher education institutes there are a lot of workstations 
that are not controlled continuously by the administrators. 
Virus shield software may provide adequate protection 
against common viruses, but a malicious user can e.g. use a 
security flaw of an operating system to install an intruder in a 
workstation in a classroom.  
Actions to protect the workstatios from malicious software 
and hardware need to be studied. The liability issues have to 
be addressed for the case that the protection fails and an 
intruder causes losses for the users or some other party. The 
institute may have responsibilities as the administrator of the 
workstation. The users have to be informed about the risks 
they have as well. 
Conclusion 3: The deployment of smart cards and PKI 
should be done step by step. At first the user administration of 
the institute needs to be centralised, so that the user has a 
single identity in all the services on the network. Distributing 
smart cards to the users is the final step.  
The usability study made in FEIDHE proved that users expect 
to have a large number of services available for the card. 
Users don't benefit from a smart card if it is used for 
replacing a password in some services, but passwords are still 
needed in other services. The card is used if it facilitates the 
user in the daily life. Using a smart card makes sense, if all 
the usernames and passwords can be replaced by smart card 
authentication. [17] 
Replacing all passwords is challenging, because in Finnish 
higher education institutes a user usually has several distinct 
usernames and passwords in separate services. For example, a 
user may have username linden in the internal web pages of 
the university, username mlinden in the Unix environment of 
the department and username mikael in the Windows domain 
of the laboratory. Nothing binds the three usernames together. 
From the system point of view, linden, mlinden and mikael 
are three distinct users in three independent systems. 
To implement smart card authentication, a means for mapping 
a certificate to a username needs to be established. The 
easiest way is to include the username in the content of the 
certificate; this is the way Windows 2000 smart card logon is 
implemented. In an alternative implementation the mapping 
of certificates and usernames is done in the back-end system. 
For example certificates and usernames can be considered as 
attributes of a person in an LDAP (Light-weight Directory 
Access Protocol, [18]) directory of the institute. The latter is a 
more flexible implementation because it enables the use of 
certificates whose contents the institute cannot affect on. One 
example of such a certificate is the FINEID card. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Centralised user administration. 
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In principle the mapping between users and certificates could 
be done independently in each of the services provided. 
However, maintaining the mapping of certificates and users is 
time-consuming and may need some manual work in the IT 
helpdesk of the institute. In order to minimise overlapping 
work, it makes sense to do the mapping in one centralised 
place. The role of the centralised user administration system 
is to keep track of all the network users and the authentication 
mechanisms such as passwords and certificates associated to 
them (Figure 1). When the users need to be authenticated, the 
services can rely on the user administration, making 
implementation of smart card authentication easier in existing 
and new services. For example, the services can utilise the 
LDAP directory of the institute in order to find out, to which 
user the presented certificate belongs. 
Centralised user administration was found an important 
enabler of services relying on PKI, but it has other 
advantages as well. Centralised user administration reduces 
overlapping work in the network services available in the 
institute. The users are more satisfied if they are able to use a 
single username and password in all the services. 
Furthermore, it makes sense to synchronise the user 
administration to other databases, such as to the student 
register of the institute. Synchronisation of databases makes it 
possible to automatically add or delete the user accounts 
when a user enters or leaves the organisation, which increases 
the security in turn. However, centralisation of user 
administration is not only a technical problem but also an 
organisational problem. In the academic world organisational 
units, such as departments and laboratories, tend to be willing 
to preserve certain independence in information systems as 
well. 
An obvious pitfall to avoid is the too smart card centric view 
to PKI, even though people not so familiar with the 
technology may consider PKI as “the smart card thing”. The 
focus of PKI implementation in higher education is not in 
smart cards, but in integrating the certificates in the user 
administration of the higher education institute. Attention 
should be paid on implementing the structural and 
procedural things of user administration so that certificates 
can be used instead of passwords in authentication. Smart 
cards, certificates, client software in a workstation etc are 
components that are commercially available, and they are not 
the primary matters to concentrate on. Consultation and even 
products, such as metadirectories, are available for user 
administration as well, but the processes have to be tackled 
by the organisation anyway. Having implemented the related 
modifications to the user administration the smart cards 
readers can be installed in the workstations and smart cards 
distributed to the users. 
Conclusion 4: Deploying PKI in a higher education institute 
requires practical experience and training for the network 
administration and IT support. Thus it is favourable to 
provide services on PKI for a small user community at first. 
Most of the staff members in the network administration of 
the higher education institutes are not yet familiar with smart 
cards and PKI. A considerable amount of education is 
required before the staff members are experienced enough for 
implementing and maintaining the related modifications and 
for providing support to the end users. The lack of experience 
may be even a bigger problem in an institute than the lack of 
funding for PKI deployment. 
A convenient way to get some early experiences is to deploy 
smart card based services for a small number of users at first. 
For example the network administration may decide, that 
strong authentication is at first introduced to people using the 
student administration system, because student records 
contain sensitive data.  
An alternative way for getting experiences is to provide smart 
card readers and related software to the staff members who 
are potential users for off-campus services. For instance the 
applications for Academy of Finland, the national 
organisation for research funding, can be signed in the web 
using the FINEID card. Providing smart cards and related 
accessories to staff members whose research work is funded 
by Academy of Finland does not require modifications in the 
institute’s own services, but makes it still possible to get 
some experience on the subject. 
Conclusion 5: Each higher education institute should 
consider the choices they have in PKI implementation and 
their benefits and costs. A common smart card for all the 
institutes is not necessary. 
In the beginning FEIDHE considered specifying a special 
smart card to be used in higher education. For students the 
chip would be integrated in the student card and for staff 
members in the badge they have. In practice specifying a card 
that fulfils the needs of all the 49 higher education institutes 
in Finland was found challenging because of the differing 
requirements. Some institutes wanted to use the card also for 
purchases and accessing buildings, some institutes already 
had a campus card with an electronic purse. When the focus 
of the project moved from the card to the user administration 
of the institute, specifying a card became unessential. 
The institutes deploying PKI have several alternative ways to 
choose between. The institutes can either use an existing 
smart card or specify a smart card of their own. Besides 
FINEID card there are a few smart cards with certificates to 
be launched for public in Finland. Few banks are going to 
issue a debit card with certificates. Some cities have plans for 
a smart card for the city dwellers. If the smart cards are 
technically compatible and the certificates are considered 
trustworthy enough, there should be no reason for not 
accepting those certificates in the services provided by the 
institute as well.  
A significant cost of PKI deployment is formed by the smart 
cards and certificates issued. A partnership with some 
external party may benefit both sides. For example the costs 
of the smart cards for students could be shared with a bank 
issuing the certificates. The bank could in turn be eager to 
make all the new students to drop in the bank office to get a 
smart card. Partnership seems more applicable for the cards 
used by students. The cards for staff members need to be paid 
by the institute anyway like other tools needed for daily work. 
In FEIDHE a separate study among students was made on the 
card and its properties [5]. In the study students were asked, 
what kinds of smart cards and services on it they would like 
to use. Using the card for getting student discount was 
considered as the most interesting property. That is for what 
the current student card is used. Ability to use the card in 
libraries and public transportation was also important, and 
small payments and building access in the campus were listed 
as well. A common denominator for the results was that the 
services related to daily life as a student were considered 
natural. The study encourages the institutes to establish 
partnerships with the public sector. 
If the institute decides to issue cards of its own, the PKI can 
be either outsourced or operated by the institute itself. Even 
in Finland there are several commercial certificate authorities 
issuing certificates for smart cards. The acceptance of the 
certificate in off-campus services depends on the quality of 
the certificate. It is desirable that at least the other higher 
education institutes trust on the certificates issued. 
Conclusion 6: In order to benefit from the reduced costs and 
increased quality of services provided by PKI, a higher 
education institute needs to carefully develop its services and 
processes. 
Replacing passwords by strong authentication based on 
certificates is relatively straightforward if the user 
administration of the institute is properly implemented. Using 
strong authentication makes it possible to introduce more 
sensitive services to the network. An even more interesting 
enabler for new services is the digital signature that can be 
implemented by a smart card with certificates.  
The non-repudiation implemented by a digital signature can 
be used to replace handwritten signatures in travel expense 
reports, book-keeping and varying other applications, making 
it possible to replace the last step that still has to be done on 
paper by a digital substitute. Forms on the paper can be 
replaced by forms on the web, and the signature can be made 
by entering the PIN code to the smart card. The amount of 
routine work decreases as printed documents need not to be 
handled any more and digital documents can be handled and 
tracked faster and more easily. According to the Directive of 
the European Parliament on a Community framework for 
electronic signatures [3], an advanced electronic signature 
made by a qualified certificate shall be considered equal to a 
hand-written signature, if it is created by a secure-signature-
creation device.  
Implementing a digital signature as a means to improve 
university administration is a challenging task. A too 
technology-oriented view to the problem should again be 
avoided. Implementing a digital signature is mostly reforming 
the processes in the university administration; what kind of 
steps an affair has to go through to be completed. Usually 
smoothening these processes would cause significant cost-
reductions even without a digital signature and PKI. 
Conclusion 7: Using inter-institutional network resources 
requires national decisions on practices and technology used 
and national co-ordination of development in the user 
administration of the institutes. 
Higher education institutes have developed their information 
systems independently. The way the systems are implemented 
has been an internal issue for each institute, and different 
solutions have been used. Each institute has had its own user 
administration systems. 
Inter-institutional use of network resources is in increase. 
Users of network resources do not necessarily represent the 
same organisation as the provider of the resource. For 
example students from different universities may attend a 
virtual course provided by one university, and the course may 
utilise a web-based learning environment with user 
authentication. Traditionally the username and password are 
generated separately for each student, causing administrative 
work for the institute and one more username and password 
for the student to remember. The need for a more convenient 
arrangement increases, as the use of network resources across 
organisation boundaries becomes more popular. 
From the user point of view an optimal solution would be the 
ability to use the same credentials such as usernames, 
passwords and certificates in all the institutes providing 
courses to the student. This can be achieved by inter-
institutional user administration, in which the user data and 
credentials are stored and maintained in the user’s home 
institute and used by all the institutes in which the student is 
taking courses.  
A prominent technology for implementing inter-institutional 
user administration is LDAP. Each institute would set up an 
LDAP directory containing all the network users in the 
institute, and the other organisations use the directory in 
authenticating the users and in retrieving other relevant 
information. Implementing inter-institutional user 
administration, however, requires common decisions on the 
practices used, including specification related to the LDAP 
schema and the responsibilities of different parties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The relation between authentication and user 
administration [16]. 
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A vulnerability of inter-institutional user administration is 
authentication. The risk of password authentication grows as 
the number of services increases; there are more places in 
which the password can be compromised, and once 
compromised, the password can be misused in several 
services. A more secure authentication mechanism, such as a 
certificate or an authentication ticket, is needed. The relation 
between authentication and user administration is sketched in 
Figure 2. Most of the institutes are in the lower left corner 
today. The arrow demonstrates the ultimate goal of strong 
authentication in inter-institutional user administration. 
5. Summary 
A joint project for Finnish universities and polytechnics has 
studied the applicability of PKI and smart cards in higher 
education institutes, and found the emerging technology 
promising in user authentication, non-repudiation and 
encryption services. An institute benefits from PKI in 
increased security, and digital signatures can be used to 
smoothen the administration of the institute as well.  
Instead of smart cards, the focus of PKI deployment should 
be in the user administration of the institute, making it 
possible to modify existing services and implement new ones 
to be used with PKI and smart cards. As the inter-
organisational use of network resources becomes popular, 
PKI can be used as a technology to meet the challenges for 
network security. 
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The increase of personal services on the web and the co-operation between organisations have made it 
necessary to find ways to identify network users regardless of which organisation they are representing. 
New middleware technologies for user authentication and authorisation are being developed and 
deployed. This paper outlines the problem of cross-organisational user administration and presents 
related new technologies and activities in the academic world. Although the paper uses higher 
education as an example, the results can be generalised to cover cross-organisational services in other 
kinds of institutions as well. 
 
1 Introduction 
User administration is considered to mean keeping track 
of the information system users and their privileges. User 
administration covers both technology in use and 
administrative processes deployed in the organisation. 
The concepts of identification, authentication and 
authorisation are relevant for user administration. Their 
interrelation is clarified in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Concepts of identification, authentication 
and authorisation. 
 
In a distributed environment, the identity of an object is 
represented by an identifier. In daily life various kinds of 
identifiers are used in distinguishing between people. 
Names are the most common identifiers, but they are not 
very useful as two persons may have the same name. In 
information systems, the traditional unique user identifier 
is the username (bsmith). Social security numbers are 
also widely used, although they are not assigned by the 
organisation in question but by the government. In 
universities other common identifiers for people are 
student numbers and employee numbers. A more detailed 
description of identifiers in universities has been done in 
Internet2 [8]. 
Identification and authentication of users are two 
interrelated concepts. When a service authenticates a 
user, it obtains assurance about her identity. A common 
way to authenticate a human user is to ask her to enter a 
password. The use of passwords is considered as weak 
authentication, as passwords can be guessed, sniffed, 
shoulder-surfed or just found on a piece of paper under 
the keyboard. There are also stronger ways to 
authenticate a user, such as one-time-passwords and 
public key infrastructure (PKI). 
Authorisation means deciding, who is allowed to access a 
system (such as a web service) and which operations she 
is allowed to do in it. Authorisation is done by the party 
controlling the system. It can be done on individual level 
by maintaining a list of the identifiers for the authorised 
users. However, in most cases authorisation is based on 
the role of the user. An example of role-based access 
control (RBAC) is that only students are allowed to 
enroll in an exam of a university course, and only staff is 
allowed to check, who have enrolled in an exam.  
Traditional view of networking has been a set of 
services, which have been interconnected by the network. 
Middleware is a layer of abstraction between the 
applications and the network infrastructure. It covers 
technologies like remote procedure call (RPC), quality of 
service, distributed computing (such as Grid) and so on. 
One aspect of middleware is administering users and 
their privileges on services in the network (Figure 2). On 
one hand it covers identification and authentication of the 
network users, on the other hand also the mediation of 
their roles and other attributes that are necessary for 
deducing what the users are authorised to do in the 
network. 
Bob Smith 
System 
User: bsmith 
Pwd: D6hkRtqJ 
Identification: Bob Smith  
known to the system as bsmith. 
Authentication: 
bsmith/D6hkRtq
The party controlling 
the system 
Authorisation: 
Let bsmith use 
the system. 
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Figure 2. User administration is a middleware 
component between the applications and the network. 
 
Formerly the network services were provided mostly by 
the university in which the user was studying or working. 
As the co-operation of universities increases, the user 
may not necessarily belong to the same organisation that 
provides the accessed service. The user, for example, can 
be a researcher that is accessing a national research portal 
or a student studying a distant course provided by 
another university. Most of these services need to be 
aware of the identity and/or the role of the user in her 
home organisation. 
2 Scope of the User Identity 
In an organisation the scope of the user identity can be 
threefold. The identity can be scoped for only one 
specific service, or the user may have the same indentity 
in all the services in the organisation. It is even possible 
to use the same identity in services outside the 
organisation. The scope of the identity and its relation to 
user authentication is sketched in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Scope of the user identity and the required 
reliability of user authentication. [6] 
2.1 From Service-Specific Identities to 
Organisation-wide Identities 
In a university an average user is usually authorised to 
use several information systems, for example 
workstations and servers in Unix and Windows 
environments, web based services such as university 
portals, learning management systems (LMS), dial-up 
services etc. If the user has different identities in each 
service, she probably has to remember several 
username/password pairs in her daily life (lower left 
corner of Figure 3). In one service Bob Smith is known 
as bsmith and in another as bobsm, and the passwords in 
the services are different unless Bob has synchronised 
them by himself. If the user administration of the 
information systems relies on service-specific identities, 
introducing a new personal service on the network means 
giving a new username/password pair to the users. 
As services in the network proliferate, administration of 
user identities causes a significant amount of work both 
for the organisation and the user herself. Replacing the 
service specific identities by one organisation-wide user 
identity for each user in the organisation (the middle row 
of the figure) reduces overlapping work and is also 
comfortable from the usability perspective. The user has 
one single username/password that is used in all the 
services that she is authorised to use in the university.  
In other words, organisation-wide identity separates the 
administration of identity from the administration of 
authorisation; granting access to a new service does not 
anymore mean issuing a new service-specific identity to 
the user. Instead it means authorising an existing user 
with a known username to use the new service. 
The use of an organisation-wide identity is also 
motivated by information security. When a user leaves 
the organisation, for example when a student graduates, 
her user accounts in all the services in the university 
should be inactivated. In contrast to opening an account, 
the user is not usually motivated to actively take care that 
her user accounts are closed as she leaves. Closing all the 
service specific user accounts is a considerable task 
unless the user has one organisation-wide identity. 
Once organisation-wide identities are introduced, it 
makes sense to use some time in integrating the user 
administration to other databases in the organisation, 
such as to the student registry and the payroll system. If 
the number of users entering and leaving the organisation 
is large, manual work and latency can be reduced if the 
accounts are automatically closed right after the person 
has left the organisation.  
Integration of user account databases and other databases 
introduces the concept of a metadirectory, which is a 
directory bringing together the strategic directories that 
the organisation has. A property of a metadirectory is 
that once a piece of information is changed in some 
database, the related changes are mediated to all the other 
relevant databases in the organisation. For example, as a 
student graduates, the event is propagated from the 
student registry to the user administration to close her 
user accounts, to the library to close her patron files 
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there, to the alumni database to introduce a new alumnus 
and so on. 
There are different technologies available for user 
administration in a university. Relational databases, 
which have been connected to student and employee 
databases, are used widely. When a new student is added 
to the student registry, a new user account is 
automatically created in the user administration database. 
Directories based on Light-weight Directory Access 
Protocol (LDAP [13]) have also become popular. 
Companies, such as Novell and Microsoft, are in the 
market with their enterprise directory products. 
The problems faced in the deployment of organisation-
wide identities are not only technical but organisational. 
Administrative processes in the organisation have to be 
justified to ensure smooth operation. For instance, if the 
user account is closed immediately after the working 
contract ends and the person is removed from the payroll 
system, the new contract has to be made in time if the 
employment still continues. Otherwise the user's account 
is closed and she is not able to do her work. 
Co-operation between different organisational units 
inside the administration of a university and between the 
administration and the faculties is needed for example in 
the integration of student registry and user database. 
Sufficient level of trust between organisational units is 
necessary, which is challenging as shown by Allen [1]. 
2.2 Using Network Services Across 
Organisational Boundaries 
So far the discussion has been limited to using services 
inside an organisation. However, co-operation between 
organisations is increasing, and as a result the user of a 
service does not necessarily belong to the same 
organisation as the service.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Cross-organisational use of network 
services. 
 
For example, a student from university X ("origin site") 
may attend a course provided by university Y ("target 
site"), and the course may use some web based learning 
management system (LMS) such as WebCT (Figure 4). 
The target site somehow has to identify and authenticate 
the user, and obtain assurance of her authorisation for the 
service she is accessing. To avoid assigning new 
identities and issuing new usernames for the user, her 
identity should be mediated from the origin site to the 
target site. This is called cross-organisational identity, or 
federated identity in short (top row in Figure 3). 
However, it is not always necessary to uniquely identify 
the user. In some contexts, it is sufficient to make sure 
the user is authorised to access the service. For example, 
the university libraries may have subscribed certain 
digital content to all the researchers and students in the 
university. For the content provider (such as EBSCO, a 
provider of digital contents for university libraries, 
Figure 4), it is enough to know, that the user accessing 
the service is either a student or a researcher of the 
university. From the data protection point of view the 
content provider should not even get the identity of the 
user, only her role in the university. 
2.3 Identification and Authentication of 
Users 
The need for stronger authentication increases as the 
scope of user identity gets larger. As the user has the 
same identity in various network services in her 
organisation and even across organisational boundaries, 
the risk of an authentication failure gets bigger. There are 
more trusted components in which a security 
vulnerability can cause the security to fail, and once 
impersonation becomes possible for an attacker, there are 
more places in which the identity can be abused. Thus, 
deploying cross-organisational identities increases the 
demand for strong authentication (the arrow to the upper 
right corner in Figure 3). 
There are different ways to implement strong 
authentication. Some European governments have plans 
on launching an identity card for the citizens. The 
identity cards contain a chip, which utilises PKI in 
authenticating the user for public and private network 
services. The chip can be inserted in a mobile phone as 
well, removing the requirement for an external smart 
card reader. Smart cards and PKI can be utilised for 
strong user authentication in the universities as well. 
Experiences on deployment of PKI based on smart cards 
are documented for example in [12]. 
Single sign-on is a commonly referenced concept related 
to user authentication. For the user, single sign-on means 
the ability to authenticate only once, and then have 
access to all the resources available without any further 
authentication. Single sign-on architectures have been 
studied for example by Clercq [3]. 
3 A Model for Cross-organisational 
Use of Personal Services 
This chapter introduces a model for cross-organisational 
use of personal services. The model contains three 
entities (Figure 5): the origin site, the target site and the 
user in question. 
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Figure 5. Entities in cross-organisational use of 
personal services. 
3.1 Origin Site 
The origin site is the entity that assigns an identity to a 
user. The identity is represented by an appropriate 
identifier, such as a user name, which is unique in one 
domain. Some architectures use identifiers that are 
globally unique (for example the phone numbers used for 
identifying a subscriber in the public switched telephone 
network), in other architectures federated local identities 
are enough (for example, the identity federation in the 
Liberty Alliance project to which we will return in 
Chapter 4). From the data protection point of view, 
federated local identifiers are preferred, because global 
identifiers make it easier to aggregate personal 
information from different sources, causing a violation of 
privacy. 
If global user identifiers are used, a method for 
implementing global uniqueness is to introduce hierarchy 
to the namespace. Each institution administrates its local 
namespace, and some global unique identifiers such as 
domain names are used to distinguish between 
organisations. EduPerson [4] suggests that a new 
attribute eduPersonPrincipalName is introduced in higher 
education. Bob Smith, for instance, could be known as 
bsmith@univ.edu.  
A drawback of hierarchy in the namespace is that once a 
person is for example a student in two universities, she 
has automatically two identities. In most cases, this is not 
a problem, as she probably is acting in some role in one 
of the two universities, such as as a distant course student 
in order to include the course in her studies in university 
X. However, in certain circumstances the two identities 
can be problematic or at least confusing for the user 
herself.  
Revoking and reassigning unique identifiers in cross-
organisational user administration is as problematic as in 
intra-organisational user administration. If Bob Smith 
leaves his university, can his unique identifier  
bsmith@univ.edu be later assigned to a Bill Smith 
starting his studies at the university? If yes, how can it be 
prevented that the "new" bsmith@univ.edu gets access to 
the information the previous one has left for example to a 
learning management system he has used? 
The origin site is not only responsible for administrating 
the unique identifiers, but also other attributes belonging 
to the user. These include her name and other contact 
information, such as phone number and email address. If 
some of these change, the user has to remember to update 
her contacts only to the origin site, and the changes can 
be mediated automatically to the targets. The origin site 
also maintains attributes expressing the user's 
relationship to the home organisation, such as the 
information that she is a student, professor etc. 
A special set of attributes are the credentials used for 
authentication, including for example passwords and 
certificates. Maintaining appropriate means for user 
authentication is the responsibility of the origin site. 
Some services may have higher requirements for the 
reliability of the authentication, making it necessary to 
maintain several credentials for one user; less sensitive 
services can be used anywhere, more sensitive only on a 
workstation with appropriate equipment such as a smart 
card reader. 
3.2 Target Site 
The target site is the organisation that controls the service 
the user wants to access. The target site can be, for 
example, another university whose learning management 
system is used in some distant course. In other words, a 
university can act both as a origin site and a target site. 
The target site can also be some national level 
organisation such as a national portal for researchers or 
students, or some commercial content provider, such as 
EBSCO. 
It is expected that the target site wants to control who is 
able to access the service. The target site authorises the 
users based on the attributes provided by the origin site. 
For example the student portal lets only students access 
the service. 
3.3 User 
The user is a member (student, staff, faculty, etc in the 
context of universities) of an origin site. She uses the 
services provided by target sites and has access only to 
the services permitted for her. 
The European Union Directive (95/46/EC) on data 
protection requires that in most cases a data subject has 
to give her unambiguous consent for dissemination of her 
personal data. User consent for transmission of personal 
information from the origin site to the target site is 
needed. If the user is not willing to release attributes that 
are necessary for the target site, access may be denied or 
granted only to some lower service level. If the target site 
gets only information about the role of the user (such as 
that she is a student at university X) but the identity of 
the user is not disclosed, the disseminated data is not 
considered as personal and problems related to data 
protection become easier. 
Origin site 
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4 Requirements for Cross-
organisational Use of Services 
This chapter introduces requirements for an architecture 
based on the model presented. The requirements 
incorporate an agreement about the protocol used in 
communications between the entities, trust between 
them, the schema used for attributes exchanged by the 
origin and target sites, and the security infrastructure 
used in securing the communications. The agreement is 
made between the entities involved in cross-
organisational  transactions, forming a community called 
a federation. 
4.1 Protocols Used in the Communications  
The traditional protocol for transferring personal 
information in the Internet is LDAP [13], that is based on 
X.500 directories. LDAP is commonly used in white 
page directories, which can be used like phone books to 
find contact information for people. LDAP is also widely 
deployed in user administration inside organisations, and 
products like Novell eDirectory and Microsoft Active 
Directory support it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Use of LDAP in cross-organisational user 
administration.  
 
LDAP can be used for cross-organisational use of 
services as depicted in Figure 6. The user (Bob Smith) 
gives his unique identifier (bsmith@univ.edu) and 
password (D6hkRtqJ) used in the origin site to the target 
site. The correctness of the password is checked against 
the LDAP directory of the origin site, and the directory 
provides attributes (e.g. Bob's name and role as a student) 
to the target site.  
However, use of LDAP in cross-organisational user 
administration has a drawback. As long as authentication 
is based on a shared secret (such as a password) Bob has 
to reveal his password, a most sensitive piece of 
information, to the target site. This causes two risks: 
1. If the security of the target site is not properly taken 
care of, Bob's password can be compromised. For 
example, if the target site uses basic authentication on 
top of plain HTTP (not HTTPS) in communications with 
Bob's web browser, his password is transmitted to the 
target site in cleartext and it can be sniffed from the 
network. The origin site has little chances to ensure that 
the security in each target site is up-to-date.  
2. If the architecture above becomes a standard practice 
and dozens of services start to use it, Bob has no real 
chance to deduce which service is trustworthy and which 
is not. Entering the password to any untrusted service is 
risky. A fake service, whose only intention is to gather 
passwords from careless users, would probably be a 
success for a cracker. 
Kerberos protocol has been a traditional solution to the 
problem. New protocols overcoming the problem have 
been introduced on the WWW. The authentication of the 
user is always done in the origin site, which provides 
assertions about the user's identity or other attributes to 
the target site. As Bob's password is never passed to the 
target site, a compromise in target's security does not 
reveal the password, and the damage is restricted to the 
particular target site. On the other hand, Bob is always 
authenticated by the familiar authentication server in his 
home organisation, and he can be told not to provide the 
password to any other web server. 
The Shibboleth protocol specified and implemented by 
Internet2 is a notable example of such a protocol [9]. The 
protocol utilises SAML (Security Assertion Markup 
Language) and SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol) 
in the communications between origin and target site. 
After piloting in some universities in the United States, 
the first versions of the open source implementation have 
been released. Attributes of the user are passed to the 
target site by the Shibboleth protocol, and the target 
makes the access control decision based on them. The 
implementation of Shibboleth also provides a mechanism 
for the user to give her consent for attribute release. 
PAPI (Point of Access to Providers of Information) is 
another protocol used in cross-organisational use of 
resources [2]. The protocol implemented by RedIris is 
commonly used for accessing electronic resources in the 
Spanish higher education.  
There are also activities outside the academic 
communities. The Liberty Alliance has defined a 
protocol for federating identities between organisations 
[11]. The focus of the Liberty Alliance project is to get 
rid of the several identities and related 
username/password pairs that a user has in electronic 
services in the Internet, without introduction of a 
centralised architecture and a globally unique identifier. 
In the Liberty architecture, the user is authenticated by an 
identity provider (origin site) and the identity is then 
federated to service providers (target site), providing a 
single sign-on experience to the user. In public, the 
decentralised Liberty protocol is considered to be a 
challenger for the Passport protocol, whose architecture 
is centralised around Microsoft. 
4.2 Trust between the Entities 
In the federation the target sites have to trust the origin 
sites, which maintain the identity and attributes for the 
users and the credentials necessary for authentication. 
The security of the user administration of the service 
relies on the assertions that the origin site has provided 
 
Univ X 
Origin site 
Target site 
LDAP 
1. Authentication: 
bsmith@univ.edu/D6hkRtqJ 
2. LDAP query 
bsmith/D6hkRtqJ 
3. LDAP response
Authentication ok. 
He is Bob Smith,  
a student 
4. Hi Bob… 
User 
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about the users. Thus, the user administration of an 
organisation needs to be implemented properly before the 
organisation can enter the federation as an origin site. For 
instance, the origin site has to ensure that the user 
account of a certain person is closed when she leaves the 
organisation.  
Also the origin sites have to trust the targets to properly 
handle the attributes released by the origin. A specially 
sensitive user attribute is the password used for 
authentication, if the origin or the user sends it to the 
target site as cleartext. The architectures presented above, 
where the user is always authenticated by the origin site, 
lower the required trust considerably because the 
passwords never reach the target site. 
The user is concerned about her privacy, and she has to 
trust the origin site that it will not release attributes to the 
target site without her consent. Even if the user gives her 
consent for attribute release, only attributes necessary for 
the target site may be released. The user also has to trust 
the origin that the log files, which may contain sensitive 
information about services the user has accessed, are not 
used to violate her privacy. In most cases, the user 
privacy is protected by the data protection legislation. 
Agreements between origin and target sites are expected 
to ensure a certain minimal level of security controls 
implemented by the sites. To avoid many-to-many 
relationships between the origin and target sites, the 
federation agrees on the minimal requirements for 
joining organisations. There may be several federations 
for services with varying sensitivity; for example, the 
accuracy of assertions on the user attributes for students 
is probably lower in library services than in health care 
services.  
In Liberty Alliance, the federation for trust establishment 
is called a Circle of trust and in the Shibboleth project a 
Shibboleth club. The requirements for an organisation 
joining inCommon, the Shibboleth club formed in 
Internet2, are drafted in [10]. 
4.3 Schema for the User Attributes 
Exchanged  
The schema describes the user attributes exchanged in 
the federation. It should cover the syntax and semantics 
of the attributes, including the vocabularies. The schema 
should provide attributes for identification, 
authentication, and authorisation of users. 
A lot of schemas have been specified for the directories 
in the Internet. The basic set of attributes have been 
defined in Internet standards and are widely used in the 
phonebook-like white page directories. Attributes such as 
the given name, surname, postal address, email address, 
phone number and user password and certificate are 
specified in [14, 15]. 
However, in higher education there are requirements that 
the Internet standards do not fully cover. Most of them 
are related to attributes necessary for authorisation, 
because authorisation is usually based on the user's role 
in the organisation, and relevant roles vary from 
organisation to another. Usually organisations extend the 
schema with their own attributes, whose syntax and 
semantics are specific for the organisation. Enabling 
cross-organisational use of services, however, requires 
that the federation agrees on certain basic set of attributes 
required for authorisation in the target sites. 
In the United States, Educause has defined a schema 
called eduPerson [4], which contains attributes specific 
for higher education. In eduPerson a new attribute for 
authorisation is eduPersonAffiliation, which expresses 
the person's relationship to the organisation. The 
controlled vocabulary contains values student, faculty, 
staff, employee, alumn, member, and affiliate. One 
person may have several roles, for example a post-
graduate student in a laboratory has probably values 
student, faculty, employee, and member. One of them 
can be promoted to the primary one. European higher 
education has also had some interest for a similar schema 
[19]. 
The attribute eduPersonAffiliation provides a coarse 
basis for authorisation, as some services are provided 
only for students, some (such as the previous example of 
EBSCO) to all members, and so on. On the other hand, it 
opens up the problem of defining the semantics for each 
value. For instance, does 'student' cover only students 
aiming at a degree or should further education students, 
open university students, etc, be counted in as well? 
The need for more fine-grained information about the 
role of a person in the organisation and the national 
differences in higher education have caused academic 
communities in many countries to specify attributes of 
their own, for example in Swizerland [16] and in Norway 
[5]. The national schemas present new attributes whose 
semantics utilise vocabularies maintained by national 
bodies, such as national statistical offices (for example in 
a vocabulary '311' means 'doctor of theology'). The 
higher education institutions already use the codes 
internally in the student registries. 
4.4 Security Infrastructure  
A security infrastructure, such as a public key 
infrastructure (PKI), is required to ensure the authenticity 
and integrity of the messages exchanged. The origin site 
and the target site require certificates for mutual 
authentication and the integrity check of the assertions 
exchanged. The certificates and SSL/TLS protocol are 
also used for authenticating the origin and target sites to 
the user.  
For the time being, personal certificates are not widely 
used, and the authentication of the users cannot be based 
on PKI on a large scale. Passwords and other weaker 
means are used instead. However, as the authentication 
of a user is a local matter for each origin site, the use of 
strong authentication is not restricted by any design 
choice. Instead some services may require authentication 
that is stronger than passwords.  
There are several commercial Certificate Authorities 
(CA) available, and in higher education some universities 
and research networks have also established a CA of 
their own. A small number of CAs trusted by the 
federation is expected to be used for server certificates in 
the origin and target sites. 
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5 Initiatives Going On in Higher 
Education in Europe 
Intuitively, the problem of user identification and cross-
organisational use of services appears to belong to the 
higher education institutions, because the users are 
usually students or employees in some institution. In 
Europe, the activities, however, are not driven by 
European University Information Systems association 
(EUNIS) but by the association of national research and 
education networks (TERENA). To ensure that the work 
done in national research networks fulfils the 
requirements for cross-organisational user 
administration, discussion and exchange of information 
between the two associations would be helpful. 
In TERENA, related work is done in a specific Task 
Force TF-AACE (Authentication and Authorisation 
Coordination for Europe) [18]. TF-AACE is a gathered 
group of people from individual research networks, who 
have their own projects, e.g. in Spain (RedIRIS), 
Netherlands (Surfnet), Switzerland (Switch), Norway 
(Uninett) and Finland (Funet). TERENA has also trans-
atlantic co-operation with Internet2, which develops the 
Shibboleth protocol and eduPerson schema and has also 
other related activities. 
Switch has been the forerunner for Shibboleth in 
European research and education network. The AAI 
(Authentication and Authorisation Infrastructure) project 
[17] has also specified a schema for attributes used in 
Swiss higher education. The Norwegian FEIDE project 
has a schema for LDAP directories used in Mellon o 
Moria, the architecture designed for cross-organisational 
use of personal services in Norway [5]. 
In Finland, the HAKA project, a common project for 
Finnish higher education, has started pilots for cross-
organisational user administration. In the pilots, 
Shibboleth protocol and funetEduPerson, the Finnish 
equivalent to eduPerson, is used for accessing services in 
the portal of the Finnish Virtual University, the Finnish 
Virtual Polytechnic and the Finnish Electronic Library. 
More information is available in [7]. 
6 Conclusions 
Demand for middleware that mediates user identities and 
attributes between services inside an organisation and 
between organisations has increased. Driving forces are 
the growing number of personal services in the network, 
increasing co-operation between organisations, and 
requirements for flexible and easy use of services 
without compromises in the information security and 
privacy.  
This paper outlined a model for cross-organisational use 
of personal services and the requirements implied by the 
model. In European universities, there are activities 
aiming at building an infrastructure for cross-
organisational use of personal services. The challenges, 
however, are not only technical but also political and 
cultural, requiring a new kind of co-operation and trust 
between organisations and organisational units.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
User administration means keeping track of an informa-
tion system’s users and their privileges. In an information 
system, a user identity is an abstraction of a person in the real 
world, and it is a collection of attributes describing her. Issues 
like management of user identities, authenticating users and 
authorising them to use services are all parts of user admini-
stration. 
Traditionally, the maximum scope of a user identity has 
been only one organisation. The identity has not been shared 
with other organisations. If the user has used services outside 
her home organisation (for example, her employer or school), 
she has had separate usernames and passwords for each 
service. However, as the networking of organisations has 
become more common, it has become a subject of interest to 
share (i.e., federate) user identities between organisations. In 
a federation, an end user only has the credentials (e.g., user-
name and password) her home organisation has given to her, 
and there is a specific middleware service that federates her 
attributes from the home organisation (called Identity 
Provider) to the service she is using (called Service Provider). 
A federation is an association of organisations that come 
together to exchange information, as appropriate, about their 
users and resources in order to enable collaborations and 
transactions [1]. The federation, consisting of Identity Pro-
viders and Service Providers, has agreed on policies and 
practices necessary for carrying out the task. Some of these 
are of a mostly technical nature (such as the protocols used 
for communication and schemas for syntax and semantics of 
attribute exchange), some of them are more political (how to 
make the involved organisations trust each other) and some 
are legal (how the privacy of the end user is ensured as her 
personal data is disseminated between the organisations). 
Shibboleth is a SAML-based middleware protocol speci-
fied by Internet2. Since the open source implementation 
became available in 2003, it has been deployed by higher 
education in several countries. In the United States, there are 
federations already using Shibboleth such as InCommon [1] 
and InQueue [2] and Australian higher education has shown 
interest in it [3]. In Europe, Swiss higher education has been 
the forerunner for Shibboleth. In the United Kingdom, 
projects funded by JISC are aiming at the deployment of 
a federation running Shibboleth. In addition, higher education 
in some other European countries has interest in Shibboleth. 
In Finnish higher education, the development of the Haka 
federation has its origins in the year 2000, when the FEIDHE 
project focused on personal certificates on smart cards as 
a tool for strong authentication of end users. However, smart 
cards did not break through, and as an effect, the project 
recommended that its followers focus on organisational user 
administration rather than strong authentication [4]. Having 
identified the problems of LDAP in cross-organisational user 
administration, federating software was considered to be an 
interesting choice [5]. 
Several national research networks have developed 
architectures of their own, such as PAPI (Spain), Athens 
(UK) and FEIDE (Norway). In Finland, we had no resources 
to implement a protocol of our own. As designing and imple-
menting a security protocol is difficult, we preferred adapta-
tion of existing federating software. The Shibboleth architec-
ture was sound and had the resources of Internet2 behind it. 
Therefore, it was easy to follow the direction chosen by 
SWITCH [6] and adopt Shibboleth as the federating software 
of Finnish higher education. The first Shibboleth pilots started 
in Spring 2003, and the pilot federation became operational in 
December 2003. 
In February 2004, the Haka project ended and the proposed 
deployment of the Haka federation, which runs Shibboleth as 
the federating software [7]. CSC, the Finnish IT Center for Sci-
ence, started to prepare the federation as a common infra-
structure for universities and polytechnics in Finland. The pro-
duction-level federation was formed in May 2005. 
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This paper focuses on the organisational elements of 
the Haka federation. The paper starts with the most important 
use-scenarios identified for federated identity. Chapter 3 
discusses the organisational models for federations and 
presents the motivation for the choice made by Haka. Chapter 
4 presents relevant parts of European data protection 
legislation from the federated identity point-of-view and how 
these regulations are taken into account in Haka. Chapter 5 
discusses the quality of institutional identity-management and 
Chapter 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  USE  SCENARIOS  FOR  FEDERATED  
IDENTITY  IN  FINNISH  HIGHER  EDUCATION 
Different kinds of services can be identified as potential 
users of federated identity. To motivate the rest of this paper, 
this chapter introduces the four main service categories for 
federated identity in Finnish higher education. 
 
2.1. Library services 
Nowadays, researchers in institutions of higher education 
do not have to go to the premises of a university library to 
read scientific journals. Instead, the researchers use electronic 
services, such as electronic journals and databases, provided 
on the web by the journal publishers. University libraries pay 
licence fees to the publishers for making the journals 
available to the students and researchers in the institution. 
Typically, libraries intend to licence the journals for students, 
faculty and supporting staff in the institution and for other 
regular and registered users on-site [8]. At present, the access 
control of the journals is usually implemented by configuring 
the IP address space of the campus in the publisher’s service. 
IP address-based access control has known problems. It 
does not actually authenticate the end user; instead, the 
authorisation to use the service is based on the place where 
she is using the service. Legitimate users are not allowed to 
use the service outside the campus IP address space (e.g., at 
home)1. On the other hand, illegitimate users, such as roaming 
users2 or other users not considered as students or faculty 
members at the institution do have access, although, ac-
cording to the licence terms, the material is not necessarily 
licensed for them. Furthermore, the authorisation is very 
coarse and there is no easy way to implement fine-grained 
access control. For example, the libraries might want to 
licence some more expensive material only to faculties in 
a certain department or to the participants of a certain course 
in the university. 
For publishers, authorisation is not the only use for an 
identity federation. The publishers may like to develop their 
                                                           
1 VPN connections or dedicated proxy servers (such as EZproxy, 
http://www.usefulutilities.com/) are commonly used to circumvent 
the limitations of IP address based access control.  
2 VPN based roaming model is the only one giving a roaming user an IP 
ad-dress from her home institution [9]. 
service further by providing end users with customisation. For 
example, computer science researchers would, perhaps, 
always like to see a list of the latest publications in the well-
known LNCS publication series of Springer as they browse to 
SpringerLink. Thus, the publisher needs to get some 
persistent identifier of the user to which the user profile can 
be attached in the service3. In order to achieve this in its 
ScienceDirect portal, Elsevier Inc. has already joined the 
InCommon Federation. 
In Finland, the libraries in higher education traditionally 
co-operate widely in licensing electronic journals. The Fin-
nish Electronic Library consortium is the centralised organisa-
tion negotiating the licence agreements with publishers. 
Furthermore, the consortium has recently deployed a portal 
(Metalib, a product of Ex Libris Ltd.) that constitutes a com-
mon interface to the dozens of publishers with which 
the libraries have licence agreements. The portal uses services 
of the Haka federation to authenticate the user and provide 
her with customised services. 
Furthermore, the Finnish libraries also have a common 
Library Management System (Voyager, a product of En-
deavor Inc.), which, for instance, keeps track of library 
patrons’ loans in a library. The web interface (WebVoyage), 
used by patrons for reviewing and renewing their loans, 
presently uses library card numbers for user identification. In 
an ongoing pilot project in Finland, Shibboleth is being 
integrated into WebVoyage to replace its current user iden-
tification system. 
 
2.2. eLearning services 
Utilising ICT for learning enhancement has been a 
subject, not only from the technical, but also from the 
pedagogical point of view. Several tools have been used, 
including video-conferencing, multimedia etc. The web has 
also become a commonly used environment for eLearning, 
and various web-based services have been developed, from 
simple web-based tools to fully-fledged learning management 
systems. Many of the eLearning services are interested in the 
identity and role of the end user. 
There is a large number of commercial and open source 
learning management systems. In Finnish universities, 
the most widely used ones are WebCT, BlackBoard, Optima 
and R5 Vision [11]. The maintenance of learning 
management systems is not so well organised as the use of 
library services. In some institutions, the laboratories have 
their own installations of their learning management systems; 
in other institutions, there are some centrally-operated 
learning management systems that belong to the institutional 
IT infrastructure maintained by the university. Some initial 
discussion has been had about a national service centre for the 
                                                           
3 The eduPersonPrincipalName or eduPersonTargetedID attributes of 
the widely used eduPerson schema [10] can be used, for instance. 
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main-tenance of learning management systems for better 
efficiency. However, many lecturers consider the tools they 
use in teaching as part of their academic freedom. 
Considering the aforementioned, it is not a surprise that 
the user administration of learning management systems is 
versatile. In some learning management systems, the students 
register to the system by themselves and get yet another 
username/password pair to remember. If the institution has 
a centrally operated learning management system, it is more 
likely to be coupled to the enterprise directory of the institu-
tion’s IT department, allowing end users to use the same 
username/password pair they also use in other IT systems. 
In Finnish higher education, it is possible to take courses 
from a neighbouring institution. Nowadays, the visiting 
students get local user accounts in the institution they are 
visiting, making cross-institutional user administration unnec-
essary. In other words, user administration of learning man-
agement systems is typically an institutional, not an inter-
institutional issue, and there is little use in joining institutional 
learning management systems to the national Haka federation. 
Instead, in order to serve the user administration of learning 
management systems, IT departments are preparing to set up 
institutional light-weight federations, serving mostly laborato-
ries inside the institution. These institutional federations may 
also use the Shibboleth technology, as it is easier to maintain 
only one middleware infrastructure4. In an institutional federa-
tion, the bureaucracy is easier because, for data protection, 
personal data is not disseminated between two organisations. 
Having a national federation in place opens new business 
models for eLearning. The eLearning service need not be 
installed and maintained in the institution, and yet, it can 
utilise the user administration of the institution’s IT depart-
ment. In order to achieve economics of scale, there can be 
separate service centres that maintain learning management 
systems for several institutions. Furthermore, an institution 
can licence some specialised eLearning material for a small 
group of students; for example, to the participants of one 
individual course. For authorisation purposes, the participa-
tion of a student on a course can be expressed as a separate 
attribute that the institution’s IT department provides to the 
eLearning service5. 
In Finland, several learning management systems have 
been, or are being integrated to Shibboleth, including WebCT 
(University of Helsinki), A&O (Tampere University of 
Technology), Moodle (University of Kuopio) and Optima 
(University of Oulu). First experiments are about to start on 
passing the students’ course enrolment as an attribute to the 
learning management systems using Shibboleth. 
                                                           
4 Shibboleth Identity Provider, version 1.3 is going to have multi-
federation support in it. 
5 The CourseID working group 
(http://middleware.internet2.edu/courseID/) of Internet2/MACE has 
specified how a person’s role can be expressed as an attribute with respect 
to a given course offering.  
 
2.3. National services for end users in institutions            
       of higher education 
In addition to eLearning and libraries, nationally central-
ised services are potential users of federated identity. Nation-
wide services are typically provided to a subset of end users 
that spans a large number of higher education institutions. 
Theend users can be, for example, students or researchers in 
any of the higher education institutions. As there has not been 
a national authentication and authorisation infrastructure in 
place, the services have either issued local usernames/pass-
words for end users or have not provided personal services to 
end users at all. 
The Academy of Finland is a public body providing 
funding for research projects in universities. The funding 
application form has been made available electronically, and 
the Academy has issued usernames and passwords to 
the researchers for filling the applications. As the applicant 
has filed the application, it is circulated to specialists in other 
universities in order to get expert opinions on it. The use of 
the Haka federation instead of local usernames makes the 
application submission and circulation process easier for end 
users as well as for the Academy. 
YTHS (Finnish Student Health Service) is a foundation 
serving all the masters degree students in Finnish universities. 
Presently, YTHS has no personal services on the web, as 
there has been no means to authenticate the 140 000 custom-
ers. YTHS would be interested in providing some basic 
services on the Internet. These services could include, for 
example, appointment reservation for the first-year-students’ 
health examination or other functions that require no medical 
expertise. 
 
2.4. Application service providers  
Outsourcing applications is becoming common also in 
higher education. The universities in Finland are government 
agencies and are involved as the state corporation makes 
outsourcing decisions to reduce costs and increase administra-
tion efficiency. The first group-level outsourcing contracts 
made by the State Treasury cover electronic circulation of 
invoices and travel-expense administration. The application 
services are provided by large Finnish IT companies. 
The Finnish state administration has 120 000 officers, 
30 000 of which are staff and faculty in universities. Not all 
of these officers are involved in the circulation of invoices, 
but typically, most of them have travel expenses. Presently, 
user administration in the outsourced services is done manually, 
while some more advanced organisations have scripting in 
place to synchronise user databases with the enterprise direc-
tories. User authentication and authorisation in outsourced 
services is clearly a customer for identity federation, although it 
couples the identity federation of higher education to user 
administration issues in other Finnish government agencies. 
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3.  THE  ORGANISATION  OF  A  FEDERATION 
As defined in the first chapter, a federation is a set of 
organisations who have decided to co-operate in order to 
authenticate and authorise end users across organisational 
borders. In order to put the co-operation into practice, the or-
ganisations pick up and deploy some middleware technology, 
such as Shibboleth. In other words, a federation is an organ-
isational, not a technical entity6. This chapter discusses how 
to organise a federation. 
As the authentication and authorisation of users is an 
essential part of computer security7 and the processing of 
personal data is regulated in the European Union, it is 
necessary to have written agreements between the federation 
participants defining related obligations and responsibilities. 
Furthermore, as the federation collects fees from the federa-
tion members to cover its costs, it also exists as an economic 
entity. There must be some kind of an organisation that signs 
the necessary agreements and deals with the accounting for 
incomes and expenses in the federation. 
This paper identifies two ways to organise a federation. 
The InCommon and SWITCHaai federations have been 
organised as a service provided by a central organisation, 
such as InCommon LLC or SWITCH. The alternative would 
be to organise a federation as a consortium. 
 
3.1. A federation as a service provided  
       by an organisation 
Having the federation organised as a service means that an 
organisation joining the federation signs a bilateral agreement 
with the operator of the federation (Fig. 1). In a way, the ope-
rator becomes a centre of a star, having bilateral agreements 
with all the organisations in the federation. In Switzerland, the 
operator is SWITCH, the maintainer of the national research 
and education network, a foundation of the governing bodies of  
 
 
Fig. 1. Federation as a service provided by the federation operator 
                                                           
6 To distinguish the organisational and technical parts of federated 
identity, SWITCH has called the technical aspect (servers, configurations, 
etc.) Authentication and Authorisation Infrastructure (AAI). 
7 According to the definition by Gollmann [12], computer security deals 
with the prevention and detection of unauthorised actions by the users of 
a computer system. 
Swiss universities. In the US, InCommon is a limited liability 
company dedicated for the provision of federation services. 
A benefit for organising the federation as a service is that 
no new organisation needs to be established for the federa-
tion. The joining organisations and the operator sign an 
agreement specifying the responsibilities of the two parties, 
and the federation is a collection of bilateral agreements 
between the operator and the participants. From a partici-
pant’s point of view, all the other participants of the federa-
tion are subcontractors for the operator of the federation. If 
the participants of the federation have, for example, claims for 
each other, they have to discuss these with each other via 
the federation operator. 
The downside is that organising the federation on top of 
bilateral agreements is not strictly consistent with the defini-
tion of a federation, which considers a federation as a set of 
organisations. As the centre of the star of agreements, the role 
of the operator becomes essential and demanding, for exam-
ple, replacing the federation operator means, in practice, 
tearing down the federation and building a new one. 
The business of the operator is inevitably to develop the 
federation service to make it more and more attractive and 
satisfying for the customers. The operator needs to deeply 
understand the requirements and, on the other hand, the 
limitations the federation participants. In higher education, the 
needs are typically driven by service providers like libraries, 
eLearning, etc. The limitations are set by the IT departments of 
the institutions and typically consist of issues like the quality of 
the institutional identity management systems or problems in 
linking organisational person registries to each other. 
 
3.2. A federation as a consortium 
Alternatively, a federation can be organised as a con-
sortium (Fig. 2) that is, by definition, an agreement, 
combination or group (as of companies) formed to undertake 
an enterprise beyond the resources of any one member [13]. 
In that sense, a consortium is quite close to what we are 
looking for. In a consortium, organisations sign a multilateral 
agreement to become members. Having signed the consortium  
 
 
Fig. 2. A federation as a consortium 
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agreement, the organisations have direct contractual relation-
ships and can make claims directly on each other. 
The consortium would need a service centre that coordi-
nates the federation. In higher education, it would probably 
make sense to place the service centre in some existing 
institution for higher education, for example, in its IT depart-
ment. The secretaries of the consortium would be employed by 
the institution in question. At minimum, the consortium could 
be just an outsourcing organisation, buying the technical 
operations of the federation from commercial organisations. 
 
3.3. The organisation of the Haka federation 
In Finnish higher education, the two alternative ways to 
organise the federation were considered. Following the way 
SWITCHaai had chosen, the higher education institutions 
preferred organising the federation as another service pro-
vided by CSC, the maintainer of the national research and 
education network Funet. The most significant reason for that 
was minimising additional bureaucracy; there was no interest 
in forming yet another body for taking care of the common IT 
infrastructure in Finnish higher education. This was also the 
reason for not choosing to found a separate limited liability 
company, like InCommon in the United States. 
CSC had been an active participant in developing the 
federation. As Funet was already a service provided by CSC, 
having the Haka federation as another service provided by 
CSC is not surprising. CSC, in turn, has the option to out-
source some parts of the federation operations. For example, 
at the moment, CSC has no 24 hour support for servers such 
as WAYF (Where-Are-You-From, a Shibboleth server used 
by the end user for picking up her Identity Provider), which 
may become necessary as the use of the federation is 
increased. 
Choosing the consortium would have meant that the in-
stitutions would have established the consortium and placed 
its administration in some existing IT department in a univer-
sity. Most probably, the administration would have consisted 
of only one part or full time employee, who takes care of the 
consortium’s administration and financing, of taking new 
members to the consortium and of outsourcing contracts for 
all technical issues in the federation. These would include 
issues like the maintenance of federation metadata and 
WAYF server, organising a helpdesk and courses for people 
in higher education institutions and so on. As there is little 
commercial supply for federated identity at the moment, the 
subcontractor would probably have been CSC, at least in the 
beginning. 
The organisation of the federation is depicted in Fig. 3. As 
the federation is organised as a service operated by CSC, 
which is not a higher education institution itself, it becomes 
vital to set up mechanisms that make sure the operator has 
contacts to the daily life of federation users in institutions of 
higher education. To ensure that the requirements and limita- 
Fig. 3. Organisation of the Haka federation is similar to SWITCHaai
 
tions related to the federation are communicated to CSC, the 
federation has an Advisory Committee. The committee 
consists of representatives for the institutions’ IT departments 
(4 persons), eLearning consortia (Finnish Virtual University 
and Virtual Polytechnic, 2 persons) and a library consortium 
(Finnish Electronic Library, 1 person) of Finnish higher 
education. CSC also has a representative on the committee. 
Participating in related events in higher education (such as 
gatherings of IT department employees, eLearning people, 
etc.) and personal contacts help the operator adjust to the 
needs of the customers. 
 
3.4. The service agreement of the Haka federation 
The Haka federation is a service provided by CSC as 
defined in the service agreement of the federation [14]. CSC, 
the operator of the federation, defines the terms of the service in 
the agreement’s appendices. These can change over time. 
The Advisory Committee of the federation acts in an advisory 
capacity and represents the members of the federation. 
The meetings of the Advisory Committee are prepared and con-
vened by the operator. In the service agreement, the Advisory 
Committee is defined as the authoritative body for a set of 
issues, such as accepting federation partners or members other 
than institutions of higher education. However, the committee’s 
main role is advisory only, and the operator makes final 
decisions on the terms of service. If federation partners are not 
satisfied with the service, they always have the ultimate right to 
terminate the service agreement, or threaten to do so. 
Like in SWITCHaai, the Haka federation has two catego-
ries for federation’s participants; federation members and 
partners. Higher education and research institutions may join 
the federation as members and become both Identity 
Providers and Service Providers. Federation partners, such as 
library content providers, may only become Service Provi-
ders. As the service agreement of the Haka federation is 
signed between the federation operator and the participant, 
from the federation participants’ point-of-view, the federation 
is a service provided by the operator and the other participants 
in the federation are subcontractors for the operator. In 
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the agreement, it is made explicit that the contents of the ser-
vice agreements are equal for each federation member. 
The section defining indemnification is modest. Neither 
party is liable for damages caused due to bad quality of 
the service such as its downtime or weak performance. Fed-
eration participants refrain from claims on each other. Other 
sanctions defined in the agreement were considered sufficient 
for all parties. If the operator has quality problems, the 
federation participants do not have to pay fees for the time -
period in question. If a participant has a problem, the operator 
is allowed to stop providing the service to it. The ultimate 
consequence is the termination of the agreement. 
It is clear that the service terms, including indemnifica-
tion, are not very strict in the Haka federation. Having CSC, a 
non-profit company owned by the Ministry of Education, as 
the federation operator is far different from a commercial 
company. The operations of the Haka federation are based not 
only on the service agreement, but also on the trust higher 
education institutions have in CSC, which has been their 
partner for decades. A service agreement with a commercial 
company would be much stricter, as the nature of a com-
mercial company is to try to minimise the costs and maximise 
the income from their services. 
 
4.  PRIVACY  ISSUES  IN  A  FEDERATION 
 As a member of the European Union, Finland has im-
plemented the EU Data Protection Directive in the national 
legislation. The Finnish Personal Data Act restricts the way 
personal data may be processed by the Identity and Service 
Providers of a federation. This chapter points out the parts of 
the directive that affect especially on attribute release in a fed-
eration. The chapter also presents related means that have 
been implemented in the Haka federation policy. 
 The privacy related mechanisms in the Haka federation 
differ from SWITCHaai. In Switzerland, there is also cantonal 
privacy legislation in which not all details are similar. As 
Finland has consistent data protection legislation, the federation 
preferred to also cover detailed mechanisms for privacy in its 
procedures; centralising certain privacy-related check-ups in the 
federation reduces overlapping of work (which the technical 
staff usually considers boring). The other alternative would 
have been to leave the privacy issues uncovered and up to each 
federation participant to take care of. 
 Liberty Alliance has made an extensive study of European 
legislation and its effect on federated identity [15]. Although 
the study focuses on the Circles of Trust, i.e., federations 
utilising Liberty technologies, the issues are, for the most 
part, applicable for Shibboleth-based federations as well. 
 Article 2 of the data protection directive defines personal 
data as information that relates to an identified or identifiable 
natural person. Processing of personal data is defined as any 
operation or set of operations which is performed upon 
personal data, such as collecting, storing, disseminating and 
so on. It is clear that user accounts in an Identity Provider are 
personal data, and, therefore, the Identity Provider processes 
personal data. The Service Provider processes personal data 
only if the attributes provided by the Identity Provider and 
other records collected by the Service Provider relate to an 
identified or identifiable individual8. As the attribute release 
takes place directly between the Identity and Service Pro-
vider, the operator, in turn, never processes end users’ 
personal data in a federation running Shibboleth as the fe-
derating software. 
 
4.1. The purpose of processing personal data 
 Dependency on the purpose of processing personal data is 
fundamental to privacy laws in Europe. According to the Data 
Protection Directive, (Article 6) Member states shall provide 
that personal data must be (b) collected for specified, explicit 
and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way 
incompatible with those purposes. Liberty Alliance has not 
covered this aspect in its document [15]. 
 In Finland, universities and polytechnics are public or-
ganisations as defined in the Universities Act and Polytech-
nics Act. The mission of universities and polytechnics is also 
specified in the acts; in short, it is research and education, 
with the polytechnics emphasising more applied aspects. 
Identity management is a supportive function in higher educa-
tion institutions. Thus, according to the Universities and 
Polytechnics act, the purpose of processing personal data in 
institutional identity management systems is supporting 
research and education. Personal data may not be processed 
(for example, disseminated) in institutional identity manage-
ment systems for purposes incompatible with that. 
 The Haka federation has addressed the purpose of 
processing personal data in its policy. The purpose of the 
federation is simply “to support higher education and research 
institutions”. Only organisations having services compatible 
with this purpose are accepted to the federation. For institu-
tions of higher education that act as Identity Providers or 
Service Providers this is not a problem. For organisations 
providing services to higher education, such as library content 
providers, this is not a problem either. On the other hand, 
services like Internet gambling that are clearly not supporting 
research and education and may not join the federation. Some 
organisations are partly compatible with the purpose; for 
example, the services related to applying for student loans at 
KELA (the Social Insurance Institution of Finland) can join 
the federation, but the services related to maternity allowance 
cannot. In borderline cases, it is up to the Ministry of Educa-
tion to draw the line. 
                                                           
8 The United Kingdom Information Commissioner emphasises identifiabil-
ity as a contextual issue [16]. In the physical world, individuals are distin-
guished from others typically by names and addresses; in the on-line 
world, for example, by tracking cookies and pseudonyms. 
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 Dependence on the purpose of the personal data process-
ing makes European privacy legislation different, for exam-
ple, from the legislation in the United States. In the United 
States, higher education is co-operating with the e-Authen-
tication project of the Federal government in order to enable 
end users in higher education to use their credentials for 
authenticating to government services as well. According to 
the Data Protection Directive, this appears not to be possible 
in Europe. Government services, such as social security, 
taxation, etc, are not supporting research and education. This 
incompatibility can be seen as an obstacle when bridging the 
United States and European federations together in the future. 
 
4.2. The relevance of attributes 
 According to the Data Protection Directive (Article 6) 
Member states shall provide that personal data must be (c) 
adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the pur-
poses for which they are collected and/or further processed.  
 In an identity federation, Identity Providers are not 
allowed to release and Service Providers are not allowed to 
collect attributes that are irrelevant for the service in question. 
The relevance of attributes depends on the service; for a stu-
dent loan service, the Social Security Number is probably 
a relevant attribute, as the SSN is used for identifying indi-
viduals in government services. For a learning management 
system, the SSN is probably irrelevant. 
 From the data protection perspective, the optimum is that 
no personal data is processed at all. In higher education, there 
are several services (such as the article databases licensed by 
libraries or WLAN roaming access) which are typically not 
interested in the end user’s identity but on her authorisation to 
the service. The authorisation may be derived from the end 
user’s attributes (for example, faculty members are authorised 
to use the library database or WLAN network). If an individ-
ual cannot be identified, the Personal Data Act is not applied 
at all to the attribute release. 
 The Haka federation’s policy documents define respon-
sibilities for ensuring that only the relevant attributes are 
released to the service. The administrative contact of the 
federation participant signs a request and sends it to CSC 
before CSC adds the new service to the federation metadata. 
It is a responsibility of the federation participant’s administra-
tive contact to make sure that all the attributes in a service are 
relevant. In a higher education institution, the administrative 
contact is typically the information manager of the institution. 
He or she knows the local circumstances and is, unlike CSC, 
competent to deduce the relevance of attributes for the service 
in question. 
 
4.3. Informed consent 
 According to the directive, an individual’s consent is the 
basis for processing personal data. For Identity Providers, 
among other things, release of attributes is considered as 
processing of personal data. For Service Providers, collecting 
attributes that identify an individual is processing personal 
data, no matter if the attributes are provided by an Identity 
Provider or by the end user herself. (Article 7) Member States 
shall provide that personal data may be processed only if: 
(a)  the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; 
(b) processing is necessary for performance of a contract to 
which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the 
request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; or 
(c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal 
obligation to which the controller is subject; or 
(d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital 
interests of the data subject; or 
(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task 
carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official 
authority vested in the controller or in a third party to whom 
the data are disclosed; or 
(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate 
interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or 
parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where such 
interests are overridden by the data subject which require 
protection under Article 1(1). 
 Some activities in an identity federation could probably 
fall in a category other than (a). However, the Finnish Data 
Protection Ombudsman gave advice that the consent of an 
individual should always be considered as the primary way 
for making the release of personal data legitimate. Further-
more, according to Article 11, the subject of the data must, in 
any case, be informed about to whom and for what purposes 
his/her personal data is going to be released. This can be done 
conveniently when asking for his/her consent. 
 It is worth noting that the user’s consent overrides neither 
the requirement for the compatibility of the purpose of 
processing personal data nor the requirement for the relevance 
of attributes released. Only relevant attributes may be released 
and only to services supporting higher education even if the end 
user has given her consent for the release of attributes. 
The policy documents of the Haka federation mandate that 
the Identity Providers always ask the user when her personal 
data is released to a new Service Provider for the first time. 
The consent is asked after the Identity Provider authenticates 
the end user but before the end user’s web browser is 
redirected back to the Service Provider. If the user denies the 
release of attributes, the Shibboleth message exchange does 
not continue.  
A Privacy Policy is a document that the Service Provider 
maintains and that contains the information required by 
the Article 11. The federation operator gathers and distributes 
the Privacy Policies’ links as a part of the federation meta-
data. To make the end user’s consent an informed one, 
the Identity Provider is responsible for providing an end user 
with the link to the Privacy Policy of the Service Provider. 
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Thereby, the end user is able to read the Privacy Policy before 
he consents to the release of attributes. 
 
4.4. How Shibboleth fulfils the privacy requirements 
Shibboleth provides excellent tools for covering the three 
issues presented above. The Attribute Release Policies (ARP) 
provide the means for controlling to which services the 
attributes are released. In the Shibboleth implementation, 
there are two kinds of ARPs. Site ARPs are maintained by the 
Identity Provider and they permit or deny attribute release for 
any end user. Additionally, each end user may have her per-
sonal User ARP. The two ARPs are conjunctive; both the Site 
and the User ARP (if existing) have to permit attribute release 
to a certain Service Provider to make the attribute release take 
place. 
Compatibility with the purpose of processing personal 
data (Chapter 4.1) can be ensured by making sure that the Site 
ARP does not permit the release of any personal data to 
a Service Provider incompatible with the purpose of the fed-
eration (“to support higher education and research institu-
tions”). The site ARP can also be used to make sure that only 
relevant attributes are released to a given Service Provider 
(Chapter 4.2). In the Haka federation, Site ARPs are 
maintained by the federation operator and distributed to 
Identity Providers as part of the federation metadata. 
The end user’s consent (Chapter 4.3) is stored as a User 
ARP. When the user accesses a service for the first time, the 
Identity Provider asks her permission for attribute release and 
writes a relevant entry to her User ARP file. Having given her 
consent once, the user is not interrupted by the dialogue again 
when she uses the service the next time. However, the end 
user can be provided a separate tool for viewing and modify-
ing the ARPs she has in force at any time. 
As presented in Chapter 4.3, user consent does not 
override the requirement for compatibility and relevance of 
processing personal data. In Shibboleth, this is ensured by 
requiring that both Site and User ARP must permit the at-
tribute release. 
 
5.  THE  QUALITY  OF  INSTITUTIONAL 
IDENTITY  MANAGEMENT 
It has become evident that many institutions of higher 
education have problems with the quality of data in their 
institutional enterprise directories. User accounts are not 
systematically closed as students graduate. The links between 
the student registry, human resources registry and the enter-
prise directory are missing. The institutions of higher edu-
cation that have gone through the project of improving the 
situation have found that it takes several years to fix an 
institutional user administration. In addition, the project is not 
only about technology but also about streamlining workflows 
in the organisation. 
Previously, the quality of institutional identity manage-
ment was an internal issue for each institution. However, in 
an identity federation, the user attributes, whether of good or 
bad quality, are visible not only to the Identity Provider itself 
but also to the Service Providers in the federation. From the 
Service Provider point-of-view, having Identity Providers 
with varying qualities of institutional identity management is 
a problem. Service Providers are questioning what the benefit 
is of the identity federation if they are not able to trust on the 
users’ attributes provided by the Identity Providers. 
Like the FEIDE federation in Norway, the Haka 
federation has made it a mandatory requirement for an 
institution joining the federation as an Identity Provider that 
its enterprise directory has high-quality data in it. Changes in 
the base registries (student and HR registry) have to be 
reflected to the enterprise directory. Releasing only high-
quality-data to Service Providers has been considered as a 
high priority issue in the federation. As an Identity Provider 
joins the federation, it makes a self-audit in its identity 
management under the supervision of the federation operator. 
As an output, a doument describing the principles of the 
institutional identity management is published in the web. 
In order to support institutions of higher education in 
the development of their institutional user administration, 
CSC has run a series of workshops called “the school in user 
administration”. In the workshops, best practices have been 
introduced and new products presented. During the work-
shops, the participants have been asked to make an assess-
ment of the present user administration system in their home 
organisation and to set the goal for its development. 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
Although driven by development of protocols such as 
Shibboleth, federated identity is not only about developing 
technology. An identity federation must be given an organisa-
tional shape as well. The policy documents of a federation 
have to be in place, defining requirements and best practices 
for organisations in the federation. Federation policy has to 
take into consideration the relevant privacy legislation and 
integrate the obligations to the organisation and procedures in 
the federation. 
This document presented how the Haka federation, the 
identity federation of Finnish higher education, had come to 
the decision to organise the federation as a service provided 
by CSC, the Finnish IT Center for Science. The service 
agreement and controls over privacy and attribute quality in 
the federation were also introduced. 
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Abstract 
There are activities aiming at abling users to dock to a 
wireless or wired network while visiting organisations outside 
the premises of their usual connection to the network. These 
activities, known as roaming access to network, are usually 
based on well-known technologies, such as RADIUS, IEEE 
802.1X, VPN or HTTP redirection. On the other hand, there 
are applications, usually on the web, that are supposed to be 
accessed across organisational boundaries. The required 
infrastructure, known as identity federation, takes care of user 
authentication and authorisation in the participating 
organisations. Federating software, based, for example, on 
XML and SOAP, is being developed in the Internet and 
academic communities. 
This research combines the two and implements roaming 
access to network on Shibboleth, a federating software 
developed in Internet2. As a result, a unified model was 
achieved for authentication and authorisation both for 
network and application access. The architecture makes role-
based authorisation easy and provides a single sign-on while 
preserving the user's privacy. A practical experiment is going 
on at the University of Helsinki. 
Keywords: roaming access, federated identity, Shibboleth 
1 Introduction 
Network users want using network services to be all the more 
comfortable. On one hand, this means the users want to have 
the network connection easily available everywhere while 
moving around. On the other hand, the users expect 
applications on the network to be able to provide more 
personal and tailored services to them. The services, whether 
they are the applications being accessed or the network 
connectivity itself, need to be able to recognise the user's 
authorisation to use the service. Usually, authorisation is 
based on the user's authenticated identity and the attributes 
describing her characteristics. The process of keeping track of 
information system users and their privileges is called user 
administration. 
Typically, the user has one home organisation that she has 
dealings with and that usually provides most of the services 
available for her. The home organisation is often the user's 
employer, school, teleoperator etc. A cross-organisational 
service means that the service is provided by an organisation 
other than the user's home organisation. For authentication 
and authorisation, cross-organisational services need cross-
organisational user administration. 
Terminology in the area is still young, and varying concepts 
are being used. In this document, the user's home organisation 
is called Identity Provider [TFAA04]. The Identity Provider 
is responsible for authenticating the user and is also the 
primary source for the user's attributes. The organisation that 
provides the actual service is called Service Provider. The 
Service Provider is expected to rely on the authentication 
done and attributes released by the user's Identity Provider.  
Chapter 2 introduces common technologies for a cross-
organisational network and application access, which are then 
compared in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the architecture for 
combining network and application access is introduced. 
Chapter 5 presents the practical experiments being conducted 
at the University of Helsinki. Chapter 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Cross-organisational Access Technologies 
A cross-organisational service may be either network access 
for roaming users in a visited organisation, or application 
level access, for example, to a service on the web. Next, 
technologies to implement cross-organisational network and 
application access shall be shortly introduced. 
2.1. Network Access 
Network access is the service that provides a network 
connection to a user when she is roaming outside her home 
organisation. A generic architecture is presented in Figure 1. 
The user can connect to the Service Provider's docking 
network using either a wireless (WLAN) or a wired link. The 
Network Access Controlleri controls the docking network and 
prevents an unauthenticated user's traffic out of the docking 
network. In order to authenticate the user, the Network 
Access Controller consults the user's Identity Provider (i.e. 
                                                          
i In [TFMO04], the component is called Access Control 
Device; here, the word "network" is added to distinguish it 
from application access. 
her home organisation) to deduce if network access should be 
granted to the user. The Identity Provider has an 
Authentication Server and a back-end database of its users. 
Although omitted from the figure, each organisation can 
typically act both as a home organisation for its local users 
and a visited organisation for roaming users coming from 
other organisations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The generic architecture for roaming access to 
network.  
Terena's TF-Mobility group has defined requirements for 
roaming network access [TFMO04c] and investigated 
technologies used in academic communities in Europe 
[TFMO04]. The three most widely used solutions are shortly 
introduced below. 
IEEE 802.1X is a layer 2 authentication protocol that a 
Network Access Controller uses to authenticate a roaming 
user. Together with EAP (Extensible Authentication 
Protocol) and a hierarchy of RADIUS proxy servers, it can be 
used to validate the user’s username and password against her 
Identity Provider. The user gives her username in the format 
of username@domain and based on the domain name, the 
RADIUS proxies are used for relaying the authentication 
request to the correct Identity Provider. The user's credentials 
(usually the password) are passed to the Identity Provider on 
EAP. In European higher education, roaming based on 
802.1X is used for example in the Netherlands. 
Web Redirection is another roaming solution based on a 
hierarchy of RADIUS proxies. Instead of using 802.1X, the 
Network Access Controller presents to the user a web dialog, 
prompting her to enter her username and password, which are 
then validated against the Identity Provider’s RADIUS 
server. For the user, access from the docking network to the 
rest of the network is granted only if the Identity Provider 
responds that the credentials were successfully validated. 
Web Redirection is used in roaming, for example, in Finnish 
higher education. 
VPN based roaming solution does not require a hierarchy of 
RADIUS proxies. Instead, the Network Access Controller has 
a list of all the Identity Providers' VPN gateways, which are 
the only hosts outside the docking network to which the 
Network Access Controller allows traffic. It is then up to the 
VPN gateway in the user's home organisation to authenticate 
the user and route her traffic to the Internet.  
The administrational overhead of the extensive list of VPN 
gateways can be simplified by attaching all the VPN 
gateways to a single or a small number of networks, and 
configuring the address space of the networks to each 
Network Access Controller. Adding a new Identity Provider 
would then require no modifications to any of the Network 
Access Controllers. The solution is known as CASG 
(Controlled Address Space to Gateways) and described in 
detail by Terena’s TF-Mobility [TFMO04b]. VPN based 
roaming is used in Swiss higher education. 
2.2. Application Access  
Accessing cross-organisational applications means using an 
application level service provided by a Service Provider 
situated somewhere in the Internet. Typically, applications for 
a large user base are provided on the web, or may have a web 
front end for them (such as videoconferencing). Thus, 
application level access technologies, known as federating 
softwaresii, are mostly designed for the web, Kerberos being 
the most well known exception.  
Unlike network access, federating softwares do not have 
widely deployed protocols on top of which to run. There are 
implementations utilising web redirects, embedding tickets in 
the URL fragments, hidden web forms and cookies, but no 
single standard has emerged. Most prominent technologies, 
such as SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language), are 
built on XML and SOAP.  
A group of organisations co-operating to administer user 
access to cross-organisational services is called a federation 
[TFAA04], which consists both of Identity Providers and 
Service Providers. To put the co-operation into practice, the 
federation decides to use some federating software (or 
develops one of its own). 
In academic community, federating software and federations 
using them are typically aimed at protecting library and e-
learning services. The United Kingdom has had the Athens 
federation [ATHE04] running for years. In Spain and 
Norway, the national research and education networks have 
developed the PAPI [PAPI04] and FEIDE [FEID04] systems, 
respectively. In the Netherlands, Surfnet is promoting A-
select [ASEL04] also for cross-organisational transactions. 
                                                          
ii From telecommunications perspective, a federating software 
is a protocol which both the Identity and Service Provider 
have implemented. From a service developer’s point of view, 
it is a middleware service that provides user authentication 
and authorisation service to the application. 
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There are, however, some technologies that have acquired 
international use. Shibboleth [SHIB04], the federating 
software by Internet2, is being used or piloted in the 
academic world in the United States, Canada, Australia, 
Switzerland, Finland and the United Kingdom. Outside 
academic communities, there are commercial organisations 
developing their federating software, such as Liberty 
[LIBE04] and WS Federation [WSFE03]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Cross-organisational application access. 
Although varying implementations are available, a typical 
federating software architecture is depicted in Figure 2. The 
user wants to access a web service outside her home 
organisation (1. in the figure). At first, the user selects her 
Identity Provider to whose web server she is then redirected 
for authentication (2.). Having authenticated the user, the 
Identity Provider provides the user's attributes to the Service 
Provider (3.). Based on the attributes, the service decides if 
the user is authorised to use the service. 
Requirements for a federation are listed, for example, in 
[LIND04]. In addition to a federating software, a federation 
needs to agree on the syntax and the semantics of the 
attributes released, on a security infrastructure such as PKI 
for authenticity and confidentiality of the message exchange 
and on the arrangements to establish mutual trust between the 
organisations in the federation. As personal data is processed 
in the federation, attention should be paid to not 
compromising the user's privacy when releasing the 
attributes. For example, the EU directive on data protection 
[EC95] stipulates that only attributes relevant for the service 
may be released, and usually only with the user’s consent. 
3. Comparison of Network and Application 
Access 
Network and application level access have several things in 
common and some differences as well. In network access, the 
basic scene is that the user, while roaming outside her home 
organisation, wants to connect to the network. In application 
access, the user is perhaps physically in her home 
organisation, but wants to use services provided by some 
other organisation. However, nothing prevents a roaming user 
from accessing remote applications as well.iii 
Application access technologies typically pay a considerable 
amount of attention to releasing user attributes properly from 
the Identity Provider to the Service Provider. In a minimal 
setup, the only attribute released to the service could be, for 
example, some role information, such as "the user is a 
computer science student at the University of Helsinki", that 
is enough to let her use an article database licensed only for 
the computer science department. In that case, the identity of 
the user is hidden from the service, following the EU’s data 
protection directive. A sophisticated service, such as a service 
for applying as a visiting student to a course in a 
neighbouring university, probably needs to get a large set of 
attributes about the applicant and her background in her home 
organisation (for example: her name, mail address, phone 
number, target degree, study subject, major, number of credit 
units so far etc). Unlike application access technology, 
network access technologies are typically not designed for 
passing user attributes from the Identity Provider to the 
Service Provider. On the other hand, if the RADIUS 
hierarchy is used, the user's identity is, nevertheless, revealed 
to the Service Provider, because the user's Identity Provider 
needs to be derived from the username that is in the format of 
username@domainiv. 
Roles are user's attributes that describe her relationship to her 
home organisation. Role-based authorisation, studied, for 
example, by Sandhu et al [SAND96, SAND01], relies on the 
user's role on deciding what services are permitted for her. In 
a large organisation, such as a university with thousands of 
users, role-based authorisation is attractive, reducing the 
complexity of user administration tasks. 
Federating software with fine-tuned means for passing user's 
attributes to the Service Provider provides comprehensive 
means for role-based authorisation. Limiting access to a 
service (such as access to the network or to an article 
database licensed by a university library) to some smaller 
subgroup (such as staff and students of one university 
department) is easy and is up to the Service Provider. 
However, network access technologies, which have limited 
support for attribute release, leave authorisation actually to 
the Identity Provider. The Service Provider grants access, if 
the Identity Provider validates the user's credentials 
                                                          
iii In the case where the authorisation to an application is 
based on the client's IP address, it is worth noticing that VPN 
roaming solution is the only one in which the user gets an IP 
address from her Identity Provider's address space. In 
academic communities, databases licensed by libraries 
typically use authorisation based on the client's IP address. 
iv Tunnelled EAP, such as PEAP or EAP-TTLS, can, 
however, be used so that the username is passed in a tunnel to 
the Identity Provider. Outside the tunnel, only the user’s 
domain is visible to the Service Provider for relaying the 
authentication. 
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successfully. In fact, authorisation is implicit; the user is 
authorised to access the network if she has a user account in 
an Identity Provider.v 
4. Combining Network and Application Access 
Technologies 
Maintaining two overlapping infrastructures for network and 
application access is ineffective. A single infrastructure for 
cross-organisational user administration could serve both 
network and application level access control. Maintaining and 
supporting one infrastructure for both network and 
application access would save work and costs for both 
Identity Providers and Service Providers. The next part 
introduces a model on how roaming access to network can be 
implemented on top of Shibboleth federating software. The 
model and its benefits and downsides are then compared to 
the models in Chapter 2. 
4.1. Roaming Architecture on Shibboleth 
The architecture of roaming access to network on Shibboleth 
is depicted in Figure 3. Shibboleth is a web based protocol 
that uses browser redirects to pass the user to her Identity 
Provider for authentication. After a successful authentication, 
the Service Provider uses SOAP to retrieve the user's 
attributes from the Identity Provider. As this paper is not 
intended to be an in-depth-introduction to Shibboleth, readers 
are encouraged to refer to Shibboleth architecture [SHIB04c] 
for description of the protocol and Shibboleth distribution 
[SHIB04b] for its implementation and deployment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The architecture of roaming access to network on 
Shibboleth. 
                                                          
v TF-Mobility's requirements document [TFMO04c] states 
that roaming access should be available for all users 
authorised for Internet access in any home organisation, but 
visited organisations may want to have more fine-grain 
authorisation. 
The three Shibboleth servers: the Shibboleth origin, the 
Shibboleth target and the Where Are You From (WAYF) are 
run on web servers and maintained by the Identity Provider, 
the Service Provider and the federation, respectively. The 
Shibboleth origin is the Identity Provider's ordinary 
Shibboleth server and, from its perspective, network access is 
just another service for which it provides user authentication 
and attributes. The Shibboleth origin authenticates the user 
and communicates with the organisation's user database to 
supply the Shibboleth target with the user's attributes. The 
WAYF is the central server that is run by the federation and 
provides the user a simple drop-down list of all the Identity 
Providers in the federation. 
The actual "shibbolisation" of roaming access to network is 
done by integrating the Shibboleth target and the Network 
Access Controller, the component that prevents unauthorised 
roaming users from accessing the network. The Shibboleth 
target is the peer of the Shibboleth origin, retrieving attributes 
of the authenticated user using SAML and SOAP protocol. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The message exchange in roaming access to 
network on Shibboleth. 
Figure 4 describes the message exchange when a roaming 
user enters the docking network in a visited organisation. 
1. The user activates her client device, connects to the 
docking network (for example, by activating her WLAN 
card or by plugging in to an ethernet socket) and gets an 
IP address via DHCP. However, the Network Access 
Controller initially blocks all her traffic in and out of the 
docking network, except the traffic to the TCP port 443 
(SSL) of the WAYF and all the Shibboleth origin servers 
in the federation. 
2. The user launches her web browser. The Network Access 
Controller, which has a web server with Shibboleth 
target componentsvi in it, captures the user's initial HTTP 
                                                          
vi In its current Apache implementation, the Shibboleth target 
consists of an Apache module and a daemon process running 
in the same machine. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Visited organisation 
(Service Provider)
 
 
 
 
 
 
Home organisation 
(Identity Provider) 
Internet 
Docking 
network
Nw access controller
 (Shibboleth target) 
User database
Shibboleth origin 
WAYF 
1.  
2.  
3.  
4.  5.  
6.  
7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Visited organisation 
(Service Provider) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Home organisation 
(Identity Provider) 
Internet 
Docking 
network 
Nw access controller 
 (Shibboleth target) 
User database
Shibboleth origin 
WAYF 
request. As the web server's main page is protected by 
Shibboleth, the Shibboleth target is activated and first 
redirects the user to the WAYF. 
3. In the WAYF server the user selects her Identity 
Provider from a drop-down list. The WAYF server 
redirects the user to the Shibboleth origin server of her 
home organisation. 
4. The Shibboleth origin authenticates the user, for 
example, with a username and a password, which are 
provided to the origin by the user on a web form over 
HTTPS. The way the authentication takes place is up to 
the Identity Provider and the federation.  
5. After a successful authentication, the Shibboleth origin 
redirects the user's browser back to the Shibboleth target 
with a SAML assertion containing a Shibboleth handle. 
6. The Shibboleth target uses the handle to acquire the 
user's attributes from the Shibboleth origin. 
Communication takes place directly between the 
Shibboleth target and origin and uses SOAP and SAML. 
7. Based on the user's attributes, the Network Access 
Controller decides if the user is authorised to access the 
network. If access is granted, it changes the firewall rule 
so that the traffic can flow between the client and the 
network. 
Roaming access on Shibboleth does not have any specific 
needs for the client device. A web browser with support for 
SSL and HTTP redirect, a network interface card and DHCP 
client is sufficient. 
For the visited and the home organisation, roaming access on 
Shibboleth requires that they are part of a federation which 
has made necessary agreements for trust establishment, 
organised the WAYF server etc. In addition, the Identity 
Providers' Network Access Controllers have to know the IP 
addresses of the WAYF and the Shibboleth origins in the 
federation.vii 
4.2. Comparisons and Remarks 
The Shibboleth based roaming architecture and the three 
roaming architectures presented in Chapter 2 have some 
common characteristics and also differences, which are 
summarised in Table 1. 
Like the web redirection model, the Shibboleth model relies 
on capturing the user's HTTP connections in the Network 
Access Controller. To get access out of the docking network, 
the user has to open her web browser to initiate the 
authentication process. However, in Shibboleth, the user's 
web browser communicates directly on HTTPS with the 
                                                          
vii Here it is assumed that the Shibboleth origin authenticates 
the user by itself. If the Shibboleth origin redirects the user to 
a separate login server for authentication, its IP address has to 
be configured to the Network Access Controller as well. 
Identity Provider, whereas in the web redirection model the 
communication with the Identity Provider is done by the 
Network Access Controller on top of RADIUS. 
Like in VPN and 802.1X models, the connection for user 
authentication is an end-to-end connection between the client 
device and the Identity Provider and, thus, the user's 
password is never available in cleartext to the visited 
organisation or any other intermediary, making trust 
establishment easier. However, in 802.1X and web 
redirection models, the user's identity is usually revealed to 
the visited organisation, because the RADIUS hierarchy 
needs the domain part of the username to route the 
authentication request to the Identity Provider. In VPN and 
Shibboleth models, neither the user's identity nor the 
password need to be revealed to the visited organisation, thus 
preserving the user's privacy.viii 
Like the list of gateways in the VPN model, the Network 
Access Controller must have an extensive list of the Identity 
Providers’ Shibboleth origins and the WAYF's IP addresses 
to which unauthenticated traffic is allowed in the SSL port 
443. The hole in the firewall is required for letting the 
Shibboleth origin authenticate the user directly. However, 
once the authentication is done and the Network Access 
Controller allows the user to access the network, the traffic 
                                                          
viii However, to investigate abuse, logs in the Shibboleth 
origin and target can be merged to reveal user identity. 
Table 1. Comparison of Shibboleth and the three roaming 
architectures.  
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Uses HTTP connection capture  X  X 
Uses RADIUS proxy hierarchy X X   
End-to-end security for credentials, 
e.g., user passwords 
X  X X 
User identity not revealed to the 
visited network 
(x)  X X 
The Network Access Controller 
has to know the Identity Providers' 
IP addresses (or use CASG) 
  X X 
All traffic routed through the 
Identity Provider 
  X  
Vulnerable to MAC address 
spoofing 
 X  X 
(x): If tunnelled EAP is used, user identity need not be 
revealed to the visited network. 
need not be routed through any gateway in the Identity 
Provider. On the other hand, the CASG proposed for the 
VPN model can be applied for Shibboleth as well.  
Like the web redirection model, the Shibboleth model is 
vulnerable to a MAC address spoofing attack. Neither of the 
two models provides a link layer traffic encryption or an 
integrity check, making it possible for an attacker to hijack 
the MAC and IP address of a legitimate user, for example, 
right after she has left the wireless network. The attack is 
made by reconfiguring the victim's MAC address to the 
attacker's client device, requiring skills and special tools from 
the attacker [TFMO04, p. 20].  
Shibboleth uses WAYF for deducing the user's home 
organisation. In 802.1X and web redirection, the RADIUS 
protocol and the hierarchy of RADIUS proxies carry out the 
task; the user's home organisation is derived from the user's 
username that is in the format of username@domain. 
A practical remark is, however, that usually different people 
are responsible for the network and the applications in an 
organisation. The network people are not necessarily familiar 
with application level authentication and authorisation 
technology. For the network people, it may be easier to 
deploy a technology, such as RADIUS or VPN, that they are 
already familiar with. 
4.3. Benefits and Downsides 
A benefit of the Shibboleth model is that it separates the 
authentication and the authorisation from each other. 
Authentication is always done by the Identity Provider, and 
the Service Provider is not involved in it. What the Service 
Provider has to do to let authentication happen is just to let 
the user communicate with her home organisation on SSL. 
Authorisation, in turn, is solely up to the Service Provider, 
based on the roles and other attributes released by the Identity 
Provider. The Service Provider can, for example, decide to 
prioritise the users with role "staff" in places where there is 
only a limited amount of network capacity available.  
Another benefit of Shibboleth is that it unifies the network 
and application level access architectures, considering 
network access as just another shibbolised service. 
Maintenance and support for overlapping architectures 
becomes unnecessary. Furthermore, the user is able to enjoy a 
single sign-on, because the authentication takes place when 
she accesses the network, and she then has an existing session 
with her Identity Provider's Shibboleth origin. The existing 
session makes reauthentication unnecessary if the user later 
accesses another shibbolised service.  
A downside of the Shibboleth model is that the technology is 
not as widely known and deployed as the other models 
utilising protocols that have been used for years. Besides 
Shibboleth, there are also other application level access 
technologies being used and developed, such as Liberty, 
whose interoperability may require extra effort. As a 
technology for fine-grained application level access, 
Shibboleth also needs a more complex federation with related 
trust fabrics underneath. 
Another downside of Shibboleth is the scalability and 
security issue raised by the maintenance of the extensive list 
of Shibboleth origins in the federation. It can be, however, 
partially overcome with CASG. 
5. Practical Experiments 
To get practical experience, the Shibboleth based roaming 
architecture has been implemented and piloting started in the 
University of Helsinki. The shibbolised Network Access 
Controller was connected to the HAKA pilot federation, the 
federation of Finnish higher education that uses Shibboleth as 
the federating software. However, there were no 
modifications to Shibboleth implementation as the federation 
in use is just a configuration issue for the Shibboleth target. 
The architecture should be easily adapted to other Shibboleth 
federations as well. 
5.1. Background Information of the University of 
Helsinki 
The University of Helsinki is the largest university in 
Finland, with 39 000 users. The university has four campuses 
in Helsinki, the main one located in the centre of the city. 
There are also 6 other universities and several polytechnics in 
Helsinki.  
HUPnet, Helsinki University Public network, has been 
available for the staff and the students of the University of 
Helsinki since 2001. Currently, HUPnet covers about a third 
of the university buildings in Helsinki, and the coverage is 
increasing as more base stations are installed. HUPnet also 
has ethernet sockets available for wired use. On an average 
day, there are about 50 different users connecting to HUPnet. 
Situated in the heart of Helsinki, the university has been 
deliberate to open HUPnet for roaming users. There have 
been concerns that there would be considerably more 
roaming users coming in than going out, causing the cost to 
accumulate to the university. However, the university could 
open HUPnet to some limited user group, for example, to the 
staff and the faculties of other universities. Allowing access 
for staff and denying it from students requires role based 
authorisation, which is not supported by the web redirection 
roaming model. As the University of Helsinki has been active 
on Shibboleth deployment, it has now been integrated to 
roaming access as well. 
5.2. Implementation 
In the implementation, the Network Access Controller runs in 
a Debian Linux machine (Figure 5). When a user enters the 
docking network, a DHCP server gives her an IP address that 
belongs to a virtual LAN that the Network Access Controller 
separates from the Internet. Initially, the Iptables 
configuration of the Network Access Controller is configured 
to block all traffic from the user's IP address to the Internet, 
except the TCP traffic in port 443 to the Shibboleth origins in 
the federation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The shibbolised network access controller of 
HUPnet. 
There are Shibboleth target components installed in an 
Apache web server that runs on the Network Access 
Controller. When the user opens her web browser, the 
Network Access Controller captures the web browser's initial 
HTTP request and provides the initial front page of HUPnet 
as the HTTP response. The user is asked if she is a local user 
(and to be authenticated against the local user database of the 
University of Helsinki) or a user from another university (and 
to be authenticated on Shibboleth).  
To initiate Shibboleth authentication, the user enters a 
directory in the web server that is protected by Shibboleth in 
the web server configuration. The Shibboleth authentication 
and attribute exchange take place, and if the user has 
attributes required in the server authorisation configuration 
(that is, eduPersonAffiliation value ‘employee’), she is 
allowed to run a Perl script in the directory. The Perl script 
calls a daemon process running in the same machine and 
provides it with the IP address of the user. The daemon 
process, running with root privileges, makes necessary 
modifications to the Iptables configuration file of the 
Network Access Controller in order to let the user access the 
Internet. 
In HUPnet, user authentication is valid for two hours at a 
time, after which it has to be renewed. A user can also initiate 
an explicit logout from HUPnet by calling another CGI script 
that restores the Iptables configuration.  
The university of Helsinki is aware of the architecture's 
vulnerability to the MAC address spoofing attack and has 
accepted the risk of a successful attack, because all the 
attacker gains is just unauthorised access to the Internet. If 
Internet access is what the attacker wants, it can be obtained 
freely from the many public Internet "hotspots" at the 
university and there is little need to hack the university’s 
wireless network. On the other hand, as the attack requires 
special skills and tools, it is expected that the present 
architecture is sufficient to prevent ordinary users from 
getting unauthorised access, and the small number of 
attackers skilled enough is tolerable.  
However, if MAC address spoofing becomes a problem, a 
sketch has been made of an improvement of making the web 
browser in the client device poll the Network Access 
Controller regularly on SSL. As the communication on SSL 
relies on a shared secret between the web browser and the 
server, the attacker replacing a client device in the docking 
network can be recognised and detached from the network. A 
downside of the improved architecture is that a temporary 
interference in the wireless network may block the polling 
and detach the user from the network.  
5.3. Current Status and Future Plans 
The shibbolised HUPnet has been launched for pilot use. 
Staff and faculty members are able to roam at the University 
of Helsinki if their home organisation belongs to the HAKA 
pilot federation. The source code of HUPnet has been made 
public and available for other institutions and federations for 
free as open source in SourceForge [HUPN04]. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper presented an architecture that turns network access 
into just another service that can be used across 
organisational boundaries like application level services in a 
federation. Piloting the implementation that utilises 
Shibboleth federating software has started. 
Combining network and application level access technologies 
reduces overlapping infrastructure and brings application 
level features, such as role-based authorisation and single 
sign-on, available also for network access. As a downside, 
application level access technologies are not yet so mature as 
network level access technologies. The architecture has to 
allow an unauthenticated user’s traffic to a small set of hosts 
in the Internet, making the maintenance of the service more 
difficult.  
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